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论文编号：	9315
作者编号：	2120152445
上传时间：	2017/6/19 23:30:11
中文题目：	股权激励、审计质量与非效率投资 ——基于我国成长期上市公司的视角
英文题目：	Equity Incentive, Audit Quality and Investment Inefficiency: Based on the Perspective of the Growing Companies
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	股权激励；审计质量；非效率投资
英文关键字：	Equity Incentive；Audit Quality；Investment Inefficiency
中文摘要：	投资决策是公司战略决策的关键，投资效率的高低不仅影响了公司的盈利能力，还与公司的长远发展密不可分，然而当前我国上市公司中普遍存在非效率投资行为。股权激励作为一种对管理层进行长期激励的契约，是公司治理机制的重要组成部分，有效的股权激励机制可以缓解企业内部的代理问题，使管理层在进行决策时更加关注公司的长远发展。 代理问题一直是学术界研究的重点，近年来随着相关法规制度的相继出台以及股权分置改革的基本完成，越来越多的公司开始推出股权激励计划，国内外的学者也开始关注股权激励计划对公司投资效率的影响。本文也以此为切入点，并进一步研究审计质量对于股权激励治理功能的影响，使企业关注内外部治理机制的协同作用，使股权激励发挥更好的治理效果。 本文以2009～2015年沪深两市A股成长期上市公司为样本，研究其投资行为的特征；然后从过度投资和投资不足两个方面，对股权激励是否有利于缓解企业的非效率投资行为进行实证检验；最后，引入外部审计质量作为调节变量，研究不同审计质量下股权激励与非效率投资关系的差异。 研究发现，非效率投资现象普遍存在于我国成长期上市公司中，其中投资不足公司所占比例更大，过度投资公司数量虽然较少，但危害程度更大；股权激励能起到抑制投资不足的作用，但是不能显著抑制过度投资；较高的审计质量使股权激励对投资不足行为的抑制作用显著增强，即股权激励与高质量的独立审计存在协同作用，但是审计质量在股权激励与过度投资的关系中没有起到显著的调节作用。本文研究表明，近年来推出的股权激励和独立审计相关制度都在一定程度上起到了积极的效果。最后，本文从完善我国股权激励制度和独立审计制度的角度为提高上市公司投资效率提供了相关的政策建议。
英文摘要：	Investment decision is a critical part of corporate strategy decision. The efficiency of investment not only impacts the profitability of the company, but also closely connects with company's long-term development. However, inefficient investment behavior widely exists in China listed companies. As a kind of long-term incentive contract for management, equity incentive plays an important part in corporate governance mechanism. Effective equity incentive mechanism can alleviate agency problem in the company and make the management pay more attention to the long-term development of company when making decisions. Agency problem has always been the focus of academic research. In recent years, with relevant laws and regulations released and non-tradable share reform almost completed, more and more companies began to launch equity incentive plan, both domestic and abroad scholars begin to pay close attention to the influence of the equity incentive plan on corporate investment efficiency. This paper also took this as a breakthrough point, and further studied the effects of audit quality on the governance function of equity incentive, making the enterprise pay attention to the synergy of internal and external governance mechanism, so that equity incentive could create a better governance effect. This paper selected listed companies in China from 2009 to 2015 as sample, firstly studied the characteristics of their investment behaviors. Then, from two aspects of overinvestment and underinvestment, this paper tested whether equity incentive was helpful to relieve the inefficient investment behaviors. Finally, the paper introduced external audit quality as a moderator variable to study the different relationship between equity incentive and inefficient investment under different audit quality. The results of the study showed three points. Firstly, it has been found that the inefficient investment widespread existed in listed companies, and the proportion of underinvestment was larger than overinvestment，but the level of overinvestment was more serious than underinvestment. Secondly, the equity incentive can play the role of inhibiting underinvestment, but can't inhibit overinvestment. Thirdly, considering the influence of audit quality, the inhibiting effect of equity incentive on underinvestment increased significantly, which means high audit quality strengthen the governance effect of equity incentive. However, audit quality didn’t play a significant moderator role in the governance process of equity incentive on overinvestment. To sum up, this paper indicated that the managerial equity incentive and independent audit have played a positive role in improving the efficiency of corporate investment to some extent. Finally, the paper provided some practical suggestions, including establishing a rational incentive mechanism and enhancing the supervision of independent audit.
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