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论文编号：	9406
作者编号：	2120152426
上传时间：	2017/6/21 12:14:32
中文题目：	媒体关注与关联并购掏空的研究
英文题目：	Study on Media Focus and Tunneling in Related Party M&A
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	关联并购；控股股东掏空；媒体关注；政府质量
英文关键字：	related M&A; tunneling; media attention; government quality
中文摘要：	传统并购理论认为,并购可以从管理、财务等方面取得协同，增加效率,扩大规模并多元化生产，从而在整个社会角度增加了福利。但学者们研究发现,有些并购的真正的目的在于侵占上市公司和中小股东利益,即掏空性并购。相较于西方等发达资本市场的并购行为，关联性是我国上市公司并购行为的一个鲜明特征。当缺乏有效的约束机制时，控股股东有强烈的动机和能力通过关联并购的方式来掏空上市公司，不利于资本市场健康发展和秩序的建立，也阻碍了上市公司的持续运营，更是严重侵害了广大中小投资者的利益。这时需要一个影响更加广泛的约束机制。媒体关注近年来被认为是外部治理的一个有效机制。深入分析媒体关注与关联并购控股股东掏空行为之间的关系有助于我们更好的理解媒体的公司治理作用,同时有助于减少并购掏空行为、保护投资者利益和完善公司治理。 基于此，本文以 2011 年至 2015 年间发生关联并购的上市公司为样本，分析了媒体关注对控股股东掏空行为的影响。首先检验媒体关注是否能够抑制关联并购中控股股东的掏空行为，之后根据上市公司的终极控制权和地方政府治理环境，探讨不同情况是否会对媒体关注的抑制作用产生影响。本文采用累积超额异常收益率来衡量掏空，以百度新闻搜索数量和报八分权威财经报刊报道数量分别衡量媒体关注。研究的主要结论如下： 1.两种媒体关注均能够显著抑制关联并购中控股股东的掏空行为。 2.当上市公司为非国有性质时，两种媒体关注对关联并购中控股股东的掏空抑制作用更大，并且产权性质的不同对报纸媒体关注治理作用的发挥影响更大，对于国有上市公司网络媒体关注依然能够起到显著的治理作用，但是报纸媒体则没有显著的治理作用。 3.在政府质量较高的地区，两种媒体关注的治理作用更能有效发挥，对于关联并购中控股股东掏空行为的抑制作用更显著。 本文的研究结论表明媒体关注有效发挥了外部治理机制,能够抑制控股股东掏空性并购，提高了投资者保护水平。
英文摘要：	Traditional M & A theory suggests that mergers and acquisitions can increase efficiency, achieve economies of scale、 diversification strategies and financial synergies, thereby increasing welfare throughout the social perspective. But scholars have found that some of the real purpose of mergers and acquisitions is to encroach on the interests of listed companies and small shareholders, that is, tunneling. Compared with the western developed capital market M & A behavior, relevance is a distinctive feature of M & A behavior of listed companies in China. When lack effective restraint mechanism, the controlling shareholder has a strong motivation and ability to tunnel through the relevant acquisition of listed companies, seriously violating the interests of other shareholders and not conducive to the company's long-term development and the healthy development of capital markets. At this point, there is a need for a more extensive constraint mechanism. Media attention as an important manifestation of corporate social supervision has become an important factor affecting corporate behavior and improving corporate governance. In-depth analysis of the relationship between media attention and associated M & A holdings helps us to better understand the corporate governance role of the media, while helping to reduce the risk of mergers and acquisitions, protect investor interests and improve corporate governance. Based on this, this paper analyzes the influence of media attention on the emptying behavior of controlling shareholders from the listed companies with related mergers and acquisitions between 2011 and 2015. First of all, it is necessary to test whether the media attention can inhibit the hollowing out of the controlling shareholder in the related M & A, and then discuss whether the different situations will have an effect on the suppression of the media according to the ultimate control of the listed company and the local government's governance environment. This paper uses the cumulative excess abnormal rate of return to measure the hollow, to Baidu news search number and the number of newspaper reports were measured media attention. The main conclusions of the study are as follows: 1. Media attention can significantly inhibit the associated acquisition of the controlling shareholder of the hollowing out behavior. 2. When the listed company is non-state-owned, the media is concerned about the hollowing out of the controlling shareholder in the associated M & A. And the different nature of property rights to the newspaper media attention play a role in corporate governance is more influential for the state-owned listed companies, internet media attention is still able to play a significant role in the governance, but the newspaper media will have no treatment effect. 3. In areas where the government is of high quality, the governance role of the media is more effective, and it has a greater effect on the emptying behavior. The conclusion of this paper shows that the media attention does have the effect of governance, which can restrain the shareholders from taking advantage of mergers and acquisitions and improve the level of investor protection.
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