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论文编号：	8568
作者编号：	1120090717
上传时间：	2016/6/20 9:11:42
中文题目：	中国上市公司股权激励有效性研究
英文题目：	The Research of the Effectiveness of Equity Incentive in China’s Listed Company
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	股权激励；风险承担；盈余质量；资产减值；收益平滑
英文关键字：	Equity Incentive; risk taking; Earnings Quality; Earnings Manipulation; Income Smoothing
中文摘要：	2005年末，证监会颁布的《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》，标志着中国的股权激励制度正式实施。一方面，股权激励可能是最优契约的一种体现，可以减轻代理冲突，将委托人和代理人的利益趋于一致；另一方面，股权激励还有可能是管理者权力理论的一种体现，反映了高管的机会主义行为。股权激励作为国外发展相对成熟的制度和机制，引入中国后是否发挥了有效性是一个值得研究的问题。 本文以股权激励管理办法实施以来，推出股权激励方案的公司为样本，以信息不对称理论、古典代理理论和不完全合约理论为理论基础，采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法，从股权激励的激励效应和股权激励中的机会主义行为两个角度研究我国现行股权激励制度。从最优契约理论的角度，本文以利益协同激励和风险承担激励两个方面考察股权激励制度对公司风险承担、投资政策、财务政策以及公司经营集中度的影响，剖析股权激励所起到的正面激励效应，并进一步分析了风险承担激励可以改善公司的资源配置效率。从管理者权力理论的视角，分析了高管股权激励中的机会主义行为，包括股权激励中的盈余管理问题以及操纵财务会计政策的问题。本文主要包括以下几个部分： 首先，本文考察了股权激励对风险承担的影响。本文分别用高管财富-股票价格敏感性(Delta)和高管财富-股票收益波动率敏感性(Vega)来度量利益协同效应和风险承担效应，实证检验了股权激励与企业风险承担水平和政策选择之间的关系。研究结果表明，Vega与公司风险承担水平、经营集中度和资产负债率显著正相关，Delta与R&D投资显著正相关。进一步的分析发现，激励公司的风险承担改善了资本配置效率，但是这种改善主要体现在民营企业而非国有企业。 其次，本文考察了股权激励制度对盈余质量的影响，股权激励可能会诱发高管的盈余操纵动机。中国于2006年推出了业绩型股权激励制度，股票期权行权或限制性股票的解锁是以高管完成规定的业绩门槛为条件。高管薪酬与会计业绩直接挂钩，但会计业绩在很大程度上又受会计行为的影响，因此，高管可能对会计业绩进行操纵来实现自身收益最大化。再加上中国的业绩型股权激励采取多期行权或解锁的方式，使得高管有更强的动机操纵盈余，这可能导致盈余质量的下降。本文用双差分方法研究了中国上市公司股权激励与盈余质量之间的关系，发现实施股权激励的公司的盈余质量下降：股权激励降低了上市公司盈余的信息含量和损失确认的及时性。 再次，本文考察了股权激励制度对资产减值准备的影响。本文研究了实施业绩型股权激励的公司在方案公告前通过大规模计提资产减值进行盈余操纵的行为。本文实证结果发现，在公告前一年或当年激励公司资产减值计提较高；资产减值变化有逆转的特性，且正资产减值变化逆转的速度更快，但在公告前一年或当年，为了降低基准年度的业绩，如果前一年度资产减值的增幅较大，激励公司会继续将资产减值的变化维持在一个较高的水平上，即正资产减值变化逆转的速度被减缓；管理层主要是通过流动资产减值而非长期资产减值进行盈余操纵。 最后，本文考察了股权激励制度对业绩平滑的影响。与国外标准股权激励不同的是，中国的股权激励包含了业绩条款，并采用了分期行权解锁安排，这有可能导致高管进行盈余操纵。本文利用双重差分方法实证检验了激励公司收益平滑程度在股权激励公告前后的变化，发现激励公司的收益平滑程度变高，这说明在股权激励有效期内，当业绩较高时激励公司会隐藏利润，为以后的解锁行权留有余地；当业绩较差时，会提高绩效以尽量满足行权条件解锁条件。
英文摘要：	At the end of 2005, the "listing Corporation equity incentive management approach (Trial)", promulgated by the Securities Regulatory Commission, marks the formal implementation of China's equity incentive system. On the one hand, equity incentive, as an embodiment of the optimal contract, can reduce the agent conflict, and can help to coordinate with the interests of the principal and agent. On the other hand, equity incentive is also likely to be a manifestation of managers' power theory, which reflects the opportunism behavior of executives. Although the equity incentive in foreign countries has been mature, whether the introduction of equity incentive to China turns out to be effective is a problem worthy of study. As the using of normative analysis and empirical research combining method, We use data to examine the effectiveness of equity incentives and opportunistic behavior of executives based on the principal-agency theory, contact theory and asymmetric information theory. From the perspective of the optimal contract theory, this paper synergistic the incentive compatible effect and the risk taking effect to examine two aspects of the company's equity incentive system risk, policy, financial policy and the impact of investment company concentration, and furthermore, we find that analysis of the risk-taking incentives can improve the efficiency of resource allocation of the company. From the perspective of managers of power theory, this paper analyzes the executives in the equity incentive opportunistic behavior, including equity incentives of earnings management and manipulation of financial and accounting policy issues. First, using sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock price (Delta) to measure the incentive compatible effect, and uses sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock return volatility (vega) to measure the risk taking effect, this paper empirically tests the relation of equity incentive and enterprise’s risk taking and risk decisions. We find that Vega is positively related to risk taking, industry concentration and asset-liability ratio. Further results show that the risk taking brought about by companies which have implemented equity incentive improve the efficiency of capital allocation. However, this improvement was mainly reflected in the private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises. However, this improvement was mainly reflected in the private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises. This research confirmed the incentive effect of Chinese equity incentive. It not only riches and expands the research on the executive incentive in China, but also have some implications for the design of Equity incentive program in the next stage. Second, this paper investigates the effects of performance-vested equity incentives on the propensity of managers to engage in earnings manipulation. To align the interests of shareholders and managements, China introduced equity incentive system in 2006. Different to traditional stock option and restricted stock, Chinese equity incentive systems use performance-vested provisions to options and restricted stocks grants and link vesting to the achievement of performance targets. Another important feature of Chinese equity incentive systems is that almost all Chinese corporation use graded vesting schedule rather than cliff vesting commonly used by US awards. Performance-vested provisions and graded vesting may induce executives to game the equity incentive system. To achieve the performance hurdles, executives may manipulate and smooth earnings, which cause the decrease of earnings quality. Using Difference-in-Differences method, our study shows that the informativeness of earnings and the timeliness of loss recognition lower after corporations announced equity incentives plans. Third, Equity incentive may induce executives’ earnings manipulation. Performance targets of stock award and stock option are directly related to performance before award of equity award: The high performance before announcement of incentive plans, the high the performance targets. Therefore opportunistic executives have enough motivation to manage earnings downward to reduce exercise difficulty. Before the announcement of equity incentive plan, managers manipulate earnings by asset write-down policy to decrease performance before award and therefore reduce vesting conditions of stock option. Asset write-downs in announcement year and the year before announcement are higher than other years for award firms. Award firms increase the amount of write-down and the changes of write-down in announcement year and the year before announcement are higher than other years for award firms. Due to accounting conservatism, the changes of write-down will reverse and big changes of write-down reverse faster than small changes of write-down. Finally, China introduced equity incentive since 2006. Compared to traditional equity incentive, Performance-vested provisions and graded vesting are used by Chinese award firms, and these arrangement may induce executives to game the equity incentive system and manipulate earnings. Using Difference-in-Differences method, this paper investigates the effects of performance-vested equity incentives on the propensity of managers to engage in income smoothing. This paper finds that executives may smooth earnings to achieve the performance targets and exercise as much as possible in whole incentive duration. Our research has important implication for Chinese equity incentive.
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