联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	9302
作者编号：	2120152472
上传时间：	2017/6/19 20:53:51
中文题目：	上市公司自由现金流对投资效率的影响研究 ——基于2011-2015的面板数据
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Free Cash Flow on Investment Efficiency of Chinese Listed Companies: Based on 2011-2015 Panel Data
指导老师：	余娟
中文关键字：	自由现金流；投资效率；公司治理；调节作用
英文关键字：	Free Cash Flow; Investment Efficiency; Corporate Governance; Moderating Effect
中文摘要：	纵观中国经济的发展历程，投资活动通常是各企业乃至国家关心的重点，众多学者也从不同的视角对上市公司的投资行为展开探讨。企业投资决策是否有效对其长远发展和未来业绩有重要的影响。近几年，中国的经济增长持续加快，上市公司面临的投资问题也明显增加，从宏观到微观都显现出了“非合理化投资”的现象。部分企业势头强劲，呈现出了“投资过热”的问题，还有部分企业由于两权分离存在代理问题等，导致“投资不足”错失了可获得收益的项目，以上两类投资行为均体现为投资无效率，会减少企业可获得的利益影响其未来的发展。由此可知，深层次研究企业投资行为的影响因素和相关的约机制，同时提出合理化的意见和建议是十分有必要的。 针对这一现象，本研究依据投资-现金流敏感性、委托代理理论等，借鉴国内外研究成果，对中国1279家A股上市公司2011—2015年的投资行为展开了分析，首先研究对上市公司投资效率和自由现金流的影响路径进行检验，同时，根据前人研究成果及中国的现有状况，建立了公司治理指标体系，计算了样本公司的治理水平得分。接着，为了验证公司治理对企业投资行为的调节作用，对自由现金流、投资效率、公司治理三者展开回归分析，构建自由现金流和公司治理得分的交互项，将其引入回归模型，观察交互项是否显著。 经过一系列的回归检验，能够获得下面的结论：首先，从Richardson投资支出模型的残差分布可以看出中国的上市公司内部确实存在非合理化投资的问题，既有投资过度也有投资不足，且中国企业中出现投资不足问题的企业数量高于投资过度；其次，上市公司过度投资的程度和自由现金流之间呈现显著正相关关系，自由现金流对投资不足问题有负向影响；接着，企业的公司治理水平在自由现金流对投资过度的影响中起到了调节作用，公司治理机制可以较好地对企业的投资过度进行调节。但是，从公司治理体系的不同视角观察，只有部分维度的抑制作用明显。最后本文以研究结果为基础，为公司的运转和研究提出建议。
英文摘要：	Throughout the development of China's economy，Investment activities have always been the focus of enterprises and countries. Many scholars have also researched the investment behavior of enterprises. The effectiveness of investment decisions directly affect enterprises’ future performance and long-term development. Recently, many companies have strong desire of investment. However, there is phenomenon of "irrational investment" from the macro level to the micro level. And there are also some companies faced with divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights as well as agency problem, appear underinvestment and miss items with positive NPV. Such inefficient investment behavior will have a negative impact on the interests and future development of enterprises. Therefore, it is really necessary to deeply study corporate investment behavior and its control mechanism and put forward corresponding suggestions. In response to this phenomenon, this paper bases on the theory of investment cash flow sensitivity, learn from domestic and foreign research results, and studies on the investment behavior of 1279 listed companies from 2011 to 2015. Firstly, our research examines the relationship between the investment efficiency of Listed Companies and free cash flow. At the same time, according to previous research results and the actual situation in China, the paper establishes the index system of corporate governance and calculate the KM Level of sample firms. Then, in order to verify the moderating effect of corporate governance on companies’ investment behavior, we make a regression analysis on three variables of free cash flow, investment efficiency and corporate governance. Constructing the interaction between free cash flow and corporate governance and introducing the interaction term into the regression model in order to observing whether the interaction terms are significant. Through a series of empirical tests, we can obtain some conclusions: Firstly, it can be seen from the residual distribution of Richardson investment expenditure model that there are some problems of irrational investment in Chinese Listed Companies. There are both excessive and insufficient. And the problem of insufficient investment in Chinese enterprises is more serious than over investment. Secondly, there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of over investment and free cash flow, and there is a negative correlation between the degree of underinvestment and free cash flow. Then, the level of corporate governance plays a moderating role in the impact of free cash flow on Overinvestment. Corporate governance mechanism can effectively curb excessive investment behavior. However, for different points of corporate governance, only a part of the inhibitory effect is obvious. Finally, considering the research results, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the operation and further study of the enterprise.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)