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论文编号：	962
作者编号：	2120072062
上传时间：	2009/5/26 11:09:37
中文题目：	风险态度、社会偏好与劳动契约选
英文题目：	Risk Attitude, Social Preferen
指导老师：	李建标教授
中文关键字：	契约选择、社会偏好、风险态度、
英文关键字：	Contract option; Social prefer
中文摘要：	作为公司治理利益相关者的劳方和资方在签订契约时，双方的议价能力决定了契约的属性，劳资双方的风险态度和偏好类型是影响契约类型的重要因素。按照偏好类型来分，可以把人分为自利偏好型和社会偏好型；按照风险态度来分，可以把人分为风险偏好型、风险中性型和风险厌恶型。由于人们的风险态度和偏好类型不同，在劳动契约选择时，其选择行为势必存在差异，而且同一个契约作用在不同偏好类型的人身上所带来的效率也是不一样的。不同类型的个体，什么样的契约更加有效率呢？本论文采用比较制度实验研究的方法，观察不同类型的被试在面对多个契约时的选择倾向性，对比其收益和努力水平的差异。 本文主要沿着不同风险态度和不同偏好类型两条主线，考察被试在面对信任契约VS惩罚契约、信任契约VS奖励契约和奖励契约VS惩罚契约时如何进行选择。本文采用风险态度测试量表区分被试的风险态度；利用最后通牒博弈实验区分被试的偏好类型。按照不同风险态度和不同偏好类型，分别比较委托人选择的契约类型、委托人给代理人工资额、期望代理人的努力水平和代理人实际努力水平等参数的大小，以此找到给不同类型个体带来最佳激励效果的契约组合。该实验设计不仅可以将组内被试的契约选择行为进行对比，也可以将组间被试的契约选择行为进行对比。 实验结果表明，在不同风险态度下，信任契约和惩罚契约进行比较时，风险偏好型被试更加倾向于选择惩罚契约；在信任契约和奖励契约比较时，风险偏好型被试更加倾向于选择奖励契约；在奖励契约和惩罚契约比较时，风险偏好型被试倾向于选择惩罚契约。在不同偏好类型下，信任契约和惩罚契约比较时，社会偏好型被试更加倾向于选择惩罚契约。在信任契约和奖励契约比较时，社会偏好型被试和自利偏好型被试都倾向于选择奖励契约。在奖励契约和惩罚契约比较时，社会偏好型被试倾向于选择惩罚契约。 本文可能的创新有两点：其一将被试的风险态度差异和偏好类型差异考虑进劳动契约的选择之中，为实现劳动契约签订双方的激励相容提供了行为基础；其二按照序贯博弈的框架设计契约选择实验，突破了原有静态博弈框架的设计，这会更加凸显劳资双方在订立契约时的利益冲突。公司治理利益相关者在签订契约时，如果考虑到个体的不同类型，那么将会带来更好的激励效果，这是本文的研究意义所在。
英文摘要：	Employees and employers, who are the Corporate Governance Stakeholders, the bargaining power between them determines the contract attribute. Meanwhile, risk attitude and preference type are two important factors as well.Truly, some people are self-interested, and other people are social preference. People can be divided into three types-risk preference, risk neutral and risk aversion according to people’s risk attitude. Due to the differentia of the preference and risk attitude, people tend to select different contracts. Contract efficiency will also be different, when different people choose the same contract. So what kind of contract is more efficient for different type of subjects? The thesis takes experimental method to observe different subjects’ preference and compare their profit and effort level. The thesis is along the two main line like different risk attitude and preference type. We observe how subjects pick parameters when confronting three circumstances-trust contract vs. punish contract, trust contract vs. bonus contract and bonus contract vs. punish contract. Furthermore, we adopt risk attitude testing table and ultimatum game experiment to distinguish subjects’ risk attitude and preference type respectively. Then, we compare principals’ contract preference, agents’ pay, agents’ prospective effort level and actual effort level and so on under three conditions in order to discover which contract has the best incentive effect for different people. This design also allows us to compare the group-in people’s act with the group-between people’s act. The experimental results show us under different risk attitude, as to trust contract and punish contract, people with risk preference tend to select punish contract; as to trust contract and bonus contract, risk-seeking people are declined to adopt bonus contract; as to bonus contract and punish contract, people with risk preference tend to choose punish contract. Regardless what subjects’ preference types are, people with social preference tend to select punish contract comparing with trust contract; both social preference people and self-interest people are apt to choosing bonus contract comparing with trust contract; people with social preference choose more punish contract than bonus contract. In this thesis, the innovations lie in these two following parts. Firstly, we take subjects’ different risk attitude and preference type into consideration, which can fulfill incentive compatibility between employers and employees when signing contract. Secondly, we employ sequential game framework in order to highlight profit conflict between employers and employees. If employer of company can consider types of employee, the effect of motivating employees would be better.
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