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论文编号：	9986
作者编号：	2120162697
上传时间：	2018/6/6 15:13:13
中文题目：	以现金支付的并购中盈余管理与并购市场反应研究——以制造业上市公司为例
英文题目：	Research on Earnings Management and M & A Market Reaction in Cash Payment M & A ——Taking manufacturing listed companies as an example
指导老师：	陆宇建
中文关键字：	企业并购；现金支付；盈余管理；市场反应
英文关键字：	Mergers and acquisitions; cash payment; earnings management; market reactions
中文摘要：	随着股权分置改革等一系列政策的推进实施，并购已成为我国资本市场上日益活跃的一项经济活动。由于并购交易复杂多变，其引发的会计信息质量问题逐渐受到利益相关各方的关注，其中，盈余水平以其可操纵性强、对投资者引导程度高等特点，成为企业内外各方的关注焦点。基于当前我国的资本市场环境，企业能否透过盈余管理行为影响其在并购活动的短期绩效，值得研究和探讨。对此，作者梳理相关领域的重要文献后发现，对于并购活动中的被收购方相关研究较多，仅有的对收购企业的研究重点多集中于以股份作为支付方式的并购活动，而对于现金支付并购中的盈余管理行为并没有较为统一的研究结论。为此，本文尝试性地提出并试图解决以下几点问题：作为并购活动的主导一方，收购公司是否会进行盈余管理？如果是，应计与真实两种盈余管理方式的方向是怎样的？企业能否通过盈余操纵在并购活动中得到理想的市场反应？ 本文选择了上市公司中最具代表性且企业数量最高的制造业，对现金支付形式并购进行研究。首先，对应计和真实活动盈余管理水平进行度量；其次，以并购首次公告日期作为事件时点，将并购公司和可比公司在并购发生前的盈余管理结果进行对比统计分析；再次，将并购行为作为被解释变量，研究盈余管理的影响因素；最后，将并购前主并方盈余管理作为一项解释变量，探究盈余管理对并购事件发生时市场反应的影响，以及公司内外部特征对该影响产生的作用。得出如下结论：（1）现金支付并购中，并购企业在并购之前存在运用真实盈余管理负向调节盈余的现象，企业内部较高的股权制衡度可以降低其调节程度；此外，并购企业在并购之前存在运用应计盈余管理正向调节盈余的现象，企业内部较高的股权制衡度和高质量的外部审计可以降低其调节程度。（2）总体上，收购企业的两种盈余管理行为对并购发生窗口期的市场反应有积极影响。对于国有控股公司以及股权制衡度较低的公司，投资者能够相对有效地识别盈余管理行为。
英文摘要：	With the implementation of a series of policies such as the non-tradable shares structure reform, M & A has become an increasingly active economic activity in China's capital market. Due to the complex and ever-changing M&A transactions, the quality of accounting information that has been triggered has gradually become of concern to stakeholders. Especially, the level of surplus has become the focus of attention of all parties inside and outside the enterprise due to its strong maneuverability and high degree of guidance to investors. Based on China's current capital market environment, whether companies can influence their short-term performance in mergers and acquisitions through earnings management practices is worth studying and exploring. In this regard, the authors reviewed important documents in related fields and found that there are many researches on the acquiree in mergers and acquisitions, and the only research related to acquisition companies focuses on mergers and acquisitions that use shares as a payment method. There is no unified research conclusion about the earnings management behavior in mergers and acquisitions that use cash as a payment method. For this reason, this dissertation tentatively proposes and tries to solve the following problems. As the leading party to the M&A activity, will the acquisition company perform earnings management? If so, what are the directions of the two earnings management methods for accruals and real activities? Can companies get an ideal market response through this surplus manipulation in M&A activities? This dissertation selects manufacturing company as the most representative industry in listed companies and focuses on research on mergers and acquisitions in the form of cash payments. First of all, measure the level of accrual and real activity earnings management. Secondly, taking the date of the first announcement of merger and acquisition as the event time point, compare the statistical results of the earnings management results of the acquisition company and the comparable company before the M&A activities. Next, take M&A behavior as an explanatory variable to study the influencing factors of earnings management. Finally, take earnings management of M&A companies before M&A as an explanatory variable to explore the impact of earnings management on the market reaction at the time of M&A events, and the effect of internal and external characteristics of the company on this impact. The conclusions are as follows. In mergers and acquisitions in form of cash payments, acquisition companies have a negative adjustment of earnings using real earnings management prior to M&A activities. Higher internal ownership limits can reduce the level of adjustment. On the other hand, acquisition companies have a positive adjustment of earnings using accrual management prior to M&A activities. Higher internal ownership and high quality external audit can reduce the degree of adjustment. In general, the two kinds of earnings management behaviors of acquisition company have a positive impact on the market reaction of M&A window period. For state-owned companies and companies with lower degree of internal ownership dispersion, investors can more effectively identify earnings management behavior.
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