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论文编号：	914
作者编号：	2120072065
上传时间：	2009/5/23 12:37:40
中文题目：	治理环境对钢铁行业上市公司利益
英文题目：	Research on Institutional Envi
指导老师：	马连福 教授
中文关键字：	控股股东 利益输送 关联交易 治<
英文关键字：	Controlling shareholder Tunnel
中文摘要：	我国上市公司与控股股东保持着密切联系，频繁的关联交易逐渐成为控股股东利益输送的一个重要方式和手段。近年来，钢铁行业并购重组浪潮不断推进，控股股东与上市公司之间的资产收购关联交易更加频繁。因此，以钢铁上市公司的资产收购关联交易为切入点，考察控股股东的利益输送行为，具有一定的研究价值和现实意义。 本文对前人研究进行了梳理和评述，对我国特殊的制度背景以及钢铁行业的行业背景进行了总结。公司治理环境是公司治理机制发挥有效性的基础之一。治理环境包括市场化进程、政府对企业的干预以及法律对投资者的保护力度等。在中国这个新兴加转轨的市场经济环境下，不同区域的市场化程度、政府水平以及投资者法律保护程度是存在显著差异的。这些因素将影响到控股股东的行为。我国上市公司的外部环境和公司治理水平都难以对控股股东行为形成约束。 本研究采用事件研究法，以大股东在资产收购关联交易中的非正常报酬率作为大股东侵占上市公司和中小股东利益的直接衡量指标，建立公司治理环境指数，考察了治理环境对大股东“利益输送”（tunneling）行为的影响。实证结果发现，上市公司所处地区的治理环境与大股东的利益侵占行为呈显著的负相关关系，上市公司所处地区的市场化进程越快、政府水平越高，则大股东利益输送程度越低。但是没有显著证据证明地区法制水平对利益输送有显著影响。 研究还发现，利益输送行为与股权集中度之间呈现U型关系，支持大股东控制的利益侵占效应和利益趋同效应假定。 基于研究结论和理论分析，本研究提出以下政策建议：第一，优化治理环境。进一步改革证券发行制度。进一步健全投资者保护的法律体系，提升投资者利益保护的程度。第二，控股股东应当知会上市公司独立性的要求，按照规范的公司治理做法处理与上市公司关系。第三，上市公司应当健全公司治理机制，建立相关的机制规范控股股东行为。包括健全关联交易内部控制制度、强化信息披露、充分发挥独立董事的作用等。
英文摘要：	Listed companies maintained inextricably links with controlling shareholders. Frequent related party transactions have gradually become an important way of tunneling. In recent years, because of the policy, the steel industry continue to push forward a wave of merger and acquisition, related party transactions are more frequent. Therefore, to study related party transactions of China's steel companies and to examine the controlling shareholders’ actions have very practical significance. Based on previous research, China's special institutional background and the current background of the steel industry, this study put forward new research ideas. Corporate governance environment is also one of the foundations of the validity except of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanism. In an emerging market and transition economy, different regions have different degree of government intervention, as well as the degree of legal protection of investors. In this research, event study is our main research tool. We use CAR as tunneling in related party transactions and occupation of small and medium-sized shareholders’ interests. We set up corporate governance environment index to study the controlling shareholders’ tunneling in different regions. Empirical results show that, tunneling has significant negative correlation and corporate governance environment. The sooner the process of market-oriented, and the lower the degree of intervention between government and business, the lower degree of tunneling. But we did not find any evidence that the legal degree has significant correlation with tunnelling. Tunneling and ownership concentration shows significant U relations. Based on the findings and theoretical analysis, this study makes the following recommendations: First, optimize the institutional environment. Make further reform on the securities distribution system. Protect the interests of investors as the basic objectives of securities regulation. Further improve the legal system of investor protection and enhance the extent of the protection of the investors. Second, the controlling shareholders should maintain the relationship with listed companies based on corporate governance rather than controlling. Third, listed companies should set up corporate governance mechanisms better to make rules on the acts of controlling shareholders, such as information disclosure and make better use of independent directors.
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