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论文编号：	9414
作者编号：	2120152452
上传时间：	2017/6/21 19:48:53
中文题目：	交叉上市、公司绩效和高管变更 ——基于绑定假说与政府干预假说的实证研究
英文题目：	Cross-Listing, Firm Performance, and Executive Turnover ——A Test Based on Bonding Hypothesis and Government Intervention Hypothesis
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	交叉上市、绑定假说、政府干预假说、高管变更-业绩敏感性
英文关键字：	Cross-listing; Bonding Hypothesis; Government Intervention Hypothesis; Executive Turnover
中文摘要：	在全球资本市场日益一体化的趋势下，交叉上市成为一个普遍现象，并成为学术研究的一个热点。自1993年以来，越来越多的中国公司选择到国际市场交叉上市。其中，香港作为国际资本市场之一，又是我国的特别行政区，与内地有着紧密的政治经济联系，因此中国的交叉上市大多以A股和H股同时上市的公司为主。在交叉上市研究领域，Coffee（1999，2002）和Stultz（1999）提出的绑定假说（Bonding Hypothesis）成为主流学说，认为公司通过交叉上市，可以与上市地更为严格的法律及监管制度绑定在一起，从而提高投资者保护水平，改善公司治理机制，获得更高的公司价值。但中国的交叉上市植根于特殊的政治背景，又有着独特的历史进程，在很多方面呈现出与国际市场完全不同的特点与市场表现。基于此，覃家琦、邵建新（2015）提出了与绑定假说相竞争的政府干预假说，认为相对于纯A股公司，H+A公司会受到更多的政府干预，从而承担更多的政策性负担，导致H+A公司具有更低的投资、经营效率，最终降低H+A公司的价值。 本文的研究目的在于对绑定假说和政府干预假说进行检验，找到更适用于中国交叉上市情况的假说。首先，本文从交叉上市的经济结果角度对两个假说进行初步检验，考察公司绩效与交叉上市的关系。其次，本文从公司治理的角度对两个假说进行更为直接的检验，选择高管变更这一能直接衡量公司治理水平的指标，考察交叉上市对高管变更-业绩敏感性的影响。 本文以2006-2014年中国上市公司的非平衡面板数据进行实证研究，得出以下结论：（1）公司业绩与交叉上市负相关；（2）公司业绩与高管变更负相关；（3）H+A公司比纯A股公司具有更低的高管变更-业绩敏感性。因此，本文的实证结果拒绝了绑定假说，支持了政府干预假说，证明政府干预假说是更符合中国交叉上市情况的假说。
英文摘要：	With the increasing globalization of capital markets, listed companies, which are the mainstay of the market, not only issue shares on the national exchange, but also issue shares on foreign exchanges, thus become cross-listings. Chinese companies have also cross-listed on the market in Hong Kong, New York, London, Singapore and other places since 1993. However, as the Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong, an international capital market, has the advantage of special status. So it has attracted the vast majority of Chinese companies to cross-list in H-share market. In the study of cross-listing, the Bonding Hypothesis, which is proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stultz (1999), has become the mainstream theory. The Bonding hypothesis predicted that through cross-listing, companies can be tied to the more stringent legal regulatory system so as to improve the level of investor protection and improve corporate governance mechanisms, then obtain higher corporate value. Due to the unique institutional background and historical process, China's cross-listings differs from the international market in many ways. Based on the unique institutional background and historical process of H+A cross-listings, Qan Jiaqi, Shao Jianxin (2015) proposed a hypothesis that competed with the Bonding Hypothesis: the Government Intervention Hypothesis. It predicted that compared with non-cross-listed companies, cross-listings in China are burdened with more government intervention, which will lead to a lower efficiency of investment, operating and result in lower value of the company. In order to test which of the two hypotheses is more suitable for China's cross-listings, the author first examines the relationship between firm performance and cross-listing with non-equilibrium panel data from China's listed companies in 2006-2004. Second, from the perspective of corporate governance, the author examines a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing executives, to test the applicability of Bonding Hypothesis for China’s H+A cross-listed companies in a more direct way. Through the empirical analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: first, corporate performance is negatively correlated with cross-listing; second, company performance is negatively related to executive change; third, compared with non-cross-listed companies, H+A cross-listed companies has lower executive change - performance sensitivity. Therefore, the empirical results of this paper rejects the Bonding Hypothesis, and supports the Government Intervention Hypothesis, proving that the Government Intervention Hypothesis is more in line with China’s H+A cross- listed companies.
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