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论文编号：	97
作者编号：	2120052035
上传时间：	2007/6/21 23:05:35
中文题目：	中国上市公司股权结构与控制权私
英文题目：	Research on Relationship betwe
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	控制权私人收益; 股权集中度; 股
英文关键字：	Private Benefits from Control
中文摘要：	就我国的上市公司而言，特殊的制度环境造就了其特殊的股权结构特点，控股股东的股权性质多样化而且股权高度集中。这种股权结构很可能造成大股东利用控制权获取巨大的控制权私人收益，从而侵害广大中小股东的利益。因此对我国上市公司股权结构与控制权收益关系问题进行深入研究，具有重要的理论和现实意义。 本文采用理论分析、实证检验和实验测度相结合的方法对我国上市公司股权结构与控制权私人收益的关系进行研究，旨在找到股权结构特征与控制权收益之间的内在联系。本文的主要研究内容和研究结果如下： 首先，论文在对控制权收益问题的国内外相关文献从理论研究和实证研究两个维度进行分类梳理的基础上，阐述控制权收益的基本理论框架，深入剖析了控制权的涵义和控制权收益的本质属性。通过理论模型对控制权私人收益产生的机理进行了分析，并指出了大股东进行利益侵害的几种常用路径。 其次，论文对股权结构与控制权收益的关系进行理论分析，重点结合我国上市公司股权结构特征从股权集中度、股权制衡度和控股股东的产权性质三个方面阐述了股权结构对控制权私人收益的影响，在理论分析的基础上，提出了3个研究假设：（1）股权集中度与控制权私人收益存在倒U型关系；（2）股权制衡度与控制权私人收益存在显著负相关关系；（3）国有控股的上市公司被控股股东利益侵占的程度高于非国有控股的上市公司，并选取2002－2005年深沪两市的A股上市公司4686个数据点为样本，对上述假设进行了大样本的实证检验。根据最后的实证结果，我们接收了H1和H2，拒绝了H3。 论文在理论分析和实证研究之后，运用实验研究的方法，设计了三种不同股权结构下的控制权收益分配场景，对股权结构和控制权私人收益之间的关系做了进一步的检验，并对一些影响控制权私人收益的其他因素也进行了相关测度，从全新的视角对控制权收益的影响因素进行诠释，从而为希望能够为实验研究在公司治理问题中的应用做一些有益的尝试。 实验方案的设计是实验研究的核心和灵魂。本文在针对股权结构和控制权私人收益关系进行实验设计时，主要基于对以下三方面因素的考虑。 （1） 通过对我国上市公司1999-2005年间大股东的持股比例进行统计，我们发现第一大股东持股比例一般维持在40%以上，平均值为43.29%。但是，这一比例有逐年下降的趋势。因此，在我们的实验设计中，第一种股权结构中的第一大股东被赋予了44%的股权，第二种和第三种股权结构中的第一大股东持股比例依次降低。 （2） 我们还发现在1999-2005年的7年间，我国上市公司前5大股东基本上掌握着公司的绝大部分股份。其他股东持有的股份额度非常少（如第6大股东的持股比例还不到1%），对公司股东大会的决策几乎没有什么影响。因此，在实验设计中，我们将每种股权结构下的股东数目确定为5个。 （3） 我们的实验重点测度股权集中度和股权制衡度对大股东控制权私人收益的影响，因此将小股东看作是同质的，在实验方案中设计小股东拥有相同的股份份额，即将第一大股东之外的公司股份平分。
英文摘要：	As the research in the field of Corporate Governance deepens, the role of controlling shareholder has been attracted more attention, the core issue in corporate governance has been shifted to the question that how to deal with the agent problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Private Benefits from Control Right is the key of this problem. Large amount of theoretical and empirical researches have been done by academics, which concerns about the problems of controlling shareholders obtaining benefits from control right. By now, the popular opinion on this problem is that the private benefit from control obtained by controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies is vast and the conclusion of controlling shareholders expropriating the benefit of minority shareholders through seizing private benefit from control is provided. For Chinese Listed Companies, the ownership structure is particular with the result of the particular institutional environment. Due to varieties of equity property of controlling shareholders and ownership concentrating in Chinese listed companies the research on the relationship between ownership structures and benefit from control must have important theoretical and empirical meanings for solving that problem above. The purpose of the research on the relationship between ownership structures and benefit from control by this dissertation is finding the internal connection of ownership structures and benefit from control and making objective conclusions on the current level of benefit from control by controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. The theoretical analyses, empirical and experimental study methods have been used in this dissertation. The main content and results of this thesis are as follows. Firstly, this thesis reviews the previous literatures concerning the Private Benefits from Control Rights both form the theoretical and empirical perspective, and introduces the fundamental theoretical knowledge. Based on this, we also analyze the mechanism on why and how the Private Benefits from Control Rights come out. Then several routes that large shareholders usually take to expropriate the benefits are pointed out. Secondly, this thesis theoretically analyzed the relationship between ownership structures and benefit from control and mainly studied the influence on benefit from control by ownership concentration, ownership control and equity property of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. Based on the analytical results, three hypotheses are proposed: （1） there is a reverse U relationship between ownership concentration and Private Benefits from Control Rights; （2） ownership control has significant negative correlations with Private Benefits from Control Rights; （3） the extent of the benefits expropriation in state-controlled listed companies is much severe than it in non-state-controlled listed companies. Then 4686 A-Share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2005 are selected to verify the above-mentioned hypotheses. As a result, the empirical analysis results supported the first two hypotheses, but refused the third one. In the following section, experimental study method was adopted. We designed a special situation concerning the distribution of control rights benefits under three different kind of ownership structure, with the aim to further test the relationship between ownership structure and private benefits from control rights, and some other influential factors as well. According to the experimental data, we verified the six hypotheses based on the cooperative game theory in the last chapter.
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