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论文编号：	9967
作者编号：	2120162768
上传时间：	2018/6/6 13:29:51
中文题目：	董事会非正式层级与非效率投资行为关系研究
英文题目：	Research on the Relationship between Informal Hierarchies of Board of Directors and Inefficient Investment Behavior
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	董事会非正式层级；非效率投资；国有企业
英文关键字：	Board informal hierarchy;inefficient investment;state-owned enterprises
中文摘要：	投资是公司的一项重要决策活动，与公司未来能否迅速健康成长息息相关。然而由于代理问题、经理对个人利益的追逐等，公司往往会存在非效率投资，即投资过度或投资不足。董事会作为公司的重要决策机构，能否对投资项目进行正确的评价和决策，对公司投资是否能够有效进行有着不可替代的影响。关于董事会对投资决策行为的影响的研究，研究学者大部分集中在董事会特征（如独立性、薪酬激励等）对投资的影响，对于董事会内部成员之间基于社会资本形成的无形的具有等级之分的关系对决策的影响的研究却比较少，对董事会非正式层级与公司投资效率二者关系的研究就更是寥寥无几。在已有的对二者关系展开的研究中，研究结论也存在一定的差异。对于国有企业中非正式层级与投资效率关系的研究国内尚未进行过这方面的研究，只是有极个别学者对国有企业非正式层级与投资规模之间的关系进行过实证研究。基于这样的背景，本文进行了如下研究。本文以2014-2016年的全部A股上市公司作为研究样本，对非正式层级和非效率投资分别进行了测量与计算，然后对非正式层级与非效率投资关系进行了实证研究。接着，考虑到国有企业所有者主体特殊和政治背景的存在，本文又专门以国有企业为样本，对非正式层级与非效率投资行为的关系进行了实证研究。具体实证研究结论如下：（1）在全样本回归中，董事会非正式层级强度与非效率投资行为之间呈显著的正向相关关系，就非效率投资的具体形式而言，董事会非正式层级强度与投资不足之间存在正相关关系，与投资过度没有明显相关性；（2）在国有企业中，董事会非正式层级强度与非效率投资之间的显著正相关关系会进一步增强，具体来说，与全样本不同，与投资过度呈显著正相关关系，与投资不足关系不显著。这些结论对于完善董事会决策和推动国有企业改革具有重要的启示意义。同时，本文对于丰富董事会非正式层级的相关研究具有一定的贡献作用，也为非效率投资的研究提供了新的研究视角。
英文摘要：	Investment is an important decision-making activity in the company, which is closely related to whether the company can grow rapidly and healthily in the future. However, due to agency problems, managers' pursuit of personal interests, etc., companies often have inefficient investments, that is, excessive investment or insufficient investment. As an important decision-making body of the company, whether the board of directors can correctly evaluate and make decisions on investment projects has an irreplaceable impact on whether the company's investment can be effectively carried out.Regarding the research on the influence of the board of directors on investment decisions, most of the research scholars focus on the influence of board characteristics (eg, independence, compensation incentives, etc.) on investment decisions.However, there are relatively few studies on the effect of informal hierarchy of the board of directors on decision making. There is even less research on the relationship between informal hierarchies and corporate investment efficiency. In the existing research on the relationship between the two, there are also some differences in the research conclusions. Research on the relationship between informal hierarchies and investment efficiency in state-owned enterprises has not been conducted in this respect. Only a few scholars have conducted empirical research on the relationship between the informal hierarchies and the scale of investment in state-owned enterprises. Based on this background, this paper conducts the following research. This article takes all A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2016 as research samples, measures and calculates the informal hierarchies and inefficient investments, and then conducts an empirical study on the relationship between informal hierarchies and inefficient investments. Then, taking into account the special owners of state-owned enterprises and political background, this paper also specifically uses state-owned enterprises as a sample to empirically study the relationship between informal hierarchies and inefficient investment behaviors. The specific empirical findings are as follows: (1) In the full sample regression, there is a significant positive correlation between the informal hierarchy of the board of directors and the non-efficiency investment behavior. In terms of the specific forms of non-efficiency investment, there is a relationship between the informal hierarchy of the board of directors and the investment shortage. Positive correlations are not significantly related to overinvestment; (2) In the state-owned enterprises, the significant positive correlation between informal hierarchy of the board of directors and the non-efficiency investment will be further strengthened. Specifically, unlike the entire sample, there is a significant positive correlation with overinvestment and an underinvestment relationship not obvious. These conclusions are of great significance for improving the decision-making of the board of directors and promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, this paper contributes to enriching the relevant research of the informal hierarchy of the board of directors and provides a new research perspective for the research of inefficient investment.
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