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论文编号：	8543
作者编号：	2120142424
上传时间：	2016/6/17 16:05:54
中文题目：	企业社会责任与盈余管理的研究——基于社会责任偏重度视角
英文题目：	Research on Correlation between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management from the perspective of the Focus Policy of Social Responsibility
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	社会责任；盈余管理；社会责任偏重度；产权性质
英文关键字：	Corporate Social Responsibility; Earnings Management; the Focus Policy of Social Responsibility; Nature of Property Right
中文摘要：	随着公司社会责任理念的深入人心，企业在谋求利润增长的同时也不断加大对社会责任的履行。然而信息的披露往往是需要成本的，在我国现阶段的制度背景下，上市公司愿意付出大量成本加大披露社会责任信息，其动机值得理论界与实务界进行深入思考。 本文选取2011-2014年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象，运用理论与实证分析相结合的方式，通过检验社会责任和盈余管理间的相互关系，以研究企业承担社会责任的动机是基于透明观视角下的道德责任，还是柠檬观视角下的机会主义行为。在此基础上，本文又考虑了社会责任偏重度的影响，探究偏重履行基础责任和偏重履行高层次责任的企业在承担社会责任动机上的差异。最后，本文又进一步研究产权性质的不同对企业承担社会责任动机的影响。 本文通过实证检验，得到了如下的结论：（1）本文支持了企业承担社会责任的“机会主义动机”观点，在我国现阶段社会责任履行越好的企业，盈余管理的程度越高。（2）按照社会责任偏重度不同对样本进行划分，研究发现偏重履行高层次责任的企业相较于偏重履行基础责任的企业，承担社会责任的机会主义动机更加强烈，社会责任与盈余管理的正相关关系更明显。（3）相比于国有企业而言，非国有企业承担社会责任的机会主义动机要更加强烈，承担社会责任的掩饰作用更加明显，表现在社会责任和盈余管理间的正相关关系更加强烈。此外，本文又进一步证明了国有企业中无论是偏重基础责任的企业还是偏重高层次责任的企业承担社会责任均没有表现出明显的机会主义动机，而在非国有企业中，偏重承担高层次责任的企业较偏重承担基础责任的企业履行社会责任的机会主义动机更强。 最后，针对研究结论，本文对企业以及政府相关监管部门提出了相应的建议。企业应当加强社会责任自律，端正履行社会责任的意义，努力将社会责任内化于企业日常的经营策略中。监管部门应当规范和完善相关法律法规，更好的监管企业管理层的行为。
英文摘要：	As corporate social responsibility gets a great recognition from the public, enterprises try to make a profit growth as well as improve the performance of the social responsibility. However, it needs a lot of cost to disclose the information. At the background of the present system in China, listed companies are willing to spend much cost to disclose the information of social responsibility greatly, their motivations are deserved to make a further study. Based on the theoretical and empirical research, using the samples of listed companies in China's stock market in 2011-2014, this paper examines the correlation between corporate social responsibility and earnings management in order to research the motivation of the fulfilment of corporate social responsibility, which is an ethical behavior based on the transparent view or an opportunistic behavior based on the lemon view. On this basis, the paper also considers the influence of the investment focus policy of social responsibility, which is aimed at finding differences between the basic responsibility-oriented policy and high-level responsibility-oriented policy. Finally, the paper makes a further study about the nature of property rights’ influence to the motivation of the social responsibility. With empirical tests, the paper found that, firstly, we support that to fulfill social responsibility is more an opportunistic behavior, the better the performance of social responsibility of listed companies, the higher the earnings management they take at present. Secondly, compared to basic responsibility oriented companies, the relationship between the social responsibility and earnings management is more positive in high-level responsibility oriented companies, the opportunism motivation is more obvious. Thirdly, corporate social responsibility is positively related to earnings management and its correlation is strengthened in non-state-owned enterprises compared to state-owned enterprises, the opportunism motivation is more obvious and the mask of social responsibility effects more apparently. Furthermore, the paper suggests that neither basic responsibility oriented nor high-level responsibility oriented companies show the opportunism motivation obviously in state-owned enterprises. Otherwise, in non-state-owned enterprises, high-level responsibility oriented enterprises fulfill social responsibility with a strong opportunism motivation. Finally, as for the research conclusions, we provide some useful advice for enterprises and government regulators. Enterprises should strengthen the social responsibility self-discipline, attach great importance to the significance of social responsibility, and try to internalize social responsibility in the enterprises’ daily operations. Regulators should standardize and improve the relevant laws and regulations, supervise the management behavior of executives effectively.
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