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论文编号：	8539
作者编号：	2120142421
上传时间：	2016/6/17 15:36:38
中文题目：	内部控制、股权激励与会计盈余价值相关性
英文题目：	Internal Control，Equity Incentive and the Value Relevance of Accounting Earnings
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	价值相关性；内部控制；股权激励
英文关键字：	Value Relevance; Internal Control; Equity Incentive
中文摘要：	会计盈余价值相关性对于投资者作出正确的投资决策十分重要，在我国资本市场改革和发展的进程中，上市公司会计盈余价值相关性越来越受到外部投资者的广泛关注。近年来，企业内部控制失败的案例频发，如万福生科事件、绿大地事件、中航油事件等，使人们意识到加强内部控制建设的重要性。已有学者通过研究得出，公司内部控制缺陷与会计盈余价值相关性显著负相关。2008年以来，企业内部控制基本规范与相关配套指引为我国内部控制的建设指明了方向，此后，我国上市公司逐步建立了内部控制制度。然而，相关内部控制法规的颁布只是从外部督促企业管理层改善内部控制质量，往往忽略了企业加强内部控制建设的主观能动性。企业高管在内部控制的设计和运行中扮演着“中心人”角色，上市公司的股权激励会对公司高管的行为产生一定的影响。公司高管可能加强内部控制，努力提高企业绩效，达到股权激励的目标，这是“利益协同效应”的观点。然而，面对一些财务业绩方面的限制，公司高管亦可能凌驾于内部控制之上，进行盈余操纵已达到股权激励行权条件，这是“管理者防御效应”的观点。管理层股权激励会产生“管理者防御效应”还是“利益趋同效应”，这还有待进一步检验。因此，本文运用回归分析实证检验股权激励对内部控制与会计盈余价值相关性之间关系的影响。 本文搜集2013-2014年我国A股上市公司的财务数据，按是否实施股权激励将全部样本划分为两组，通过多元回归检验本文的研究假设。最终得出：公司内部控制质量越高，每股盈余与股票价格的价值相关性越强，股权激励会降低内部控制对会计盈余价值相关性的提升作用。本文的主要创新点在于：尽管国内外学者已经有针对内部控制与会计盈余价值相关性的研究，但尚无文献分析上市公司股权激励是否会作用于内部控制与会计盈余价值相关性之间的关系。本文尝试研究股权激励对内部控制与会计盈余价值相关性之间关系的影响，拓展了内部控制与会计盈余价值相关性之间关系的研究成果。
英文摘要：	The value relevance of accounting earnings is a very important qualitative characteristics of accounting information. With the continuous reform and development of China's capital market, the value relevance of accounting earnings has increasingly become the focus of attention among public companies. It has been studied that the company internal control deficiencies will reduce the value relevance of accounting earnings. Since 2008, with the basic norms of internal control and related guidelines have been promulgated, the internal control system of our country has been continuously improving. However, the relevant laws and regulations of the internal control merely urge enterprises to improve internal control quality from the external perspective, often ignored the subjective initiative of enterprise to strengthen internal control construction. Corporate executives play a central role in the design and operation of internal control, the public company's equity incentive will have a certain impact on the behavior of the company executives. Company executives may strengthen the internal control, to achieve the goal of equity incentive, which is the point of “alignment effect”. However, in the face of some limitations of the financial performance, company executives may also place themselves above the internal control, manipulate earnings to reach equity incentive vesting conditions, which is the point of “managerial entrenchment effect”. Executive stockholding will produce "Alignment Effect" or "Management Entrenchment Effect", which needs further inspection. Therefore, this paper study the impact of equity incentive on the relationship between the internal control and the value relevance of accounting earnings from the perspective of an empirical study. This paper collects the financial data of public companies in China’s A share market between 2013 and 2014, all samples will be divided into two sample groups: the implementation of equity incentive and not implementation of equity incentive, regression analysis was performed to verify this hypothesis. Finally: the internal control will improve the value relevance of accounting earnings, equity incentive will reduce the role of internal control to enhance the value relevance of accounting earnings. The main innovation of this paper lies in: although domestic and foreign scholars have studied the relationship between the internal control and the value relevance of accounting earnings, but there is no literature analyzes whether the relation between internal control and the value relevance of accounting earnings is affected by equity incentive of public company. This article attempts to study the equity incentive’s impact on the relationship between the internal control and the value relevance of accounting earnings. Equity incentive’s effect is significant after empirical study, expanding the research achievements of the relationship between the internal control and the value relevance of accounting earnings.
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