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论文编号：	9379
作者编号：	1120110782
上传时间：	2017/6/20 22:41:33
中文题目：	关系投资机构与金融关联董事的战略治理效应研究——基于并购战略情境的实证分析
英文题目：	The Study on the Strategic Governance Effects of Relational Investing Institutions and Financial Connecting Directors: Based on the Empirical Analysis by the M&A Strategy Context
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	关系投资机构；金融关联董事；公司战略治理；监督与互惠效应；资源与信息效应；多元化战略并购
英文关键字：	relational investing institutions; financial connecting directors; corporate strategic governance; supervision and reciprocity effect; resource and information effect；diversified strategic M&As
中文摘要：	自20世纪90年代以来，伴随着机构投资者的崛起和壮大，在上市公司股东出现机构化的同时，我国资本市场开始出现两种现象：一方面，机构投资者开始寻求与公司经理层建立合作关系，积极从事关系投资；另一方面，上市公司开始密切与金融机构投资者的联系，积极建立金融关联。关系投资是指与公司具有承诺和互惠关系并积极介入公司治理的金融机构投资者的一种长期、稳定、集中投资行为，监督（或控制）与互惠（或合作）是关系投资的核心内涵。金融关联是指公司通过聘请曾经或当前具有金融机构任职背景的高管作为公司董事，进而与金融机构建立密切联系的一种战略行为，资源获取与信息传递是金融关联的核心内涵。本文敏锐捕捉到我国资本市场呈现的上述两种动态，紧密围绕关系投资和金融关联的核心内涵，理论分析和实证研究关系投资机构和金融关联董事可能对上市公司的公司治理与战略管理造成的潜在影响。具体来说，本文按照如下逻辑开展研究工作。首先，本文从公司治理与战略管理两门学科交叉的视角出发，基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论的观点，将公司战略治理的内涵理解为，从公司治理层面缓解公司战略过程中的代理冲突与资源约束进而保证公司战略得以科学决策和有效执行的一系列正式或非正式、内部或外部的战略管理与控制机制。其次，由关系投资的核心内涵出发，将关系投资机构介入公司战略治理的机制理解为监督机制和互惠机制，分别以委托代理理论和社会交换理论为理论工具，从监督和互惠的视角理论分析关系投资机构缓解公司战略过程中代理冲突的作用机制；由金融关联的核心内涵出发，将金融关联董事介入公司战略治理的机制理解为资源供给机制和信息传递机制，分别以资源依赖理论和信号传递理论为理论工具，从资源和信息的视角理论分析金融关联董事缓解公司战略过程中资源约束的作用机制。最后，借助上市公司多元化并购战略情境，实证分析关系投资机构与金融关联董事的战略治理效应，即关系投资机构缓解公司并购战略过程中代理冲突的监督效应和互惠效应，以及金融关联董事缓解公司并购战略过程中资源约束的资源效应和信息效应，以此实现对理论分析结论的实证检验。这些研究工作分别呈现于论文主体内容的第三至第六章。利用2006-2015年我国上市公司多元化战略并购事件为样本，运用均值差异比较分析、最小二乘回归分析、有序逻辑回归分析和结构方程建模分析等计量分析方法，对由理论推演的研究假设和逻辑框架进行实证检验，进而本文发现以下主要实证研究结论。首先，在关系投资机构的战略治理效应方面。关系投资机构持股的集中性、持久性和稳定性有助于约束公司战略过程中高管自利性代理行为，从而体现出关系投资机构缓解公司战略过程中代理冲突的监督效应。相比非独立的关系投资机构，独立的关系投资机构能够更加显著地约束公司战略过程中高管自利性代理行为。机构关系投资行为能够促进关系投资者与公司管理者之间形成互惠性的社会和经济交换关系。一方面，通过这种互惠关系的中介机制，关系投资机构能够约束公司战略过程中高管自利性代理行为，从而体现出关系投资机构缓解公司战略过程中代理冲突的互惠效应；另一方面，这种互惠关系能够诱导高管自负性代理行为，进而抵消关系投资机构对公司战略过程中高管自负性代理行为的约束作用，这种抵消作用对于非独立的关系投资机构来说更加严重。监督效应和互惠效应在关系投资机构约束公司战略过程中高管自利性代理行为的作用方面具有不同程度的重要性，监督效应居于主导地位。相比独立的关系投资机构，互惠效应在非独立的关系投资机构约束高管自利性代理行为的总效应中占比更高。其次，在金融关联董事的战略治理效应方面。金融关联董事的丰富性和专业性有助于缓解公司战略过程中融资约束，而其异质性和专业性有助于缓解公司战略过程中管理能力约束，从而体现出金融关联董事缓解公司战略过程中资源约束的资源效应。银行关联董事要比非银行关联董事能够更加显著地缓解公司战略过程中融资约束程度。金融关联董事的信息中介和信号传递功能能够降低公司与资金供给方之间的信息不对称程度。通过降低资金供需双方之间的信息不对称，金融关联董事能够缓解公司战略过程中融资约束程度，从而体现出金融关联董事缓解公司战略过程中资源约束的信息效应。资源效应和信息效应在金融关联董事缓解公司战略过程中融资约束的作用方面具有不同程度的重要性，资源效应处于主导地位。相比银行关联董事，信息效应在非银行关联董事缓解公司战略过程中融资约束的总效应中占比更高。论文从公司治理与战略管理学科交叉的视角，理论分析和实证研究了作为外部股东的关系投资机构和作为外部董事的金融关联董事介入公司战略治理的机制及其有效性问题。本文的研究工作在以下两个方面体现出了一定的创新性。其一，不同于以往公司治理领域关于代理冲突问题以及战略管理领域关于资源约束问题的研究，本文将研究焦点汇聚于公司战略过程中代理冲突和资源约束的缓解机制，并辅以多元化并购战略情境进行佐证，研究视角体现了公司治理与战略管理的融合，以及战略过程与战略内容的融合。其二，本文尝试从监督效应和互惠效应的整合视角对关系投资机构股东缓解公司战略过程中高管自利性和自负性代理冲突的机制和效果进行实证研究，并利用结构方程路径模型对监督效应和互惠效应加以比较；同时尝试从资源效应和信息效应的整合视角对金融关联董事缓解公司战略过程中融资约束和管理能力约束的机制和效果进行实证研究，并利用结构方程路径模型对资源效应和信息效应加以比较。这些研究内容在研究视角和研究方法上都具有一定的创新性。
英文摘要：	Since the 1990s, along with the rise and growth of institutional investors, there are more institutional investors in the shareholder lists of public listed companies. At the same time, China’s stock market began to appear two kinds of phenomena: on the one hand, institutional investors began to seek cooperation with the top management team and engage in relational investment actively; on the other hand, the public listed companies began to create close contact with financial institutions and actively establish financial connections. Relational investment refers to the engagement in a kind of long-term, stable and centralized investment behavior by institutional investors who have commitment and reciprocal relationship with the company. The supervision/control and reciprocity/cooperation are the core connotation of the relational investment. Financial connection refers to the strategic behavior that the company has close contact with the financial institutions by hiring executives who had professional experience in a financial institution as the director of the company. The access of resource and transmission of information are the core connotation of the financial connection. This doctoral dissertation keenly captures the above two developments in China’s capital market. Based on the core connotation of relational investment and financial connection, we theoretically analyze and empirically test the potential impact of relational investment and financial connection on corporate governance or strategic management in a company. Specifically, this doctoral dissertation follows the following logic to carry out our research work. Firstly, from the perspective of the crossing field of corporate governance and strategic management, this doctoral dissertation puts forward a new concept of corporate strategic governance based on the perspective of principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory. Corporate strategic governance is a mechanism set of formal or informal, internal or external strategic management and control mechanisms that can mitigate the agency conflicts and resource constraints throughout the strategic process, thus can guarantee the scientific making and effective implementation of corporate strategy. Secondly, we explore the mechanisms of relational investing institutions interfering in the corporate strategic governance as supervision mechanism and reciprocity mechanism, we then analyze the mechanisms that relational investing institutions mitigate agency conflicts in the strategic process based on principal-agent theory and social exchange theory. We explore the mechanisms of financial connecting directors interfering in the corporate strategic governance as resource-supplying mechanism and signal-transmission mechanism, we then analyze the mechanisms that financial connecting directors alleviate resource constraints during the strategic process based on resource dependency theory and signal transmission theory. Lastly, we use the diversified merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy context of China’s public listed companies to empirically test the strategic governance effects of relational investing institutions and financial connecting directors, that is the supervision effect and reciprocity effect by whcich relational investing institutions mitigate agency conflicts during the M&A strategy process, and the resource-supplying effect and signal-transmission effect by whcich financial connecting directors alleviate resource constraints during the M&A strategy process. These above studies are presented in the third to sixth chapters of the main body of the doctoral dissertation. Taking China’s public listed companies which implemented M&As for diversification strategy through the year of 2006 to 2015 as samples, and using mean difference comparison analysis, least squares regression analysis, ordered logistic regression analysis and structural equation modeling analysis to test the theoretical hypothesis and logical framework empirically, then the following main conclusions are found. The concentration, persistence and stability of the relational investing institutions’ shareholding are helpful to restrain the managerial self-interest behaviors during the strategic process, this could demonstrate the supervision effect of relational investing institutions to mitigate the agency conflicts during the corporate strategic process. Compared with non-independent relational investing institutions, the independent ones can significantly restrain the managerial self-interest behaviors during the strategic process.The relational investment can promote the formation of social and economic reciprocal exchange between relational investing institutions and corporate top managers. On one side, through this reciprocal intermediary mechanism, the relational investing institutions could restrain the managerial self-interest behaviors during the strategic process, which demonstrates the reciprocity effect of relational investing institutions in mitigating agency conflicts. On the other side, this reciprocal relationship could induce the managerial self-interest behaviors, and then offsets the restriction effect of relational investing institutions in the corporate strategic process, which is more unfavorable for non-independent relational investing institutions than the independent ones.The supervision effect and reciprocity effect of relational investing institutions have different importance in restraining the managerial self-interest behaviors during the strategic process, between which the supervision effect dominates. Compared with independent relational investing institutions, the reciprocity effectof non-independent ones accounts more to restrain the managerial self-interest behaviors. The abundant and professional attributes of financial connecting directors are beneficial to alleviate the corporate financing constraints, and their heterogeneity and specialization can help to alleviate the managerial competence constraints during the strategic process, which demonstrates the resource effect of financial connecting directors. Compared with non bank-connecting directors, bank-connecting directors could more significantly reduce the degree of financing constraints.The information intermediary and signaling function of financial connecting directors could reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the company and the fund providers. By reducing the information asymmetry from both sides, financial connecting directors could alleviate the financing constraints during the corporate strategic process, which demonstrates the information effect of financial connecting directors in alleviating the resource constraints during the strategic process.The resource effect and information effect of financial connecting directors have different importance in alleviating financing constraints during the strategic process, between which the resource effect dominates. Compared with bank- connecting directors, the information effect of non bank-connecting directors accounts more to alleviate the corporate financing constraints during the strategic process. This dissertation theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the mechanism and validity of relational investing institutions and financial connecting directors involving in the strategic governance based on the perspective of the crossing field of corporate governance and strategic management. Our research reflects some innovation in the following two aspects. Firstly, different from the previous research of corporate governance about agency conflicts and strategic management about resource constraints, this dissertation focuses on mitigating agency conflicts and alleviating resource constraints during the strategic process, supplemented by empirical tests in the context of diversified strategic mergers and acquisitions. Our research embodies the integration of corporate governance and strategic management, as well as the integration of strategic process and strategic content. Secondly, based on the integrated perspective of supervision effect and reciprocity effect, this dissertation initially makes an empirical study on the mechanisms and effectiveness about relational investing institutions to mitigate the self-interest or over-confident agency conflicts during the strategic process, and then compares the supervision effect and reciprocity effect according to the path coefficients estimated by structural equation model. At the same time, based on the integrated perspective of resource effect and information effect, this dissertation initially makes the other empirical study on the mechanisms and effectiveness about financial connecting directors to alleviate the financing constraints or managerial competence constraints during the strategic process, and then compares the resource effect and information effect according to the path coefficients estimated by structural equation model. These research contents are innovative in the aspects of both research perspectives and research methods.
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