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论文编号：	988
作者编号：	2220070582
上传时间：	2009/6/8 9:39:01
中文题目：	基于EVA的绩效奖金制度研究 t
英文题目：	The research of EVA based perf
指导老师：	陆宇建
中文关键字：	EVA;绩效奖金;激励制度><
英文关键字：	EVA;Performance and incentive
中文摘要：	近些年，对绩效奖金激励制度的研究越来越引起企业的关注。随着人力资本在企业中发挥的作用越来越重要，企业的所有者越来越重视对管理人员及全体员工的激励机制设计，特别是基于绩效的奖金激励制度的设计。为了更好地使绩效奖金制度在激励过程中起积极作用，理论界和实务界人士开展了大量的研究和应用实践活动，但始终收效甚微，代理人操纵企业经营，短期化经营等行为仍时有发生，不利于企业健康发展。从各种绩效奖金激励制度设立的目的和依据来看，基本核心是为满足企业利润最大化目标服务的，它忽略了所有者和代理人的利益。因此，建立一个有效的绩效奖金制度，要统筹考虑所有者和代理人的利益，是十分必要的。 本文主要围绕如何建立一个公平、有效的绩效奖金制度，以激励代理人行为向着所有者利益最大化目标迈进展开论述。公平、有效的绩效奖金制度必定建立在公平、真实的业绩评价及相关激励机制基础之上，为此，本文先阐述了EVA绩效奖金制度建立所需的委托代理理论、人力资本理论、激励理论和EVA评价理论等基础知识，然后分析我国企业绩效奖金制度的现状和存在的问题。针对这些问题，提出在我国企业基于EVA的绩效奖金制度设计时，应遵守的原则，EVA绩效奖金模型中主要参数的确定方法，EVA的计算及EVA绩效奖金制度的局限性。通过典型案例分析，进一步说明在实践中如何应用EVA绩效奖金制度。论文认为，建立在所有者与代理人利益一致目标基础上的EVA绩效奖金制度可以很好地激励代理人，避免代理人进行业绩操纵或短期化经营等行为。 基于对公平及有效性的特别关注，论文采用劳动分配率作为EVA绩效奖金分配的客观依据，避免了所有者对代理人进行奖金分配的主观判断，为企业在进行绩效奖金分配时提供了一种新思路。最后，对建立基于EVA的绩效奖金制度，有针对性地提出了若干解决方案。
英文摘要：	Recent years, the research of performance and incentive pay system is attracting more and more people’s care. With development of the capital of human resource is more and more important in enterprise, the owners of enterprise think much of incentive systems for their managers and stuffs, especially take more intensions to the design of performance and incentive pay. People have done lots of research and take exercises at academic and applied filed, in order to make the performance and incentive pay system is more work. But the result is not satisfying, the actions that agents manipulate enterprise’s performance or the short dated management are happened occasionally, it goes against enterprise’s development. We can see different performance and incentive pay systems from their aim and base, the core serves to maximize profit of the enterprise, which neglect common advantages between owner and agents. So thinking it over is necessary for building a performance and incentive pay system. The main viewpoint is how to build a faire, efficient performance and incentive pay system, which can encourage agents to do good things for the owner and maximize profit of the enterprise’ owner. The author of paper think the system must be build on faire and efficient appraisable performance and correlative prompting, so the paper expatiate principle-agent theory, capital of human resource theory, incentive theory, EVA theory, which are fundaments to build EVA performance and incentive pay system in the first. Then analyse the actuality and issue of performance and incentive pay system in our country. Above those, the author advance some principles for build the system, methods to set the main parameter in EVA performance and incentive pay system, and calculate process for EVA, also some limit for EVA performance and incentive pay system. The analysis of typical case can explain the application of EVA performance and incentive pay system further. The dissertation concludes that EVA performance and incentive pay system can be very work if it’s based on common profits between the owner and agents, and avoid from manipulating enterprise’s performance or the shortened management efficiently. The dissertation takes attentions to faire and efficiency, it distribute the incentive pay according as the rate of labor’s contribute, which is more impersonality than any other method, it is a new idea for distributing the incentive pay. Otherwise, the author advances some solutions for building an EVA performance and incentive pay system.
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