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论文编号：	9854
作者编号：	2120132527
上传时间：	2017/12/20 10:30:29
中文题目：	商业银行治理结构对风险承担的影响研究
英文题目：	The Impact of Commercial Bank ''s Governance Structure on Risk- taking
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	股权结构，治理结构，风险承担
英文关键字：	Ownership Structure,Governance Structure,Risk - taking
中文摘要：	商业银行是一类特殊的企业，是一国金融系统中的重要构成部分，在经济发展中发挥着不可或缺的职能。然而，自美国次贷危机以来，频繁出现的区域性金融风暴或金融危机暴露除了各国商业银行在经营过程中所存在的各种潜在风险和治理缺陷，由此国内外学者开始着眼于通过调整商业银行的组织架构和治理方式，以达到控制其风险的目的。 本文在大量参考前人研究成果的基础上，从商业银行的股权结构和治理结构两个角度出发，分析这两者与银行风险承担水平之间的关系。其中，本文将股权结构分为股权比例和股权属性两个维度进行分析，将治理结构分为董事会构成、两权分离度和委托代理问题三个维度进行分析。结合相关理论基础，本文首先通过理论分析对股权结构和治理结构的各个维度影响银行风险承担水平的作用方式进行了系统论述，并根据分析结果提出了相应假设，之后，本文通过收集14家上市商业银行2007年至2015年年末数据供126条，对上述假设进行实证研究，借助面板固定效应模型，本文分别就股权结构对商业银行风险承担水平的影响、治理结构对商业银行风险承担水平的影响、股权结构和治理结构对商业银行额风险承担水平的影响三个模型进行实证检验，结合理论分析结果，本文得出以下结论：（1）随着第一大股东持股比例增加，商业银行的风险承担水平呈先下降后上升的“U”型变动，（2）在同时考虑股权结构和治理结构时，股权制衡度对商业银行的风险承担水平有着显著地负的影响，（3）国有股份占比对商业银行的风险承担水平没有显著影响，（4）董事会规模和独立董事规模对商业银行的风险承担水平没有显著影响，（5）两权分离度对商业银行的风险承担水平有着显著地正的影响，（6）委托代理问题的程度与商业银行风险承担水平呈显著正相关关系。 文章最后，结合理论分析与实证分析结果，本文认为可以通过控制第一大股东的持股比例，建立有效地股权制衡机制、建立科学的治理机制，发挥独立董事的作用、减少管理人员与银行间的利益不一致，控制委托代理问题等方法控制商业银行的风险承担水平。
英文摘要：	Commercial banks are a special kind of business,they play an indispensable role in a country's financial system and economic development.But,Since the US subperime mortgage crisis,Frequent regional financial turmoil or financial crisis exposure the extent of the commercial banks in the course of the existence of the various risks and governance deficiencies,Thus domestic and foreign scholars began to focus on the adjustment of commercial banks through the organizational structure and governance,to achieve the purpose of controlling its risk. This article is based on a large number of references to previous research results,using commercial bank’s ownership structure and governance structure as two perspectives,to analyze the relationship between the two and the level of bank risk.This paper divides the ownership structure into two dimensions: equity ratio and equity attribute,and divide the governance structure into three dimensions: board composition, two.power separation and principal.agent problem to start the research.Combined with the relevant theoretical basis,this paper first discusses the effect of various dimensions of ownership structure and governance structure on the level of bank risk,then according to the analysis results,we put forward several corresponding assumptions.After that,this article through the data of listed banks,using the panel fixed effect model,we carried out empirical tests of the impact of ownership structure on the level of risk of commercial banks, the impact of governance structure on the level of risk of commercial banks, the structure of ownership structure and the impact of governance structure on the risk level of commercial banks.Combined with theoretical analysis results,we draws the following conclusions:(1) With the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder, the risk level of commercial banks decreased first and then increased.(2) When the ownership structure and governance structure are taken into account at the same time, the equity balance has a significant negative impact on the commercial banks' risk taking level.(3) The proportion of state.owned shares has no significant effect on the risk level of commercial banks.(4) The size of the board and the size of the independent directors have no significant impact on the risk level of the commercial banks.(5) The separation of the two powers has a significant positive impact on the commercial banks' risk taking level.(6) There is a significant positive correlation between the risk level of commercial banks. At last,Combined with theoretical analysis and empirical analysis of the results,this paper argues that it ，we can from controling the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,establishing an effective mechanism of equity checks and balances, and scientific governance mechanism,enhancing the effect of independent directors,reducing the disagreement between the management and the interests of bank owner,controling the principal agent problem,to reduce the risk level of commercial banks
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