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论文编号：	8565
作者编号：	2120142519
上传时间：	2016/6/18 14:47:47
中文题目：	合同参与度与参照点强度的实验研究
英文题目：	An Experimental Research on Degree of Participation in Contracts and Strength of Reference Points
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	合同参与度；参照点强度；实验；格式合同；谈判合同
英文关键字：	Degree of Participation in Contracts; Strength of Reference Points; Experiment; Standard Form Contracts; Negotiated Contracts
中文摘要：	合同是一种交易机制，是对交易关系的一种保障。社会生活中，人们签订了大量的格式合同，提高了合同的效率，但在某种程度上也侵犯了平等的缔约关系，引发了一些社会问题，如对保险合同和霸王条款的争议。随着人们个性化需求的增加和沟通成本的降低，签订一份谈判合同变得更加必要而方便，两种合同孰优孰劣？同时，不完全合同理论的发展经历了从事前专用性投资视角到参照点合同理论的转变，促进了企业理论的发展。学者们做了很多相关实验以比较刚性合同与柔性合同，却没有实验比较格式合同与谈判合同的参照点效应差异。 本文在实验室环境中比较了格式合同、谈判合同所形成的参照点强度与外生参照点的强度，并把格式合同分为卖方定价合同与买方定价合同分别研究，这四种设置的本质区别在于缔约者对于制定合同条款的参与程度不同。根据订立合同的两个阶段——要约和承诺，我们分别给签订谈判合同、卖方定价合同、买方定价合同与不签订合同四种情况中的卖方参与度赋予不同的值。为了定量刻画初始合同给卖方形成的参照点强度，我们使用在同等的状态改变之下，卖方愿意违背初始价格而提出加价的频率和程度。卖方越可能加价或加价越高，初始合同的参照点强度越小。 通过比较四种设置下的加价，发现合同的参照点强度大于外生参照点；对于卖方来说，参照点强度由大到小的合同依次为谈判定价合同、卖方定价合同和买方定价合同，即谈判合同形成的参照点强度显著大于格式合同。合同参与度越高，合同的参照点强度越大，违约率和违约程度越低。我们提出如下建议：在交易成本进一步降低的现代社会，应该使用更多的谈判合同。 本文的创新点在于，尝试通过参照点效应的强度来比较格式合同与谈判合同，从合同再谈判与履约角度比较了两种合同的优劣；拓展了现有的关于参照点合同理论的实验，提供了合同参与度的新视角；为同一决策中不能共存的多种参照点的强度比较提供了一种方法。
英文摘要：	Contract is a trading mechanism, and a guarantee of the trading relationships. In social life, people sign a lot of standard form contracts, to improve the efficiency of signing contracts. However, they violate the equality in contractual relationship, and even cause some social problems, such as disputes of insurance contracts and terms of Overlord. With the increase of individual needs and decrease of communication costs, it becomes more and more necessary and convenient to bargain before signing contracts. Which kind of contract is better? Meanwhile, the development of incomplete contract theory experienced a transition from the perspective of ex ante specific investment to contracts as reference points, and promoted the development of theory of the firm. Scholars have done a lot of experiments to compare rigid contracts with flexible contracts, but none have compared the reference point effect between standard form contracts and negotiated contracts. Our study compares the strength of reference points in standard form contracts, negotiated contracts and exogenous reference points in the lab environment. The standard form contracts are divided into buyer-offer contracts and seller-offer contracts. The essential difference among this four kinds is the degree of participation in developing the contract terms. According to the two stages of signing a contract, offer and acceptance, we assign different values to the degree of seller's participation of negotiated contracts, buyer-offer contracts, seller-offer contracts and non-contracts. In order to quantitatively describe the strength of reference point formed by the original contract, we uses the markups provided by sellers. The more likely and sharply sellers increase in price, the weaker reference points of original contracts are. By comparing the markups in four treatments, we find several conclusions as follow. Firstly, Contracts generate stronger reference point than exogenous reference point. Secondly, for sellers, the descending order of the strength of reference points is negotiated contracts, seller-offer contracts, and buyer-offer contracts. In other words, the reference points of negotiated contracts is stronger than those of standard form contracts. In a word, the higher the degree of participation in contracts is, the stronger the reference points of contracts are, and the less likely the contracts are violated. So we suggest using more negotiated contracts in this modern society, in which transaction costs are decreasing. The innovation of this study includes several aspects. Firstly, it compares standard form contracts with negotiated contracts from renegotiation and implementation, through the strength of reference point. Secondly, it develops the experiments of contracts as reference points from a new aspect——degree of participation. Thirdly, it provides a method to measure the strength of different reference points which couldn’t coexist in making a decision.
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