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论文编号：	8649
作者编号：	1120100785
上传时间：	2016/12/6 16:02:51
中文题目：	商业银行关系资产与银行风险承担 ——基于商业银行治理特殊性的研究
英文题目：	Commercial Bank’s Relationship Assets and Bank’s Risk Taking: Research on the Particularity of Commercial Bank’s Governance
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	银行治理；关系资产；风险承担；股权结构；高管薪酬
英文关键字：	bank governance; relationship assets; risk-taking; ownership structure; executive compensation
中文摘要：	商业银行作为主要的间接融资中介，在国民经济运行过程中扮演着重要的角色，通过信贷资源支持实体经济发展，是实体经济资金融通的重要环节。商业银行能否更好的发挥金融服务于实体经济的功能并避免金融资源的错配，一直受到世界各国关注。而实现保障商业银行良好运转的重要基础在于进一步完善其公司治理机制。巴塞尔委员会早在20世纪末就对公司治理加以关注，其发布的《加强银行的公司治理》将公司治理在银行运作以及风险防范中的作用给予充分肯定。1997年的亚洲金融危机和2008年的华尔街金融危机，其爆发的根源也都在于银行等金融机构的内外部治理机制存在极大缺陷，治理风险的不断累积最终引发金融风险。我国银行业在其长期发展历程中，经历了计划经济体制下央行一元体系、改革开放后建立央行商行二元体系、建立政策性银行剥离银行政策性业务、股份化改造建立现代银行制度等四个发展阶段，基本建立起银行的公司治理结构，并在不断完善自身的公司治理机制，但其整体治理能力和治理水平依旧不高。 商业银行治理的重要性也一直受到理论界的关注。已有的研究思路主要还是依托已有的公司治理研究框架，在银行这一研究对象的实践情境中，将银行经营的某些特点同已有理论结合进来，以公司治理理论为基础而加以扩展，实现从“公司治理”到“银行治理”的跨越。对于商业银行治理的特殊性还没有形成比较统一的框架，尚停留在将一般的公司治理理念应用于商业银行治理政策的层面，缺乏针对商业银行经营特殊性的治理探索，需要进一步结合金融机构的特殊性，打开银行治理这一“黑箱”。 针对目前商业银行公司治理理论的研究局限，本文从商业银行经营特殊性出发，基于银行经营的原生态特征，在对银行的核心盈利模式和核心竞争力进行分析的基础上，提出了银行关系资产这一概念；并运用产权理论从关系资产的作用这一视角切入，界定了关系资产的收入效应和价值效应，在行政型治理这一制度背景下，分析银行股东、高管薪酬机制与银行风险承担的关系；使银行治理研究深入到业务层面，将商业银行关系资产对风险承担的约束机制与一般公司治理机制相结合，初步实现了商业银行经营特殊性与治理特殊性的的统一，从更为基础的层面拓展已有的商业银行治理研究范围，为影响银行业风险承担的治理机制作用路径提供新的理论解释；并以中国上市公司2003-2014年所有银行贷款数据为研究样本，进行实证研究，本文得到的主要结论如下： （1）商业银行的关系资产能够降低商业银行的风险承担，而且关系资产的收入效应和价值效应都在中国的银行中得到体现。但在不同股权性质下，我国不同性质商业银行的收入效应和价值效应的外在表现有所不同。 （2）对于国有银行而言，虽然关系资产的价值效应和收入效应同时存在，但是收入效应的影响更大，也即国有股权的存在使得关系资产对银行风险承担的约束作用较弱，同时国有大型银行也存在价值效应，这表明我国大型国有银行在由行政型治理向经济型治理转型的过程中，国有控股地位一方面是为了维持对金融体系稳定而保持控制力的补充手段，其行为特征符合一般控股股东的逻辑而非政治逻辑，另一方面国有股东对银行的政治压力和干预影响也还有所体现。 （3）对于股份制商业银行而言，因为历史沿革的原因，控股股东也保持了一定的控制力，股份制银行的关系资产价值效应在一定程度上，发挥了约束银行风险承担的作用，主要体现为关系资产的价值效应大于关系资产的收入效应。但是，由于控股股东的存在，股份制商业银行的关系资产的收入效应也还存在，也削弱了股份制银行对银行风险承担的约束作用。 （4）我国商业银行的关系资产的价值效应和收入效应无论是在国有银行还是在股份制银行均发挥了一定的作用，然而因为受制于不同的治理情境，其外在表现不同。我国商业银行高管薪酬对银行风险承担影响的治理机制受到国有股东和股份制银行治理安排的影响较大。在我国的治理转型期，银行高管薪酬的制度设计远没有达到最优，银行高管薪酬机制没有起到应有的治理效应。 （5）国有大型银行的薪酬机制受行政型治理影响，行政任命和行政考核使得国有银行的高管薪酬同国有银行的关系资产的两种效应均不存在。这表明对于我国国有银行而言，区别于关系资产对股权结构的直接影响，高管的行政任免使得银行的高管的薪酬机制不仅与外部股东的收益脱离了联系，也同公司内部绩效脱钩，这可能与行政限薪的后续影响有关。国有大型银行的薪酬治理还表现出了比较强烈的风险承担愿望，主要体现为银行关系资产提高了银行的风险承担水平。可能的解释是，国有银行通过积累关系资产的租值，为其有政治目的的项目累积所需要的资金，这样的安排必然违背了资金配置最优化，浪费了宝贵的金融资源，也表明我国的国有银行的行政型治理还普遍存在。 （6）我国的股份制商业银行的高管薪酬同时具有收入效应和价值效应，有利于协调管理层和股东的风险冲突，股份制商业银行的高管薪酬的收入效应存在并且显著，但是有些研究的实证结果显示股份制商业银行的高管甚至存在价值效应，即银行的高管薪酬受到了价值效应的影响，这似乎印证了目前股份制商业银行薪酬与股权挂钩甚至持有股权的情况。需要特别注意的是，股份制商业银行的高管薪酬可能存在激励过大的迹象，主要表现为关系资产的收入效应大于关系资产的约束作用，使关系资产的约束机制基本失效。 基于本文的研究，可以得出以下政策建议：（1）在监管机构和评价机构对商业银行风险承担的研究和政策制定过程中，应纳入银行关系资产的相关变量，对银行风险承担水平的选择和相应政策效果的考量需要考虑对关系资产的影响；（2）对我国商业银行的公司治理尤其是股权结构的调整，应结合关系资产的相关作用，进一步探索商业银行股权对关系资产形成和作用的机制和影响。在基于所有权相应调整的政策制定过程中，必须通盘考虑关系资产和所有权的交互影响；（3）在我国供给侧改革和实体经济转型的大背景下，政府应该考虑银行关系资产的重要影响，在转型过程中给予银行重新进行关系资产构建的时间，以确保商业银行在我国行政型治理向经济型治理转型的过程中进行平稳的过度，不因银行关系资产的重构而发生金融风险的波动；（4）我国银行高管薪酬制定者可以尝试对高管薪酬进行两种效应的分析，并关注与发挥商业银行关系资产对风险控制的自发性机制作用。建议在保持对大型金融机构控制的基础上采用其他方式比如AB股或一股否决权的方式，尝试利用银行股权的价值效应，提升银行股东的监督意愿，同时改变政治任命的自上而下的任命方式，而建议采用自下而上的公开选拔等等方式，并在薪酬改革的同时配套产权改革，以推进我国大型商业银行的改革；（5）我国股份制商业银行的高管薪酬整体来看，关系资产对高管薪酬的作用主要表现为收入效应，但是高管薪酬的收入效应比较强，因而推进高管薪酬改革时，应在考虑赋予高管股权时应特别注意收入效应和价值效应的冲突问题，要严格限制该股权的持有时间、交易方式等，在薪酬分配方式和分配比例之间找到合适的折衷办法。
英文摘要：	As the main indirect financing institution, commercial banks play an important role in the national economy. They support the real economy through credit resources, which is an important link of the real economy.The world has been concerned about whether commercial banks can better serve the real economy and avoid the wrong allocation of financial resources. The important basis for commercial banks to guarantee their good functioning lies on the further improvement of bank’s corporate governance mechanism. As early as the late 20th century, Basel Committee had begun to pay attenetion to corporate governance, the publishment of "strengthen the banking corporate governance" granted full recognition to corporate governance's role in bank operations and risk prevention. The root of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Wall Street financial crisis in 2008 lies in the fact that there are big flaws in the internal and external governance mechanism of banks and other financial institutions, and governance risk continue to accumulate and ultimately lead to financial risks. China's banking industry has experienced four stages in its long course of development, the central bank unique system under the planned economy, the binary system with the establishment of central bank instituinon after the reform and opening up, the establishment of policy banks peeling bank policy-related business, demutualization transformation. The basic corporate governance structure of banks has been set up, which constantly improve their own corporate governance mechanism, but the corporate governance capacity is still low. The importance of commercial bank governance has been the concern of theorists. Existing research in bank mainly focus on the existing corporate governance framework, and combine some characteristics of bank operations with the existing theory, extending corporate governance theory from bank’s "corporate governance" to "bank governance". But till now researchers have not formed a relatively unified framework. The study of particularity of bank governance still remains in the stage of using general concept of corporate governance into policy making, lacking the exploration for the specificity in the operation of commercial banks. Further research on the particularity of financial institutions is needed to open this "black box" of bank governance. Considering the limitation of research on bank governance, this paper analyzes the characteristics of commercial bank operation. Based on the analysis of the core profit model and core competitiveness of banks, this paper puts forward the concept of bank relationship assets and defines the income effect and value effect of the relationship assets from the perspective of property rights theory. This paper analyzes the relationship between bank shareholders, executive compensation mechanism and bank risk taking in the context of administrative governance system. This paper makes bank governance research deep into operations, and combines the role of relationship assets with bank governance in the constrain of bank risk taking. This paper initially realizes the unity of paticularity of operations and governance in banks, expanding the scope of existing bank governance research and providing theoretical explanation for the path how governance mechanism affects risk taking . Based on all the bank loan data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2014, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1)Relationship assets of commercial banks can reduce the risk taking of commercial banks, and income and value effect of relationship assets have been reflected in the Chinese banks . But the external manifestations of income and value effects of commercial banks are different under different ownership nature. (2)For state-owned banks, although the relationship assets' value effects and income effects exist simultaneously, but income effect shows greater impact. The presence of state-owned shares makes the relationship assets less restrictive to bank risk-taking. While the state-owned banks also present value effect, which indicates that China's state-owned banks are in the process of transformation from administrative governance to economic governance. State-owned holding position, on the one hand is a supplementary means to maintain the stability of the financial system, reflecting the controlling shareholder logic rather than the general political logic. On the other hand, state-owned controlling shareholders' political pressure and intervention on the state-owned banks also exist. (3)For the joint-stock commercial banks, the controlling shareholders also maintain some control for historical reason. The effect of the relational assets value of the joint-stock banks has played a role in constraining bank risk taking to some extent, and value effect of relationship assets is greater than the income effect. However, due to the presence of the controlling shareholder, the income effect of relationship asset still exist, weakening the restraining effect of relationship asset in joint-stock banks. (4)The relationship assets' value effects and income effects of China's commercial banks both exist in state-owned banks and joint-stock banks. But subject to different outside governance contexts, their external manifestations are different. The impact of executive compensation of China's commercial banks on bank risk management mechanism is severely affected by state-owned controlling shareholder and governance arrangements. During the governance transition of our country, bank’s executive compensation design is far from optimal, bank executive compensation governance mechanism has not play its due effect. (5)Compensation Mechanism of large state-owned banks is influenced by administrative governance. The administrative appointment and political assessment of state-owned banks make the executive compensation and two effects of relationship assets of state-owned banks loose desired effect. This indicates that in Chinese state-owned banks, different from the effcets of relationship asset, executive compensation mechanism does not benefit outside shareholders, but also not benefit company's internal performance. This may affect subsequent administrative salary limit. Compensation mechanism of large state-owned banks also showed a relatively strong risk aspirations, relationship assets increasing banks risk taking. State-owned banks may invest in politically motivated project through the accumulation of rental value in relations asset. This arrangement necessarily violates the optimal allocation of bank’s money, wasting financial resources, indicating that administrative governance are still widespread in China's state-owned banks. (6)Compensation mechanism in joint-stock commercial banks have both income and value effects, facilitating the coordination between shareholders and managers. Although income effect of executive compensation affects banks risk taking significantly, some empirical results show the existence of value effect in joint-stock commercial banks, which seems to confirm the existence of equity-linked compensation or equity-holding compensation. Special attention should be paid to the fact that executive compensation in joint-stock commercial banks may encourage managers to take excessive risk, when the income effect is greater than the value effect, causing the constrain mechanism loose its due effect. Based on this research, we can draw the following policy recommendations: (1)The regulatory bodies and rating agencies of commercial banks need to consider the impact of the relationship assets in risk related research and policy-making process; (2)The adjustment of ownership structure of commercial banks in corporate governance should be combined with relationship asset to further explore the relationship between commercial bank stockholders and relationship asset in capital formation and its related impact. In the ownership adjustment related policy-making process, we must take into consideration the interaction between relationship assets and ownership; (3)In our supply-side reform and real economy transition, the government should consider this significant impact of banking relationships assets in the transition process, giving banks enough time to re-build relationship assets in order to ensure that commercial banks can smoothly adapt to the transformation from administrative governance to economic governance, avoiding financial fluctuations in the restructuring process; (4)China's banking executive compensation have to pay attention to the two effects, and their role in the relationship between commercial bank assets and risk control. Recommendations for large financial institutions to maintain control lies one the use of other means, such as an AB shares or veto stock, trying to use the bank equity's value effect, enhancing the supervision willingness of banks' shareholders. Meanwhile, we recommend to change from top-down appointment to bottom-up way of open selection etc., and to carry out salary reform along with the reform of property rights, in order to promote the reform of large commercial banks; (5)The effect of relationship assets on executive compensation is mainly income effect. Therefore, in the process of promoting executive compensation reform, we should pay more attention to the conflict between income effect and value effect when giving executive equity. Equity holding time should be strictly limited, as well as the way to trade in markets. A suitable compromise should be found in the mode of distribution and allocation ratio of remuneration.
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