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论文编号：	902
作者编号：	2120071990
上传时间：	2009/5/24 15:16:44
中文题目：	信息披露、治理结构对股权融资成
英文题目：
指导老师：	武立东教授
中文关键字：	信息披露 治理结构 股权融资成本
英文关键字：	Information Disclosure Company
中文摘要：	信息在整个证券市场上起着重要作用。证券市场信息不对称会导致逆向选择和道德风险，增加证券交易的成本，进而导致整个证券市场的低效率。有关于信息披露与股权融资成本之间关系的研究是国际资本市场研究的重点领域之一。随着我国证券市场的发展壮大及逐步规范，信息披露问题也日益受到上市公司、投资者、监管机构的重视。然而在我国，关于信息披露对股权融资成本影响的研究还比较缺乏，现有的研究虽然从实证方面证明了我国上市公司信息披露与股权融资成本存在负相关关系，但仅局限在对控制财务变量的基础上对两变量关系进行研究，未深入探讨公司治理对股权融资成本的影响以及治理结构是否对二者关系产生调节作用。 本文在借鉴国内外研究的基础上，建构了包括信息披露影响股权融资成本的主效应以及治理结构对二者关系调节效应在内的理论框架，在理论分析的基础上提出了信息披露与股权融资成本负相关的假设以及股权结构的调节作用会强化二者负相关关系，高管激励和董事会监督会弱化二者负相关关系的假设。 最后，本文以我国深圳证券交易所主板上市的238家A股非金融类公司2006年的情况作为研究样本，进行了实证研究。在实证过程中，本文选用剩余收益折现模型计算出股权融资成本，并对股权融资成本的合理性进行了检验；同时采用深交所公布的上市公司信息披露考核结果作为信息披露的替代变量。实证结果显示，无论是在仅对财务指标进行控制的情况下，还是在同时对财务指标和治理结构指标进行控制的情况下，信息披露水平与公司股权融资成本都显著负相关，说明信息披露对股权融资成本的影响是稳定的；然而，实证结果没能完全支持治理结构对二者关系调节作用的假设。仅高管激励会弱化两者的负相关关系，即高管持股比例越高的上市公司通过信息披露带来的股权融资成本下降的利益越少。结论说明，上市公司提高信息披露水平具有实践意义，治理结构在资本市场上的作用还有待进一步探讨。
英文摘要：	Information plays an important role in the stock market. Information asymmetry will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard, increase the transaction cost and make the stock market low efficiency. The full disclosure of information may save the transaction cost by reducing the degree of information asymmetry in the release and the transaction process in the stock market. The relationship between information disclosure and the cost of equity capital is a significant field in international research. In China, with the great development of the stock market, information disclosure is also be attached more and more importance by listed companies, investors and related institutions. However, study in China is lacking and existing research is limited, they have not considered corporate governance would influence the cost of equity capital and the relationship between information disclosure and cost of equity capital. In this paper, we construct a research framework including the influence of information disclosure on the cost of equity capital and the moderating effect on the two variables by the governance structure. Then we suppose a high level of information disclosure will reduce the cost of equity capital, ownership centralized will strengthen the negative correlation between these two variables, on the contrary, executives inspiring and board supervising will weaken their relationship. We take A stock non-finance companies in 2006 on the motherboard in Shenzhen stock market as research samples. Then we explores whether the relationship between information disclosure and cost of equity capital is same with the developed countries under our country special stock market environment. In this study, we use a discounted residual income model to estimate the cost of equity cost and examine the results’ rationality, and then we use information quality released by Shenzhen stock market to evaluate the level of information disclosure. We find that on the condition of controlling some financial variables, the samples with higher-quality information disclosure will have lower cost of equity capital. Then we put corporate governance variables into the model, it shows that the influence of information disclosure on the cost of equity capital is stable. But the relationship between company governance and the cost of equity capital is not significant. In the end, we tests whether corporate governance variables influence the relationship between information disclosure and cost of equity capital. The results of this research show that compared to companies with higher executives share ratio, the quality of information disclosure has more significant influences on the cost of equity capital in companies with lower ratio. And we find no evidence for other four variables.
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