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论文编号：	9997
作者编号：	2220160586
上传时间：	2018/6/6 16:03:58
中文题目：	新三板公司控制权争夺及配置研究
英文题目：	Research on Contest and Allocation of Corporate Control in NEEQ-listed Companies – A Case Study of Y Company
指导老师：	吴德胜
中文关键字：	新三板；控制权；控制权争夺；创始人
英文关键字：	NEEQ-listed Companies；control power scramble；founder
中文摘要：	我国的资本市场发展，在十八大以后得到稳步推进。市场体系不断完善，基础制度建设日益加强，企业的融资规模逐渐增长，资本为实体经济服务的功能得到进一步的提升。作为我国多层次资本市场的重要组成部分,全国中小企业股份转让系统（俗称“新三板”），经过几年的发展已日趋成熟。由于新三板的进入门槛低、挂牌周期短、操作方便等原因，吸引了大量的中小企业前往挂牌。企业在新三板挂牌，是自我梳理、自我曝露、自我完善的过程。挂牌后，企业由原来无拘无束、蒙头发展的状态，转为万众注目、受人监督的公众公司，成为资本市场的弄潮儿。在这个转型的过程中，由于企业的创始人大多数是做实业出身，没有资本市场的运作经验，没有风险防范意识，使得公司面临着巨大的公司治理风险。公司在挂牌前以及挂牌后，都有可能有各种类型的资本汇入，资本的来临会给公司注入新鲜血液，同时，也不可避免的稀释创始人的股权（份）。但稀释，不该等于失控。鉴于我国现阶段信用体系尚不成熟的情况下，创始人与投资人、职业经理人之间的博弈变得日趋复杂。公司创始人在享受以股权（份）换资本所带来的诸多好处的同时，其对企业的控制权保持也正变得越来越棘手。如何在引入资本和职业经理人的同时，保持公司控制权的稳定，防止公司控制权“失控”，这是新三板公司创始人必须解决的重要问题。本文依据控制权理论对对我国新三板公司控制权进行了研究分析。首先，本文对新三板的发展及新三板公司治理状况进行了分析；其次，本文借南菱汽车、中标科技等公司的典型案例，对新三板公司发生控制权争夺战的案例进行了分析；最后，本文以Y公司为例，结合现行具有中国特色的法律体系和法治环境，提出了设置控股权的安全边际、掌握董事会控制权，放弃累积投票制、法定代表人由创始人担任，并且控制公章、设立有限合伙企业等控制权配置方案设计，以便达到能防止新三板公司陷入内、外部争夺公司控制权的目的，同时，也为我国立法机关在修改、完善《公司法》时，提供有益的参考建议。
英文摘要：	The development of China's capital market has been steadily advancing after 18. The market system has been perfected, the foundation system construction is increasing, the enterprise's financing scale is increasing gradually, and the function of capital serving the real economy has been further promoted. As an important part of China's multi-level capital market, National Equities Exchange and Quotations (commonly known as “new three board market”), after several years of development has become increasingly mature. As a result of the new Sanbanxi entry threshold low, the listing cycle short, easy to operate and other reasons, attracted a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises to go to the listing. Enterprises in the new Sanbanxi listing, is the self-grooming, self-exposure, self-improvement process. After the listing, the enterprise from the original unrestrained, masked the development of the State, into the limelight, subject to supervision of the public companies, become the market-goers. In this process of transformation, because most of the founders of the enterprise is to do industrial origin, there is no experience in the capital market, no risk prevention awareness, so that the company is facing huge corporate governance risks. Companies before and after listing, there may be various types of capital inflows, the advent of capital will inject fresh blood to the company, but also inevitably diluted the founder's Equity (part). But dilution should not be equal to run away. The game between founders and investors and professional managers is becoming more and more complicated, given the immature credit system in our country at present. While the company's founders enjoy many of the benefits of exchanging equity for capital, their control over the company is becoming increasingly tricky. Based on the theory of control right, this thesis studies and analyzes the control rights of our new three Board companies. First, this thesis analyzes the development of the new three board and the governance of the new three board company. Secondly, this thesis analyzes the case of the control power battle of the new three board company by the typical cases of Nanling automobile and China bid science and technology. Finally, this thesis takes the Y company as an example and combines the existing laws with Chinese characteristics. The system and the environment of the rule of law put forward the design of the control right allocation scheme, such as the security margin of setting holding power, the control of the board of directors, the abandonment of the cumulative voting system, the establishment of the legal representative by the founder, the control of the public seal and the establishment of a limited partnership. hoping to prevent the new Sanbanxi company from falling into the inner and The objective of the external competition for the control of the company, at the same time, for our legislature in revising and perfecting the "Company law", provide useful reference suggestions.
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