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论文编号：	9291
作者编号：	1120130819
上传时间：	2017/6/19 18:33:01
中文题目：	混合所有制改革中国有和非国有资本的行为博弈——行为和比较制度的实验研究
英文题目：	Behavioral Game Between State-Owned Capital and Non-State-Owned Capital in Mixed Ownership Reform——A Behavioral and Comparative Institutional Experimental Research
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	混合所有制；利益分配；行为博弈实验；经济治理；公司治理
英文关键字：	Mixed ownership reform; state-owned capital; Laboratory experiment; non-state-owned capital; Behavior analysis
中文摘要：	混合所有制改革是多年来国有企业所有制改革的重要路径，更是当前全面深化国有企业改革的突破口所在。这一改革路径地实施需要国有资本与非国有资本在各个层面就利益格局地调整达成一定共识。而从现实情况来看，混合所有制改革已经在诸多竞争性领域得到了一定的发展，但在普遍具有公共资源属性的多个垄断领域，混合所有制改革地推进依然举步维艰。在这些领域中，改革共识地凝聚与达成需要有关博弈方进行的行为博弈，而国有资本与非国有资本是在不同行为认知框架上成长起来的行为主体，这二者关于改革红利地分配有着明显不同的利益诉求。前者是要在实现国有资产保值增值的前提下完成顶层设计的改革任务，后者则是要在可承受的风险范围内最大化地获取制度变迁所带来的制度收益。这种利益冲突与协调将从外部的经济治理层面延伸到企业边界内的公司治理层面。本文从行为视角出发，着重分析异质性行为主体在不同层面的利益分配的博弈行为，借助实验室实验方法研究经济治理层面影响国有资本与非国有资本进行利益分配博弈的制度元素和行为元素，并在此基础上进一步深入到公司治理层面，通过结合当前政策导向来分析异质性利益主体在公司控制权收益分配、董事会决策等方面存在的体制机制障碍，进而提出相应的政策建议。本文的研究表明，在经济治理层面，政府作为改革推动者所提供的政策支持对于有进入意愿的非国有资本而言是一种制度激励，而面对因混合所有制改革而可能出现的利益空间，非国有资本的进入次序会影响其最终的收益。越早参与则会在序贯的行为博弈中获得一定的次序优势。然而，来自顶层设计的政策支持并不能很快解决混合所有制改革所面临的一些体制机制障碍。其中政府对垄断国有资本的政策支持（如软预算约束）及其在产业进入、融资贷款等方面的政策便利等都会使国有资本获得一定的实际政治权力，从而提高了其谈判能力，进而会使其在混合所有制改革的利益分配进程中获得更多的收益。而且，垄断国有资本这些优势的存在事实上增加了非国有资本参与改革的交易成本，这显然会对本来处于弱势的非国有资本带来更多的负面影响。经济治理层面的这些行为博弈最终会在公司治理层面以具体的治理机制和治理结构体现出来。本文的研究结果表明，在企业边界之内，拥有较强谈判能力的垄断国有资本一般情况下会占有更多的股权比例，并进而在董事会治理中获得投票权优势，这使其在董事长选举、控制权收益分配等方面会拥有主导权，这一点与当前的改革所面临的实际情况是十分吻合的。在此基础上，本文利用实验室实验范式，结合特殊管理股的政策导向灵活设计了两个比较制度实验。通过变动国有资本的持股比例来考察一票否决权和超级表决权这两个机制对异质性资本行为博弈进程的影响。本文的研究发现，超级表决权和一票否决权的作用在不同的股权结构中是不同的，其还会受到信息机制的影响。本文在半公开的信息机制下检验了这两种特殊管理股制度对国有股东和非国有股东在董事长竞选和控制权收益分配方面的作用。研究结果表明，在制衡型股权结构中，一票否决权使得国有股东可以占据主导地位，同时也使其掌握了掏空控制权私人收益的机会，非国有资本的收益会降低，而超级表决权的存在并不能为国有股东带来更多收益。在相对集中型股权结构中，超级表决权的存在不能增加国有股东的收益，而一票否决权是否可以获得更多收益取决于国有股东对权力使用的认识。实现放权让利和维持主导权之间的平衡需要国有股东在使用一票否决权时能够审时度势。本文的创新之处一方面在于首次设计了能够抽象混合所有制改革中异质性主体行为特质的连续序贯博弈的实验框架。率先在实验室情境中探讨了经济治理层面的次序优势、交易成本、超级股东身份等影响国有资本与非国有资本的行为博弈的制度因素，通过分析这些影响因素来为政策制定者提供关于垄断领域混合所有制改革的经济治理机制的政策建议。另一方面本文首次在经济学实验室中结合中国改革实际检验了特殊管理股制度的可行性和有效性，充分利用了实验室实验在制度试错方面的灵活性，为当前和今后垄断领域混合所有制企业的治理机制设计与实施提供了前瞻性的理论支持。
英文摘要：	The mixed ownership reform is an important path for the reform of ownership of state-owned companies over the years, and it is the breakthrough of the deepening reform of state-owned companies. The implementation of this reform path requires state-owned capital and non-state -owned capital to adjust the pattern of interest to reach a certain consensus at all levels. From the reality, the mixed ownership reform has been developed in many competitive fields, but in the field of common monopoly of public resources, the progress of mixed ownership reform is still difficult. In these areas, the cohesion of reform consensus and the realization of the need for the parties concerned to carry out the continuous game of the benefits, while state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital are stakeholders in different cognitive frameworks. The distribution of dividends on the two has a distinctly different interest. The former is to achieve the reform task of top-down design under the promise of realizing the preservation and appreciation of the state-owned assets, and the latter is to maximize returns of Institutions brought about by the institutional changes under the range of affordable risks. This conflict and coordination of interests will extend from the external economic governance level to the corporate governance level within the corporate boundaries. From the perspective of behavior, this paper focuses on analyzing the game behavior of heterogeneous stakeholders at different levels, and explores the institutional elements and behavior elements of the negotiation of the benefit distributions in the state-owned and non-state-owned capital by means of laboratory experiments. And on this basis of penetrating into the internal corporate governance level deeply, and through the combination of the current policy oriented analysis of the stakeholders’ heterogeneity of the benefit location of control rights, the board of directors and other aspects of the institutional barriers exist, and then put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. This paper shows that at the level of economic governance, the government as a reform promoter to provide policy support is an institutional incentive for non-state-owned capital with a willingness to enter, and in the face of a possible interest space for mixed ownership reform, the entry order of non-state-owned capital will affect its final earnings. The earlier participation will gain a certain order advantage in the sequential game of the benefits. However, policy support from top-down design does not address some of the institutional barriers to mixed ownership reform quickly. The government's policy support to monopolize state-owned capital (such as soft budget constraints) and its policy convenience in industrial entry and financing loans will enable the state-owned capital to obtain some practical political power, so as to improve the bargaining power, and then which will lead to more benefits in the process of the benefit distributions in mixed ownership reform. Moreover, the existence of these advantages of monopolizing state-owned capital actually increases the transaction costs of non-state-owned capital participation in reform, which clearly has more negative effects on originally disadvantaged non-state-owned capital. Game of the benefits in the economic governance level will eventually reflect a specific governance mechanism and governance structure in the corporate governance level. The results of this study show that, within the boundaries of the enterprise, the monopoly of state-owned capital with strong bargaining power will generally have more equity ratio, and then to obtain the advantage of right to vote in the board of directors, which makes it in the chairman election, the income distribution of control rights and so on will have the initiative, which is very consistent with the current actual reform. On this basis, by using the laboratory experiment and the policy guidance of the special management shares, the author designs two comparative institutional experiments.By changing the proportion of state-owned shares to examine the veto power and super voting rights of these two mechanisms on heterogeneous capital game process impact. On the one hand, the innovation of this paper lies in the design of an experimental framework for the continuous sequential game which can be used to describe the heterogeneity of the main actors in the mixed ownership reform. The first in the laboratory situation to explore the economic governance level of the order advantage, transaction costs, super shareholder status and other factors that affect the behavioral game of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital of the institutional factors, by analyzing these influencing factors to provide policy makers with policy recommendations on economic governance mechanisms for mixed ownership reform in the monopolies. On the other hand, this paper first examines the feasibility and effectiveness of the special management system in the economic laboratory with China's reform, and make full use of the flexibility of the experiment in the trial and error of the system, which provides forward-looking theoretical support for the formulation and implementation in the governance mechanism of the mixed monopoly enterprises in the future.
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