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论文编号：	9488
作者编号：	1120120788
上传时间：	2017/12/6 16:13:32
中文题目：	大股东控制权变化对民营公司治理主体行为影响的研究
英文题目：	Research on Influence of Controllers’ Control Right Change on the Behavior of Governance Subjects in Private Companies
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	控制权变化；两职分离；非股权控制权；控制人变更预期
英文关键字：	change of corporate control; seperation of leadership structure; non-equity-based control; exit expection
中文摘要：	民营公司通过在资本市场上市获得了更多的资金和发展机会，也产生了很多问题。其中，最主要的治理问题是股权集中背景下大股东侵害中小股东利益的代理问题。虽然抑制大股东掏空的法律法规日益完善，但是民营公司中的代理问题也在实际控制人对治理环境的应对中呈现出新的特征，主要表现为控制人更隐蔽的控制方式、在变更和减持中的机会主义行为及其与高管的合谋等。根据权力来源的不同，企业控制权可以分为来源于财务资源的股权控制权和非财务资源的非股权控制权，而这两者会在董事会交汇形成董事会控制权。已有研究更多基于静态视角研究企业控制权与其他治理要素的关系，而本文则力图从动态视角揭示大股东控制权变化带来的治理效应。基于此，本文考察了控制人退出控制地位、控制人股权减持以及董事会两职分离等三种大股东控制权的变化情形，重点讨论每种情形下控制人的机会主义行为及其与其他治理主体的互动行为。 具体而言，本文的研究主要做了以下三方面工作并得到如下结论： 其一，在控制人退出控制地位的情形下，考察了其控制权变更预期与进行利益侵占的关系。通过控制时间、股权控制权等因素分组，本文发现，在实际控制人具有较高利益侵占能力的上市公司，其应收类关联交易在控制人变更发生前一年和前两年显著增多。这表明，民营上市公司控制人在退出控制地位前，很可能利用其信息优势和控制能力侵占上市公司利益；而当上市公司聘请知名会计师事务所（国际四大或国内八大）担任外部审计时，这一行为受到了明显抑制。此外，在对控制人变更的方式进行分类后，本文发现控制人变更预期与关联交易的关系，仅在二级市场减持等形式下显著，而在协议转让或重组的形式下不显著；这是因为两类变更中控制人拥有的信息优势程度有所差异、且控制人实施侵占型关联交易面临的风险也不同造成的。 其二，基于实际控制人股权减持的情境，考察了股权控制权削弱对大股东掏空的影响。为躲避监管，控股人会突破股权控制关系，寻求新的方式控制上市公司，从而获得高于股权控制链所表现出的控制权；非股权控制权的存在，使得实际控制人进行股权减持后，其股权控制权虽然削弱，但对公司的实际控制却并未降低，且实施掏空的股权成本反而下降。本文于现金流量权、股权控制权和控制时间等因素，将研究样本分为缺乏掏空动机的高控制组、缺乏掏空能力的低控制组和既有掏空动机又有掏空能力的中间组，发现对于中间组控制人而言，股权控制权减持对大股东掏空具有显著正向影响；对于高控制组和低控制组的控制人而言，两者不存在显著相关关系。这说明，既有能力又有动机进行掏空的中间组控制人在减持股权后加大了掏空程度。继而，本文还以控制人控制上市公司的时间作为非股权控制权的代理变量，发现控制时间越长，股权减持量对大股东掏空的正向影响越大；继而，在将控制人股权减持分为主动减持和被动减持两类分别考察后，还发现通过股权减持进行掏空，是控制人有计划的主动决策。此外，本文还发现绝对持股型公司的独立董事与大股东掏空正相关，在相对持股型公司中不起作用，而仅在分散持股型公司中抑制大股东掏空，其履职能力有待加强。 其三，基于治理主体合谋的视角，分析了董事会控制权变化带来的两职分离对留任高管薪酬的影响。本文根据高管来源、股权结构对董事会两职分离进行分类，以验证两职分离后，留任高管是否会获得补偿。研究发现，留任高管的权力被削弱时会显著获取超额薪酬，而其权力未被削弱时则不显著；留任高管权力削弱程度较高时，获得的超额薪酬也较高。这表明，民营上市公司中存在与权力削弱程度相关的薪酬补偿，验证了权力补偿效应的存在。而在进一步的分析中，权力补偿较多的公司，之后的公司绩效更低，表明权力补偿效应对上市公司而言是一种效率损失。因此，这种两职分离的权力补偿协调了控制人、非控股股东和职业经理人等内部人的利益，却损害了中小股东的利益。 本文的研究启示有：第一，民营公司应积极推动自身公司治理从“合规”到“有效”的升级，根据企业实际需要完善内部治理机制，减少象征性“合规”带来的效率损失。第二，应鼓励并引导外部审计等外部治理机制提升其参与治理的能力，以更好地发挥其对大股东机会主义行为的监督作用；第三，对于大股东行为的监管不仅应当考虑其股权控制权，也应当考虑非股权控制权的影响，导入实质大于形式的“穿透式监管”。第四，中国独立董事需要进一步加强自身的履职能力，不能沦为大股东的“附庸”，应真正成为中小股东利益的捍卫者。
英文摘要：	Private enterprises have gained more funds and development opportunities by listing in the capital market, but there are lots of problems. Among them, the most important governance problem is the second kind of agency problem between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. Although there are more and more laws of suppressing large shareholders tunneling, the agency problem in private companies presents new features in the response of the actual controller to the governance environment, mainly the control of major shareholders become more subtle, the opportunistic behavior in the process of controller change and stock-selling, and the conspiracy with executives. According to the existing research of power sources, right of control can be divided into equity-based control power from financial resources and non-equity-based control from non-financial resources, both of them will be on the board of directors meeting formation control. There have been more researches on the relationship between corporate right of control and other governance factors based on the static perspective, but this thesis tries to reveal the governance effects of the change of right of control from a dynamic perspective. Based on this, this paper examines the controllers’ exit, controllers’ stock-selling, and the change of board control, focusing on each situation under the opportunism of controllers and other stakeholders. Specifically, the research of this thesis mainly makes the following three aspects of work, and draws the following conclusions: Firstly, in the case of the controller's exit, this research investigates the relationship between the change of control power and the interest appropriation. By controlling the control time and equity control power, the results find that high expropriation ability of the listed companies in the controller, the receivable related-party-transactions increased significantly a year and two years before change. This shows that before the exit of control position, the controllers probably use their information advantage and control power to control the encroachment interests of listed companies; and when the listed company hired well-known accounting firms (four international or eight domestic) as external audit, this behavior was obviously restrained. In addition, in the classification of the way of controller changes, this thesis finds that the relationship between expectation of exit and the related-party-transactions, only two in the secondary market holdings and other forms of significant, and in the transfer agreement or reorganization of the form is not significant; this is due to information superiority degree of two kinds of change in controller have differences, and different risks of invasion related party transactions. Secondly, based on the situation of the reduction of the ownership of actual controller, the influence of weakening of the equity control on tunneling of large shareholder is investigated. To avoid regulation, controllers will break through the equity control relationship, seek new ways to control the listed companies, thus gain higher control than that showing on the control chain; non-equity-based right of control, makes the actual controller of equity holdings, equity-based control although weakened, but the actual control power of the company but did not reduce and cost of tunneling decreased. In this thesis, based on the cash flow rights, equity-based control power and control time and other factors, the research sample is divided into the lack of tunneling motivation high control group, the control group of the lack of low tunneling ability and middle group both have the ability to tunnel and tunneling motivation. The results shows that for the middle group controllers, stock reduction has significant positive influence on tunneling of large shareholders; for high control group and low control group controllers, there is no significant correlation. This shows that the middle group controllers increased the degree of tunneling after reducing the shareholding. Furthermore, this research takes the controllers’ control time as a proxy for non-equity-based control, finds that the longer of control time, the greater the amount of stock sellings to the positive effect of tunneling; then, the stock reduction is divided into active and passive reduction also finds that tunneling is controllers active decision plan. In addition, this paper also finds that the independent directors of absolute shareholding companies and major shareholders' tunneling positive correlation, but plays no role in the relative shareholding in the company, only in the suppression of large shareholders dispersed shareholding company. The independent directors’ ability to perform duties need to be strengthened. Thirdly, based on the separation of leadership of board of directors, this thesis studies the power compensation effect. This thesis classifies the changes of the leadership structure of the board of directors according to the sources of executives and ownership structure to verify whether the retained executives will be compensated after the separation of leadership structure of board of directors. The study finds that when the power of retained executives was weakened, they would significantly get excess pay, while their power was not significantly diminished. When the executive power was weakened, the excess pay was higher. This shows that private listed companies have compensation related to the degree of weakening of power, and verify the existence of the power compensation effect. In the further analysis, companies with more power compensation have lower corporate performance, which shows that the power compensation effect is a kind of efficiency loss for listed companies. Therefore, the power compensation of this separation of leadership has coordinated the interests of insiders, non-controlling shareholders and professional managers, but has harmed the interests of minority shareholders. The Enlightenment of this research: firstly, the private enterprises should actively promote their own corporate governance upgrades from "compliance" to "effective". Based on the actual need to perfect the internal governance mechanism of enterprises, reduce the symbolic "compliance" efficiency losses; secondly, should encourage and guide the external audit the external governance mechanism to enhance their ability to participate in governance, in order to play better supervisory role of large shareholder's opportunistic behavior; furthermore, for supervision of large shareholders’ behavior should not only control the equity consideration but also consider the impact of non-equity-based control, and import the "penetrating supervision" which following substance over form principle; finally, the independent directors need to strengthen their ability to perform their duties, which should not become major shareholders’ "client", while should become defenders of the interests of small shareholders.
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