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论文编号：	90
作者编号：	2120052036
上传时间：	2007/6/21 20:50:16
中文题目：	基于大股东选择偏好的董事会治理
英文题目：	The empirical research on boar
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	董事会治理 选择偏好 大股<
英文关键字：	Board Governance Choosing Pre
中文摘要：	作为公司治理的核心，董事会治理在市场经济刚刚起步，某些市场机制缺失或者疲软的新兴国家，特别是在股权高度集中的情况下存在明显的转轨经济特征。出于规避市场规制、攫取公司利益或是保护自身利益的需要，大股东对内外部治理机制存在显著的选择偏好性，即大股东通过对自身成本和收益的判断，对公司治理机制的设立、变更和强化存在明显的选择偏好。由此，大股东对治理机制的选择偏好以及基于股权结构的股权制衡可以成为上市公司董事会治理机制产生、改变的重要解释因素。 我们做出定义，在转轨经济体制下，董事会治理机制往往表现了显著的公司治理行为，我们认为拥有显著股份的大股东为了实现规避市场规制、保护自身利益或是达到对公司利益“挖掘”（Johnson, 2001）的目的，往往通过公司信息披露机制披露公司良好的董事会治理状况，以使投资者通过观察公司所发出的信号，愿意对高质量公司进行价格补偿的原理。也就是说，大股东往往为了公司获得较好的市场表现或是规避受到外部监管的目的，通过控制董事会等权力机构设置，传递良好的董事会治理信息以期获得良好的市场反应。当然，这也存在另外一种可能，就是董事会治理中部分治理机制可能在实质上发挥作用，进而可能成为提升公司治理机制运行水平的有效工具。按照上文的逻辑，如果控制性股东对公司存在实质上的利益侵害，作为制衡力量存在的其他大股东就可能通过董事会相应的治理机制抗衡控制性股东及其联盟的行为，从而部分董事会治理的某些机制可能被其他大股东所偏好而成为一种实质性的抗衡工具。 基于此，我们使用中国上市公司2002至2005年的有效样本，引入多元回归和逻辑回归模型，控制了相应的影响变量并引入表征大股东制衡的核心变量，同时区分了大股东持股比例和大股东制衡度，使用董事会会议次数、独立董事比例、董事长和总经理是否兼任以及是否设立审计委员会作为董事会治理机制的表征变量，具体探讨：（1）第一大股东（多为控股股东）及其联盟对以上四个董事会治理机制指标的选择偏好；（2）大股东持股比例以及以此为基础的大股东制衡机制对以上四个董事会治理指标的选择偏好；（3）控制性股东及其联盟和大股东制衡度在其对董事会治理机制选择的过程中是否存在“U”型或是倒“U”型关系。 来自多元回归模型和逻辑回归模型的数据表明，第一大股东及其联盟对董事会是否设计审计委员会、独立董事比例存在明显的选择偏好，第一大股东及其联盟“厌倦”设立审计委员会和增加外部引进的独立董事，与此相反，其他大股东特别是具有制衡潜力的第三、四大股东对以上两个指标回归正向显著。 另外，第一大股东及其联盟对董事会治理某些机制的“偏好选择”往往需要承担一定的代价，因此，控股股东需要对成本收益进行衡量。类似的，其他大股东也需要基于其监督制衡能力的大小，对成本收益进行权衡，然后决定是否抵制第一大股东行为还是选择“沉默”。如此，大股东控制与制衡能力的消长以及对成本和收益的权衡，再加上大股东对不同类型董事会治理指标选择偏好，使得第一大股东持股比例和上市公司董事会治理机制特别是审计委员会设立与否、独立董事比例存在正“U”型关系，与此相反，作为制衡力量出现其他大股东必须在选择“被勾结”和“进行制衡”做出判断，当其持股比例较低时，往往偏好于提升独立董事比例或是通过设立审计委员会的形式，以协助自己更好的制约控制性股东及其联盟的行为，但其持股比例上升到一定的阶段，其本身具备一定的制衡或是“被勾结”可能时，就偏好于降低独立董事比例或是不设立审计委员会，以更好的“被勾结”或是选择“沉默”，进而最大化自身的利益。
英文摘要：	As the core of corporate governance under the transitional countries whose market mechanism maybe missing and in their emerging stage, the board governance exists significant transitional characteristics. For the sake of evading corresponding market rules, tunneling or protecting their own interests, the blockholders show obvious preference to the corporate governance mechanism construction and its change by estimating the cost and yield. Consequently we could introduce the choosing preference mechanism of blockholders and their counter-balance to explain the existence and the change of board governance signal. We have defined the corporate governance mechanism and it always demonstrates significant corporate governance behaviors. As a new concept we introduce the board governance mechanism and blockholders’ behaviors here, that is, the big shareholders uses the information disclosure measures to publish the sound board governance mechanism signal to shield the monitoring of the capital market, to prevent their own interests, or to do “tunneling” for self interest. That is to say, the blockholders could employ the seemingly good board governance mechanism to pursue good market reaction. And we should not ignore another possibility to explain this phenomenon, which means that the sound board governance would actually perform their functions, and could be utilized by other blockholders to counter balance the controlling one and its alliance. Accordingly we use the effective sample of Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2005, introduce the multiple and logistic regression models and control corresponding variables, further investigate the following themes. Firstly, the choosing preference of the first big shareholder or controlling shareholder reacts to the board governance mechanism. Secondly, the choosing preference of share holding and the corresponding counter-balance ability react to the board governance mechanism. And lastly, we investigate whether the controlling shareholder and their alliance, as well as the other shareholders’ counter-balance ability, exhibit the U shaped relationship to the some corporate governance mechanism. The multiple and logistic models demonstrate that the first blockholder and its alliance exist significant preference for audit committee and the independent director ratio. We learn that first blockholder and its alliance “hate” to set up audit committee and augment of independent director ratio. Conversely, other blockholders, especially the third and fourth ones exist positive significant relation to these two indicators. However, the controlling shareholder and its alliance should bear some cost for their choosing preference, the yield and cost analysis should be taken into consideration for their behaviors. Similarly, other big shareholders, however, should also bear some costs to choose to be “silent” or “counter balance”. Thus, the controlling shareholders and its alliance variables demonstrate U shaped relationship to the audit committee and independent director ratio variables. Contrary to these, the other big shareholders, as the counter-balance party, should also choose to be “silent” or to be “counter-balance”. For more details, when their share holding ratio is low, they always use improving independent directors or audit committee to better counter balance the controlling one, however, when their holding ratio increases to a certain degree, they choose to counter balance all by themselves, or to be “alluded” by the controlling ones, in order to maximum their own interests.
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