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论文编号：	9413
作者编号：	2120152501
上传时间：	2017/6/21 18:01:41
中文题目：	家族企业中职业高管薪酬研究
英文题目：	Research of Professional Executives’
指导老师：	吴德胜
中文关键字：	家族企业；职业高管；薪酬绩效敏感性；薪酬差距； 隧道效应；锦标
英文关键字：	Family firms; Professional executive; Compensation- performance
中文摘要：	根据《福布斯》中文版 2015 年公布的家族企业报告中的信息显示， 截止 2015 年 7 月 31 日， 目前中国 A 股市场上的 1787 家民营的上市公司中，家族上市企业共有 903 家，占比高达 50%。 这一数据有力的证明了家族企业在我国经济主体中占有重要的地位。 家族企业与非家族民营企业之间一个很大的区别在于，家族企业中的高管团队里常常有家族成员的身影，因此在家族企业中的高管的团队中有职业高管和家族高管之分。 上市公司中高管薪酬的合理性不仅仅与企业的效率相关联，也是反映公司内部治理结构合理性的一个重要标志。在家族企业中，由于家族高管身份的特殊，因此家族高管的薪酬设计和一般职业高管的薪酬设计会有不同；而由于家族高管的出现可以起到监督作用，信息不对称程度被削弱，两权分离带来的问题被减轻， 因此职业高管在家族企业之间面临的契约环境不同于他们在非家族民营企业中的契约环境，这也就使得家族企业里职业高管的薪酬设计和非家族民营企业中的高管薪酬设计存在着不同。本文选用 2006 年至 2013 年间 A 股上市家族企业为研究样本，手工整理出职业高管的薪酬情况， 基于职业高管薪酬绩效敏感性和薪酬差距两个角度来研究家族企业中职业高管薪酬设计机制。本文的主要发现有：（ 1）由于家族高管可以较好地监督职业高管的工作努力程度，信息不对称问题得以缓解，因此家族控制人对职业高管倾向于较少的使用成本较高的绩效激励。通过实证研究，本文得出结论一：家族企业中职业高管薪酬和绩效之间显著正相关， 如果有家族的成员担任高管人员时，这种正相关关系会减弱；（ 2）家族大股东在利用其控制地位侵占公司利益，为自身谋取利益时， 一个重要的手段便是给家族高管更高的薪酬。本文通过实证研究得出结论：当 CEO 由家族成员担任时， CEO 和其余职业高管之间的薪酬差距会显著变大，这一结果本文尝试用大股东隧道效应来解释。本文主要分为六个部分：第一章为序言， 说明了文章的选题背景、 研究的意义、目标、内容、方法和创新点；第二章为相关文献综述，对家族企业的界定、高管薪酬绩效敏感性、锦标赛理论和隧道效应的文献进行了梳理；第三章在相关理论基础上提出了本文的假设；第四章研究设计，介绍了本文的实证研究部分所用数据的来源和样本选择的情况以及变量定义和模型设计；第五章展示了本文的实证结果以及进一步对实证结果进行的稳健性检验；第六章总结了本文的研究结论并且提出了本文存在的不足和对未来研究的展望。
英文摘要：	According to Forbes China’s released data, up to July 31, 2015, there are 1787 A-share private firms, among which 903 firms are family firms, accounting for almost 50% percent of China’s private firms. Family firms has become an essential part of China’s economy. Compared with non-family private firms, a significant difference is that in family business, executives can be divided into professional executives and family executives. The rationality of executive compensation in listed companies is not only related to the efficiency of enterprises, but also an important symbol to reflect the rationality of corporate governance structure. In the family firms, because of the special identity of family executives, their compensation design is different from general executive . And because of the appearance of family executives can play a supervisory role, which can weakened the degree of information asymmetry, the separation of two rights problems are reduced, thus the contract environment for professional executives in family firms will be different from non-family private firms. As a result, the compensation design of professional executives in family firms will be different from general executives in non-family private firms. In the study of executive compensation, compensation performance sensitivity is an important factor to study the rationality of executive pay; salary gap between internal management team can reflect the efficiency and fairness of income distribution, which will affect the behavior of executives motivation and work enthusiasm, and then affect the enterprise performance. This paper chooses from 2006-2013 A-shares listed family firms as the research sample, manually sorting out the remuneration of non-family executives. Then we do our research from two aspects: compensation performance sensitivity and compensation gap to explore the compensation design for non-family executives. The major findings are: (1)as family executives can better supervise non-family executives, so firms tend to use less incentives-based incentives to non-family executives, their compensation-incentives sensitivity is significantly lower when there is a family executives.(2)family shareholder often use their power of control to transfer resources. One of the most important way is to pay higher salary to family executives. When CEO is family member, the compensation gap between CEO and other non-family executives will be significantly larger. We try to use tunneling effect to explain this result. This paper is mainly divided into six parts: First chapter is preface, focusing on the background , significance, target, content, method and innovation of this paper; The second one introduce the related domestic and foreign literature, about family firms, executive compensation-performance sensitivity, tournament incentive theory and tunneling effect. The third part introduce the related theory and propose hypothesis. The next part show the empirical results of our paper. The last chapter summarize our research result and expectation.
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