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论文编号：	8524
作者编号：	2120142514
上传时间：	2016/6/16 8:31:57
中文题目：	职务消费、高管权力与股东价值
英文题目：	Perks、CEO Power and Shareholder Value
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	职务消费;高管权力;公司治理;股东价值;EVA
英文关键字：	perks; CEO power;corporate goverance;shareholder value;EVA
中文摘要：	随着现代企业制度的发展，职务消费作为非现金薪酬激励的重要组成部分，备受关注。但是，学术界对于职务消费究竟是“有效激励”还是“隐性腐败”一直争论不休。理论上讲，公司允许职务消费的初衷是通过适度的礼尚往来提高公司收益，尤其在中国的“关系”社会中，职务消费对于企业建立政治关联及维护商业伙伴关系更具有重要的意义。同时，职务消费因其隐蔽性、非公开性及公私界限不清等特征，也成为高管权力寻租的重灾区。那么，职务消费与股东价值的关系究竟是什么？ 为了回答这一问题，我们以职务消费的性质为切入点，不仅研究普通职务消费与股东价值之间的关系，而且还将异常职务消费分离出来，研究异常职务消费与股东价值之间的关系。为了寻求职务消费与股东价值之间更加稳定和一致的关系，我们还引入了高管权力作为职务消费的调节变量，探究受高管权力影响的职务消费与股东价值之间的关系。另外，为了提高职务消费的使用效率，提升股东价值，我们还结合了我国公司治理的制度背景，探讨了公司治理的调节效应，即公司治理直接调节职务消费，还是公司治理通过调节高管权力间接影响职务消费？进一步的，我们还探究了在中国的公司治理实践中，“监督机制”与“信任机制”的地位和作用。最后，本文还把样本分为国有企业组和非国有企业组，重新进行上述关系检验。 本文主要采用理论研究和实证研究相结合的方式，以职务消费与股东价值的关系为切入点，引入高管权力的调节效应，并进一步探究不同的公司治理实践的作用和效果。全文共有五章。第一章导论，介绍了本文的研究目的、研究意义、研究思路、研究框架、研究方法、技术路线图以及创新点。第二章是文献回顾，分别从职务消费、高管权力、股东价值三方面对国内外的相关文献进行了梳理，并根据已有研究文献的不足和我国的公司治理环境，阐述了本文进一步的研究方向。第三章是理论基础和研究假设，在理论分析部分，首先，探究职务消费与股东价值的关系，把普通职务消费和异常职务消费分离并进行比较研究；第二，研究高管权力对职务消费和股东价值的调节效应；第三，研究公司治理的调节模式和作用机理；最后，进一步厘清国有企业和非国有企业职务消费和股东价值关系的特征。在研究设计部分，我们确定了样本、变量和数据来源，并设计了模型。第四章实证分析与稳健性检验，主要是描述性统计、相关分析、回归分析，并对研究中可能遗漏的部分进行稳健性检验。第五章研究结论与启示，报告了本文的研究结论，提出了相应的政策建议及后续研究展望。 通过理论分析和实证检验，本文的研究结论如下： 第一，普通业务招待费与股东价值之间不存在显著的相关关系，主要受制于职务消费“激励效用”和“成本效用”的相互博弈；异常职务消费与股东价值显著负相关，支持了职务消费的“成本观”；第二，考虑了高管权力的调节效应后，职务消费与股东价值均为显著的负相关关系；第三，公司治理通过调节高管权力间接影响职务消费，也就是说，公司治理并非直接作用于职务消费，而是通过对高管权力的“收权”与“授权”来间接影响职务消费的使用效率，这在异常职务消费组中尤其显著。实证结果表明公司治理对普通职务消费组高管权力的负向调节效应没有显著的影响，但是能够显著削弱异常职务消费组高管权力的负向调节效应；同时，公司治理的强度越高，越能削弱高管权力的调节作用；第四，为了更好的了解公司治理的作用机理，本文以公司治理强度为标准，将公司治理情境划分为监督型治理情境和信任型治理情境，实证结果表明，普通职务消费组，在信任型治理情境中，公司治理存在显著的负向调节效应；异常职务消费组，在监督型治理情境中，公司治理存在显著的正向调节效应，这说明，相比信任机制，监督机制更适合中国特殊的制度背景；第五，进一步的，我们按照最终控制人性质将样本企业分为国有企业组和非国有企业组，重新检验公司治理、职务消费、高权权力和股东价值之间的关系。实证结果表明，在国有企业组，公司治理均表现为正向调节效应，这也说明公司治理在国有企业是行之有效的；在非国有企业组，普通职务消费组的公司治理是负向调节效应，异常职务消费组的公司治理是正向调节效应。 本文的创新之处在于：首先，以职务消费的性质为起点，将异常职务消费从普通职务消费中分离出来，比较两者与股东价值之间的关系；第二，以EVA作为股东价值的衡量指标，避免了资本成本产生的噪音；第三，本文认为公司治理同时受“监督机制”和“信任机制”两种作用机理的影响，并基于此提出公司治理的两种治理情境：监督型治理情境和信任型治理情境。
英文摘要：	With the development of Modern Enterprise System,perks is brought into sharp focus as the important component of non-cash compensation incentive.However, whether the perks is the effective incentive or the implicit incentive has provked fierce debate anmong academics. Theoretically speaking,the original intentional of the perks is improving the profits by reciprocity,especiallty in China’s relational society.Perks makes great significances for building political relational and maintaining a business partnership.Meanwhile,perks shows hiddens，exclusivity and unclearly boundary, where becomes epicenters of rent-seeking power. Therefore,what’s the relationship between the peaks and shareholder value? To answer this question,we consider the nature of perks as the starting point of research.That is to say,besides the perks itself only,we also separate the abnormal perks to study the relationship with shareholder value. In order to seek a more stable and consistent relationships between perks and shareholder value, we then explore the moderater effects of the CEO power. Under the premise ,we then discusses the moderator effects of the corporate goverance and the mechanism of action.More apecifically,it’s the debate on whether coporate goverance has moderating effect on the perks itself or the CEO power.Furthermore,we have also studied whether the “monitoring mechanism”or the”trust mechanism”played the leading role in Chinese corporate governance prsctices. The last issue is the relationship of enterprises of different ownership types,including a comparison of state-owned versus various forms of non-state ownership. Based on the relationship between the perks and the shareholder value,this study involved the CEO power,and further explored the function and effect of different corporate goverance practices.The article includes 5 chapers.sequentially beng introduction,the literature revies,the theoretical foundations and research hypotheses,the empirical analysis and the robust test ,the research conclusion and inspiration.Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis,we can reach the following conclusions: First of all，the normal perks is not significant relationship with the shareholder value, which is actually a mutual gambling between incentive effect and entrenchment effect.;as the comparation, the abnormal perks presents a notable negative correlation with the shareholder valuen,which support for the entrenchment effect;Second,CEO power has negative control response on the relationship between perks and shareholder value ,in other words,both the normal perks and the abnormal perks had obviously positive correlation with the shareholder value under the control of power.Thirdly,there are two moderator effects of corporate goverance to the perks.On the hand,the corporate goverance has direct effects relationship to the perks;on the other hand,the corporate goverance has indirect effects relationship to the perks.The empirical results suggest that corporate goverance has no significant influence to the relationship of perks and the shareholder value,while it can decrease the marginal effects which CEO power has on the perks and shareholder value,especially in group abnormal perks.We can infer from the conclusions that the corporate goverance effect depends on the specific conditions of the company.Subsequently,we separately divided the samples into two groups according to corporate governance context ande the ultimate owner..The above-mentioned results indicate that different proprietary nature of the listed company has quite difference in the CEO power and the governance mechanisms. The innovation of the paper lies in:separating the abnormal perks from the normal perks;regarding EVA as the explanatory variable of shareholder value;comparing the superbised corporate governance with the trusted corporate governance.
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