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论文编号：	997
作者编号：	2120071898
上传时间：	2009/5/25 21:20:52
中文题目：	零售商主导型供应链期权合同及其
英文题目：	Researches on Option Contracts
指导老师：	严建援 教授
中文关键字：	零售商主导型供应链 期权合同
英文关键字：	Retailer-led supply chain; Opt
中文摘要：	近年来，随着顾客逐渐成为市场的中心，零售商作为供应链中最接近顾客的一环开始显现出力量，强大的零售商在供需双方的互动博弈中逐渐占了上风，于是出现了零售商主导型供应链。在零售商主导型供应链中，零售商拥有强大的销售网络并控制着供应链，因此他们能够影响供应商的生产和配送决策。 供应链中的一个难题就是不容易实现供应链协调，而由于上下游企业力量不平等经常会引发利润分配争端。解决问题的一个有效办法就是采用新的机制，而不是一般的远期合同，来协调整个供应链，扩大整个市场的份额。由于双边际效应，一般的远期合同不能协调供应链。而采用期权合同时，处于主导地位的零售商可以激励供应商多生产产品，并协调其生产数量。本文的目的是研究零售商如何利用期权合同来协调供应链，同时增加决策双方的利润。首先探讨了零售商主导型供应链下的期权合同，然后分析了供应链协调和帕累托改进问题，研究了期权合同参数如何影响其它变量，比如零售商的初始订货量及决策双方的期望利润，最终得出了渠道协调及帕累托改进的条件。此外，本文还分析了合同参数确定条件下的供应商生产能力上限对双方最优利润的影响。 论文采用数学模型分析和数值算例分析对零售商主导型供应链下的期权合同进行分析，证明了期权合同不仅可以使零售商协调供应商的生产数量并更好地应对市场需求的不确定性，而且可以提高零售商与供应商各自的利润，为期权合同的参数确定提供了科学的依据，具有一定的理论意义和现实指导意义。 关键词：零售商主导型供应链 期权合同 供应链协调 帕累托改进
英文摘要：	In recent years, customers have become the core of the market, while retailers who are closest to final consumers in a supply chain begin to show their power. Retailing giants begin to dominate the supply chain, thus retailer-led supply chain appears. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who possesses strong sales networks and thus controls the channels, correspondingly is able to affect supplier’s production and delivery decisions. One knot problem in the supply chain is that channel coordination is hard to reach and thus the imbalanced power often triggers serious conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. One effective way to eradicate the problem is to let manufacturers and retailers cooperate together to find some new mechanisms out of traditional forward contract mechanism to coordinate the channel, enlarging the whole market. Due to double marginalization, traditional forward contracts fail to coordinate the channel. The purpose of this thesis is to study how the retailer can utilize an option contract to coordinate the channel and in the meanwhile increase each side’s profit. In this thesis, we present an option contract model to analyze the coordination and Pareto improvement problems in a retailer-led supply chain in which the powerful retailer takes the initiative to coordinate the manufacture’s production quantity. We study how option contract parameters affect other variables like the retailer’s rational initial order and each party’s expected profit and finally find the conditions of channel coordination and Pareto improvement. We also study the effect of supplier’s production capacity on each party’s optimal profit. Through studying the option contract model in a retailer-led supply chain with mathematical analysis and numerical example, we prove that option contract not only coordinates the suppliers’ production so that the dominant retailer can better deal with an uncertain market but also raises the profit of every party. This thesis provides a scientific basis for option contract pricing and gets some theoretical and practical guiding significance. Keywords：Retailer-led supply chain Option contract Supply chain coordination Pareto improvement
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