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论文编号:927 
作者编号:2120072022 
上传时间:2009/5/24 19:33:21 
中文题目:独立董事特征与上市公司多元化战  
英文题目:An Empirical Study about the R  
指导老师:薛有志 
中文关键字:独立董事特征;多元化战略;独立董 
英文关键字:Independent Director Character 
中文摘要:自二十世纪90年代开始,多元化战略开始成为中国企业的成长路径。然而,近几年多元化战略的频频失败引发了人们对多元化战略的问题进行了关注。大量学者的研究表明,由于委托代理问题的存在,管理者可能为了追求多元化战略的个人收益而损害股东利益。由此,公司治理与多元化战略的关系成为学术界研究的重要问题之一。然而,由于中国上市公司独立董事制度尚不完善,关于独立董事特征对多元化战略影响的研究还不多见。 独立董事制度是西方一元制权力模式下发展的产物。从美、英等的实践经验来看,独立董事制度的实施在一定程度上起到了完善公司治理结构的作用。安然事件和世界通讯公司事件引发了学术界和实务界对完善独立董事制度的深入思考。针对我国公司治理结构的现状,中国证监会在我国上市公司中引入了独立董事制度,旨在完善上市公司治理结构、促进上市公司规范运作。然而,根据资源基础论,国内很多上市公司将独立董事作为一种战略实施资源的现象较为明显,因此,笔者从代理理论与资源基础论的视角探索了独立董事特征与多元化战略的关系,研究结论不仅对我国上市公司独立董事的作用具有深入的认知,而且对于独立董事制度的优化具有一定的意义。 本文以2003到2006年中国深、沪两地的上市公司为研究样本,利用多元回归模型检验了独立董事的薪酬以及独立董事的比例对样本公司多元化程度的影响,其检验结果如下:公司的独立董事薪酬与多元化程度呈正“U”型关系,说明独立董事的薪酬不仅对其作用的发挥具有激励效应,而且独立董事薪酬的过高会给独立董事的监督职能产生风险规避效应。当独立董事薪酬处于较低水平时,独立董事的薪酬与多元化程度呈负相关关系,此时,独立董事薪酬的激励效应更加明显。当独立董事薪酬处于较高水平时,独立董事的薪酬与多元化程度呈正相关关系,此时,独立董事薪酬的风险规避效应更加明显。然而,两种效应同时存在,相互叠加后导致结果的统计意义不显著。但这一结果对于我们设计科学的独立董事薪酬制度,防止过度激励而产生的负面效应,具有一定的借鉴意义。 本文通过多元回归模型进行检验后发现,中国上市公司独立董事比例与多元化程度正相关。因此,可以认为中国上市公司独立董事的监督作用难以实现,而独立董事与管理者窜谋的现象较为明显。独立董事更多的是为管理者实现多元化战略提供一种资源。通过检验独立董事比例与大股东持股比例对多元化程度的交叉效应时发现,大股东持股比例对多元化程度的抑制作用下降,由此说明,中国上市公司独立董事的作用并非丧失,但起作用必须和有效的大股东监督进行有效的配合方可以发挥。同样,大股东的作用也必须通过独立董事的有效监督予以实现,独立董事的治理作用与大股东的治理作用存在显著的互补效应。为了研究结果的稳健性,笔者同时选择是否主动设立独立董事这一变量进行检验后,其结果与上述分析相同,并且该结论通过了统计意义上的显著性检验。由此,为我们优化独立董事制度提供了一定的启发,独立董事对公司发展战略并非是一件坏事,对于公司的长期发展的确产生了重要的作用,但我们必须加强大股东的监督控制作用,防止管理者与独立董事的窜谋,使得独立董事的资源供给与监督控制效应同时发挥。  
英文摘要:Since the twentieth century 90's, the diversification strategy becomes the growth path of Chinese corporation. In recent years, however, the frequent failures of the diversification strategy have been concerned. Many studies have shown that because of the existence of principal-agent problem, managers may pursue diversification strategy to the personal income in the cost of shareholders. Therefore, the relationship between corporate governance and diversification strategy becomes one of the important issues in academic field. However, due to the system of independent directors is not perfect in china, the studies of the impact that the characteristics of independent directors on the diversification strategy are also rare. The independent director system is the product which develops under a Western unitary system authority pattern. Looking from US and UK experience, to a certain extent, the implementation of independent director system performs a function as consummating the corporate governance structure. Enron event and the World Communication Company event have initiated the academic circle and the practical realms to thorough ponder of the consummation independent director system. In view of the present situation of Chinese Corporate Governance structure, the Chinese Securities Supervisory Association has introduced the independent director system to listed companies, for the purpose of consummating the listed companies in corporate governance structure, and promoting their standard operation. However, according to the resource based view, it is obvious that many domestic listed companies take the independent director as one kind of strategy-implementing resources. Therefore, I explored the relationship of the independent director characteristic and diversification strategy from the angle of the proxy theory and the resource-base view. The research conclusion not only has the thorough cognition of independent director's function to our country to be listed, but has certain significance to the independent director system's optimization. This thesis take 2003 to 2006 the Chinese Shenzhen and Shanghai two place's listed companies as the studied sample, using multiple regression model to examine the influence of independent director's salary as well as independent director's proportion to the sample companies' diversification level , and the result is as follows: independent directors' salary and the diversification degree present “U” relation, showed that independent director's salary not only has the motivation effect to its function, but the too much salary of independent directors had the risk circumvention effect for their surveillance function. When the independent director salary is in the low level, independent director's salary and the diversification level assume the inverse correlation relations, and then the independent director salary's motivation effect is more obvious. When the independent director salary is in the high level, independent director's salary and the diversification level present correlation dependence, and then the independent director salary's risk circumvention effect is more obvious. However, the two kinds of effects exist at the same time, which will mutually superimpose, causes the statistical significance not to be remarkable. But this result has certainly significance in designing the scientific independent director salary system, preventing the negative effect caused by excessively motivation. After the examination through multiple regression models, I discovered that the independent director proportion and the diversification degree present direct proportion in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, we may think that independent director's supervision function is difficult to realize in Chinese listed companies, but the conspire phenomenon that between the independent director and the superintendent is obvious. The independent directors' function is providing resources for the superintendent to realize the diversification strategy. Through examination the cross-effect that the proportion of independent director and the proportion that major stockholders' possession on company diversification level, I discover that the restrain effect that the proportion that major stockholders' possession on diversification level descends, which explained that independent director's function is not loses, but can take effect under the effective cooperation of major stockholders. Similarly, major stockholder's function must realize through independent director's active oversight. Independent director's governance function and major stockholder's governance function exists remarkable supplementary effect. For findings' robustness, I, simultaneously, choose the variable whether to set up independent director initiatively to test, and its result is same with the above analysis, and this conclusion adopted in the statistical significance examination. From this, it provides us certain inspiration for optimizing the independent director system. The independent director is good for the corporate growth strategy and has the vital role regarding company's long-term development. But we must strengthen major stockholder's supervisory function, preventing the conspire phenomenon between management and independent director, and in order to make the independent director's resource-supplying and supervisory go into effect together.  
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