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论文编号: | 9360 | |
作者编号: | 2120152408 | |
上传时间: | 2017/6/20 17:48:56 | |
中文题目: | 贸易信贷模式下零售商竞争对供应链运营决策的影响研究 | |
英文题目: | the Impact of Retailer Competition on Supply Chain Operation Decision under Trade Credit Model | |
指导老师: | 李荣 | |
中文关键字: | 贸易信贷;运营决策;供应链竞争;中小企业 | |
英文关键字: | trade credit;supply chain competition;operational decision;SME | |
中文摘要: | 中小企业是我国国民经济和社会发展的重要力量。然而,由于中小企业规模小、资产少、风险高等特点导致其符合贷款条件的较少,难以从银行等金融机构获得贷款,融资难融资贵问题依然突出。贸易信贷作为经济活动中比较常用的融资手段之一,从一定程度上可以缓解中小企业融资难的问题。改革开放至今,贸易信贷在我国逐步放开,范围逐步扩大,发挥了较大的积极作用。在学术界,贸易信贷模式也一直在吸引着学者们的目光,研究内容涵盖了贸易信贷模式的发展动机、影响因素和贸易信贷对运营管理的影响等。 本文在前人研究的基础上,研究供应商和零售商构成的两级供应链,用斯坦伯格博弈建立贸易信贷的模型,将零售商的初始资金和还款信用作为两个重要参数纳入到模型的构建中来,在面临不确定的市场需求的情况下,得出供应商和零售商的最优运营决策。并通过引入零售商之间的数量竞争,对比分析竞争因素对于零售商和供应商运营决策的影响。 基于模型推导和数值分析的结果,本文得出四条结论:1.零售商的最优订购量随批发价的提高先减小后增大。这主要是由于零售商订货的固定成本和线性成本之间的权重变化引起的。2.在选择零售商成为合作伙伴时,供应商更倾向于选择初始资金少、还款信用高的零售商。3.在选择零售商成为合作伙伴时,相对于零售商资金受限的程度,供应商在挑选零售商时,更看重零售商的还款信用。 4.竞争的引入,一方面提高了零售商获得贸易信贷的门槛,另一方面放大了零售商还款信用的影响。因此,对于还款信用较低的零售商,供应商更倾向于和单一零售商合作;对于还款信用较高的零售商,供应商更倾向于同时和两个零售商合作,引发他们之间的竞争。5.发现竞争与非竞争模式的对比,在进行供应链的结构选择时,针对还款信用高的零售商可以考虑引入竞争来提高供应链的利润。 | |
英文摘要: | Small and medium sized enterprises(SME) are an important force in China 's national economy and social development. However, it’s difficult for SME to obtain financial loans from banks and other financial institutions due to the small size of SME, low assets and high credit risk. As one of the most commonly used financing means in the economic activities, trade credit can alleviate the financing difficulty of SME to a certain extent. Since the reform and opening up, trade credit in China gradually liberalized, gradually expand the scope, played a greater positive role. In the academic circles, the trade credit model has also attracted the attention of scholars. The study covers the development of trade credit model motives, influencing factors and trade credit on the impact of operational management. Based on the previous research, this paper studies the two-level supply chain composed of suppliers and retailers and establishes the model of trade credit with Steinberg game. In the construction of the model, the optimal operation decision of the supplier and the retailer is obtained in the face of uncertain market demand. And through the introduction of the quantity competition of two retailers, we make comparative analysis of competitive factors for retailers and suppliers operating decision-making impact. Based on the results of model derivation and numerical analysis, this paper draws five conclusions: 1. The optimal order quantity of retailers decreases first and then increases with the increase of wholesale price. 2. When choosing a retailer to become a partner, the supplier is more likely to choose a retailer with less initial funding and a higher repayment credit. 3. When choosing a retailer to become a partner, the supplier is more concerned with the repayment credit.4. The introduction of competition, on the one hand to improve the retailers to obtain the threshold of trade credit, on the other hand to enlarge the impact of retailers’ repayment credit. As a result, for retailers with lower repayment credits, suppliers are more likely to work with a single retailer; for retailers with higher credit repayment, suppliers are more likely to work with both retailers at the same time, triggering competition. 5. To find a comparison between competition and non-competition patterns, retailers with high repayment credit can consider introducing competition to improve the profitability of the supply chain when making structural choices in the supply chain. | |
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