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论文编号：	9966
作者编号：	2120162757
上传时间：	2018/6/6 13:23:49
中文题目：	风险投资、CEO权力对被投企业高管团队稳定性的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Venture Capital and CEO Power on the Stability of Top Management Teams of Funded Firms
指导老师：	牛芳
中文关键字：	风险投资；CEO权力；被投企业；高管团队稳定性
英文关键字：	Venture Capital; CEO Power; Funded Firm; Stability of Top Management Team
中文摘要：	近年来，随着一波波创业与创新浪潮的兴起，我国的风险投资（VC）处于迅速发展阶段，一定程度上缓解了中小型创业公司融资难的问题，并对创业公司的发展起着一定的促进作用。风险投资的进入，不仅为被投企业带来了发展的资金和管理上的支持，还使得被投公司内部原本的权力分布产生了变化，产生了风险投资方与企业创始团队权力抗衡的局面。 对于创业企业而言，高管团队的稳定和更新是其成长过程中的关键问题。高管团队既要保持稳定性，同时也需要一定程度的更新，用外部高素质的管理者替代能力缺乏的创业元老。高管团队的稳定和更新，不完全是理性决策的结果，而较多的时候表现为由CEO个人的意志、情感和关系主导，偏向于庇护和保留创业元老。与CEO不同，风险投资作为一种有效的外部力量，能够在一定程度上约束CEO权力，更有效地更新高管团队。 由于风险投资者和创业公司的创始团队之间存在信息不对称，风险投资者往往会通过任命投资方人员进入高管团队的方式对创业公司的经营管理进行监管甚至掌握企业的控制权。这种高管团队中席位的更替便是风险投资者与创始团队之间权力对抗产生的结果。因此，本研究旨在探究风险投资与CEO权力对被投公司高管团队稳定性的影响。 本研究首先对风险投资与被投企业的关系、高管团队权力、高管团队离职三方面的经典理论与相关研究进行了梳理，并在此基础上通过理论推导提出了围绕着风险投资、CEO权力与高管团队稳定性之间关系的几个假设。论文主要采用实证研究的方法，以183家在中国创业板上市的公司为研究样本，利用这些上市公司公开发布的招股说明书与年报等二手数据，对反应风险投资权力、CEO权力及高管团队稳定性的关键数据进行编码、摘取与汇总，利用SPSS统计软件对数据进行相关性分析与回归分析。 通过实证分析，论文得出了以下主要结论：在企业IPO前，风险投资权力与CEO权力是影响被投企业高管团队稳定性的重要因素，且二者在企业中产生了交互作用；而在企业IPO后，企业受到证监会和社会公众的监管，并且其权力分布和治理结构变得更加复杂，风险投资与CEO权力对高管团队稳定的影响在很大程度上被削弱。 在企业IPO前，风险投资与CEO权力对高管团队稳定性的影响具体体现在：首先，风险投资的权力集中于其在被投企业董事会中的席位数量，风险投资的董事会席位越多，被投企业高管团队的更新程度越高；其次，CEO权力影响了高管团队中创始团队的保留程度，CEO的正式与非正式权力越大，企业在IPO时高管团队中创始团队人员比例越高；再次，风险投资对CEO权力与创始团队保留的关系存在调节作用，在没有风险投资的企业，CEO权力中所有权权力和声誉权力起到主导作用，而在有风险投资的企业，所有权权力和声誉权力的影响都会下降，而正式的结构性权力的作用会凸显出来，风险投资在被投企业中起到了优化权力分布和完善治理结构的作用。
英文摘要：	In recent years, with the rise of entrepreneurship and innovation practice, venture capital industry in China has entered in a rapid developing stage. VC has alleviated the difficulty of financing for small and medium-sized start-up firms, and it has played an active role in the development of these firms. The entry of venture capital not only brings development fund and management support to the funded firms, but also changes the original power distribution within the firms, creating a situation in which the venture capitalists and the founding team of the company compete against each other. For start-up companies, the stability and renewal of the top management team are key issues in their growing process. It is necessary to maintain the stability of top management team while also requires a certain degree of renewal, replacing founders who lack ability with external qualified managers. The stability and renewal of the top management team are not entirely results of rational decision-making, but more often they are dominated by the CEO's personal will, emotions and relationships, tending to shelter and retain the founders. Unlike the CEOs, venture capital is an effective external force that can constrain the power of the CEO to a certain extent and update the top management team more effectively. Because of the information asymmetry between venture capitalists and the founding team of the start-up company, VC always appoint personnel into the top management team to supervise, manage or even control the funded firm. This kind of change in seats in the top management team is the result of the power confrontation between the venture capitalists and the founding team. Therefore, this study aims to explore the impact of venture capital and CEO power on the stability of the top management team of the funded firms. This study has firstly reviewed the classic theories and related researches on the relationship between venture capital and funded firms, the power of top management team, and the top management team turnover. Based on these theories and through theoretical derivation, it has proposed several assumptions about VC power, CEO power and the stability of the top management team. The paper mainly adopts empirical research method, takes 183 companies listed on China's GEM as research samples. Using second-hand data such as publicly released prospectus and annual report of listed companies, firstly code, pick and combine the data reflecting key variables, and then conduct correlation and regression analysis by SPSS software. Through empirical analysis, the paper concludes the following main conclusions: Before the IPO of a firm, the VC power and CEO power are important factors that affect the stability of top management team of the funded firm, and these two factors interact in the firm. After the IPO, the firm is supervised by public and China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the power distribution and governance structure of the firm have become more complex, therefore the impact of VC power and CEO power on the stability of top management team has been greatly reduced. The impact of venture capital and CEO power on the stability of top management team is shown in the following aspects. Firstly, the power of venture capital is concentrated in the number of seats in the board of directors of the funded firm. The more seats in the board, the higher degree of renewal in the top management team of funded firm. Secondly, CEO power affects the degree of retention of founding team within the top management team. The greater the formal and informal power of CEO, the higher the proportion of founding team members in the top management team before IPO. Thirdly, VC has a moderating effect on the relationship between CEO power and the retention of the founding team. In companies without venture capital, the power of ownership and reputation in the CEO power play a leading role, while in VC funded firms, the influence of the power of ownership and reputation will decline, and the role of formal structural power will be highlighted. Venture capital plays a role in optimizing the power distribution and improving the governance structure in the funded firms.
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