联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	8502
作者编号：	1120120770
上传时间：	2016/6/14 11:38:15
中文题目：	高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on Executive Compensation and Management Forecast Precision
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	高管薪酬；业绩预告精确度；所有权性质；机构投资者
英文关键字：	Executive Compensation；Management Forecast Precision；Ownership Nature；Institutional Investors
中文摘要：	中国高管的薪酬问题不仅仅是某家公司的内部治理问题，而是关乎社会公平、贫富差距、社会和谐等与民生息息相关的社会热点问题，因此不仅仅广大投资者关注高管的薪酬，监管部门也高度关注。业绩预告作为重要盈余预测信息来源，是非常关键的信息披露机制，是具有前瞻性的上市公司未来业绩的提前预报，它集中反映了管理层对企业经营成果、现金流情况、财务状况的未来预估，可以有效帮助投资者提前了解与评估公司的财务信息状况，在对外传递公司核心信息时起到了重要的作用，由此国内外学者便对公司对外披露的业绩预告信息及其披露行为开展了大量有益的探索。理论上，激励有效的薪酬契约应该有助于缓解高管为获取私人收益而损害股东财富所引发的代理问题，但由于中国公司的代理问题仍然较为严重，又由于高管薪酬契约通常是与企业会计业绩相挂钩，而会计业绩是在特定准则约束下遵循一定程序得出的结果，其容易受到高管机会主义操纵，盈余管理行为会显著影响用于生成业绩预告信息的内部财务报告质量，最终降低了以内部财务报告为预测基础的业绩预告精确度。本文以高管薪酬操纵动机为切入点，探讨了上市公司高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的影响路径以及作用机理，并进一步考察了这种影响是否会受到所有权性质和机构投资者的调节影响。 本文共分为七章。第一章为绪论，主要提出了研究问题，论述了研究思路、内容、主要概念的界定以及创新点。第二章为文献综述，分别从高管薪酬和业绩预告精确度两个方面对国内外相关文献进行了梳理。第三章从委托代理理论、契约理论和信息披露理论论述了论文的理论基础，并陈述了高管薪酬和业绩预告相关的制度背景。第四章基于上市公司高管薪酬动机的视角，分析了高管为获取预期或超额薪酬而具有薪酬操纵动机，其主要通过操纵企业财务报告中的会计盈余来实现，导致损害了用于生成业绩预告信息的内部财务报告的质量，最终降低了业绩预告的精确度，并进一步检验了高管进行向上盈余管理与向下盈余管理这两种不同的薪酬操纵方式对业绩预告精确度的影响。第五章和第六章分别从所有权性质和机构投资者的视角研究了高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的调节影响。第七章为本文的研究结论，并对论文的研究局限和未来研究方向进行了论述。 通过理论分析和实证检验，并在控制内生性、样本选择等多方面的稳健性检验基础上，本文研究的主要结论如下： 第一，高管薪酬与业绩预告精确度呈负相关关系。由于受到薪酬契约中设定好的会计业绩指标的捆绑与约束，高管为了获得薪酬绝对数额上的高薪或相对数额上的超额薪酬，管理层往往对企业的会计盈余指标具有强烈的操纵动机，这会显著影响用于生成业绩预告信息的内部财务报告的质量，即此时的内部财务报告中关键的财务指标被高管进行了机会主义操纵，其质量受到了严重的影响，导致降低了以内部财务报告为预测基础的业绩预告精确度。此外，相比向下盈余管理的企业，向上盈余管理的企业高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的负向影响会变得更大。这表明高管为了保障获得预期满意的薪酬，同时需要达到薪酬契约的考核值，进行向上盈余管理的动机要明显强于向下盈余管理的动机。 第二，相比国有企业而言，非国有企业高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的负向影响更大。这一结果表明非国有企业的高管相比国有企业的高管，为了获得高额或超额的薪酬，对企业会计业绩指标操纵的动机更大，从而影响了非国有企业中用于生成业绩预告信息的内部财务报告的质量，最终降低了非国有企业对外披露的业绩预告的精确度。此外，研究还发现限薪令对国有企业高管的薪酬管制有较大的影响，限薪令的颁布对国有企业高管的最高薪酬进行了管制，降低了国有企业高管通过操纵会计盈余指标来获取高额薪酬或超额薪酬的动机，从而降低了国有企业高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的负向影响；但限薪令对非国有企业高管的薪酬管制几乎没有影响，并没有影响非国有企业高管薪酬随着时间的推移而对业绩预告精确度增大的负向影响。 第三，相比低机构持股比例的公司而言，高机构持股比例的公司高管薪酬对业绩预告精确度的负向影响更小。这一结果表明虽然机构投资者作为企业外部的财务投资者，不参与企业的日常生产经营，但机构投资者会通过他们的股权和资本市场的力量，积极参与和规范公司的治理，在实施对公司的监督效应时发挥了积极的作用，可以对高管提出的不合理的薪酬提案施加压力，从而有力地抑制了高管攫取高额薪酬和对会计盈余进行操控的动机，同时进一步提升了高管薪酬业绩敏感性。此外，机构投资者还促进了公司自愿披露更多信息，提高了盈余信息披露的透明性和及时性，进一步完善了公司治理的结构。
英文摘要：	Chinese executive compensation is not simply the internal governance issues in listing companies, it is related to the gap between rich and poor, social justice and harmony, people’s livelihood. Therefore, not only investors pay attention to executive compensation, the regulatory authorities are also highly concerned. As an important source of earnings forecast, management forecast is very critical, especially to listed companies. It reflects enterprises’ future operating, cash flow and financial condition, and also transmits core information to the outsider. It also contributes investors to evaluate the financial information of the company in advance. Thus, scholars from domestic and overseas carried out lots of useful researches on the management forecast disclosed by companies. In theory, an effective compensation contract would alleviate the principal-agent issues which are caused by executives who intend to obtain private benefits. Relatively, agency problem is more serious in China, and executive compensation usually linked to the accounting performance which comes from a certain criterion under some constraints and easily be opportunism manipulated by executive. Eventually agency problem leads to a reduction in the quality of internal financial reporting that affects the precision of management forecast. Based on manipulated executive compensation, this paper explores the effect and mechanism of executive compensation on management forecast precision, meanwhile makes a further study on whether these effects are moderated by the ownership and institutional investors. This paper includes seven chapters. The first chapter is introduction, mainly putting forward the research theme, designs, contents, definitions and innovations. The second chapter is literature review, including the correlational studies on executive compensation and management forecast precision. Based on agent theory, contract theory and Disclosure of information theory, the third chapter states the institutional background of compensation and management forecast precision. In the fourth chapter, from the executive compensation incentive perspective, we analyse the way of executives obtain excess compensation by manipulating corporate accounting surplus, which may lead to a reduction in the quality of internal financial reporting for the generation of earnings forecast information, and affects the precision of the management forecast. Simultaneously we further examine the influence of the upward and downward earnings management on management forecast precision. The fifth chapter and the sixth chapter separately from the perspective of ownership and institutional investors, primary research the moderated effect of executive compensation on management forecast precision. The seventh chapter is conclusion, including limitations and future research directions. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, and in the control of endogenous, sample selection and other aspects of the robustness test, the main conclusions of this study are as follows: First, there is a negative correlation between the executive compensation and management forecast precision. Wanting to get the absolute amount of high salary or relative amount of excess compensation, at the same time due to the constraints and binding by compensation contract setting up accounting performance indicators, management in order to obtain the expected salary often have strong motivation to manipulate accounting surplus. This will significantly affect the internal financial reporting quality that uses to generate performance forecast information. At this time, the core index of the internal financial reporting is opportunistic manipulated by executives, which leads to reducing its quality and management forecast precision. In addition, compared with the downward earnings management of the enterprise, the negative impact of the upward earnings management of the enterprise executive compensation on management forecast precision will become larger. This shows that executives in order to guarantee the expected salary satisfaction, at the same time needing to meet the requirements of compensation contract, the motivation of upward earnings management is significantly stronger than the motivation of downward earnings management. Second, compared to state-owned enterprises, the negative impact of executive compensation of non-state-owned enterprises on management forecast precision will become larger. Compared to state-owned enterprises, management of non-state-owned enterprises in order to obtain the high salary or excess compensation will have strong motivation to manipulate accounting surplus. This will significantly affect the internal financial reporting quality of non-state-owned enterprises that uses to generate performance forecast information, which leads to reducing management forecast precision of non-state-owned enterprises. In addition, the thesis found that the pay restrained policy has great influence on executive compensation regulation of state-owned enterprises. The pay restrained policy regulate the highest salary of state-owned enterprises that reduces the motivation by management of state-owned enterprises manipulated accounting surplus to obtain the high salary or excess compensation, which reduces the negative impact of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises on management forecast precision. But the pay restrained policy has little impact on executive compensation regulation of non-state-owned enterprises and does not affect the becoming lager negative effect of executive compensation of non-state-owned enterprises on management forecast precision. Third, compared to the low proportion of institutional investors, the negative impact of executive compensation of high proportion of institutional investors will become smaller. The results show that although the institutional investors as the external financial investors that do not participate in the daily production and operation of enterprises, the institutional investors can actively participate in and regulate corporate governance by the power of their equity and capital market. The institutional investors play a positive role in the implementation of corporate supervision, can put pressure to unreasonable compensation proposal so as to effectively inhibit the executives to grab the high salary and the motivation to manipulate accounting surplus, and further enhance the sensitivity between the executive compensation with performance. In addition, institutional investors also promote the company to voluntarily disclose more information, to improve the transparency and timeliness of earnings information disclosure, and further improve the structure of corporate governance.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)