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论文编号：	8499
作者编号：	2120142513
上传时间：	2016/6/14 9:16:35
中文题目：	剩余索取权匹配的比较制度实验研究——兼析委托代理中对称和非对称权利的本质
英文题目：	Arrangements of Residual Claims Based on Comparative Institutional Experiment：To Analyze the Nature of Symmetric and Asymmetric Rights in Principal-Agent Relationship
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	剩余索取权；合同选择；能力；风险态度；实验
英文关键字：	Residual claims, Contracts sorting, Ability, Risk attitude, Experiment
中文摘要：	剩余索取权分配方式一直是公司治理领域所研究的关键性问题，它不仅决定不同利益相关者所享有的风险和收益，而且关系到企业的治理效率、资源配置以及利益相关者的工作积极性，从而在很大程度上影响着企业目标的实现。实际上，剩余索取权的分配方式一般包括三种：一是物质资本所有者掌握企业所有的剩余索取权，二是人力所有者掌握企业所有的剩余索取权，三是由物质资本所有者和人力资本所有者共同享有剩余索取权。本文从不同角度梳理了这三种配属方式背后的理论逻辑并进行比较分析，可以说，剩余索取权的配属方式是随着企业制度的演进以及公司治理理论的发展而不断更新变化的。以往文献大都采用实证方式对我国上市公司治理中的剩余索取权安排问题进行分析，探讨剩余索取权安排与上市公司成长绩效间的关系，本文的创新之处在于首次以实验的方式研究剩余索取权配属问题，提出了三种剩余索取权分配方式下的合同，分别是定额租约（代理人拥有剩余索取权）、固定工资（委托人拥有剩余索取权）和分成合约（委托人和代理人共享剩余索取权），同时将代理人的个人能力、风险态度、过度自信等特质纳入到分析框架中，试图解决剩余索取权分配方式与代理人自身因素的匹配问题。本文采用两种实验设置，在内生设置中，代理人有权在任务开始前选择合同即自己的工资支付方式；而外生设置下，代理人将强制地分别在三种合同下完成任务，以此比较异质性代理人的自主选择行为是否影响契约的激励效率。本文的主要结论如下：在内生设置下：第一，参与者的劳动产出能力越强，越可能选择剩余索取权合同，也就是分成合约或定额租约；第二，选择无剩余索取权合同的参与者与选择剩余索取权合同的参与者在自我报告的努力程度方面存在显著差异；第三，过度自信会影响参与者选择合同的过程，参与者的过度自信倾向越强，他越可能选择剩余索取权比重大的合同；第四，当控制参与者劳动产出能力在不同合同临界点时，风险态度也会对参与者选择选择合同产生作用，就总体而言，风险效应会被参与者能力因素挤出；第五，与已有的研究不同，本文并未发现性别因素在合同选择过程中的作用。在外生设置下：第一，剩余索取权合同下的劳动产出明显高于非剩余索取权合同下的劳动产出；第二，相比于非剩余索取权合同，实验参与者在剩余索取权合同中报告的努力程度更高；第三，对比内生和外生两种设置，当参与者同样在剩余索取权合同下工作时，其劳动产出存在显著差异，也就是当参与者自主选择剩余索取权合同而不是强制在该合同下工作时，参与者劳动产出更高。总之，我们的研究强调了剩余索取权分配以及多维选择的重要性，也就是不同类型的激励框架会吸引不同能力、偏好的异质性代理人，从而为企业员工工资合同的选择、企业工资制度的设计、如何降低雇佣成本以及员工的筛选与雇用提供有益的借鉴。
英文摘要：	Arrangement of residual claims has always been a core point related to corporate governance, which decides the risk and interest allocation among different stakeholders as well as governance structure, efficiency of internal resource distribution and working initiative. Therefore, residual claims affect the achievement of corporate objectives to a large extent. Actually, three ways of arrangement are common: firstly, physical capital has the residual claims; secondly, human capital has the residual claims; thirdly, both of them share the residual claims. This paper analyzes the theoretically logic behind these three ways of arrangement, that is, the allocation of residual claims is changing with the evolution of enterprise system and governance theory. The previous research on residual claims usually uses empirical approach to explore the relationship between residual claims and corporate performance. Our innovation is to analyze residual claims by experimental study. We put forward three contracts corresponding to three ways of residual claims arrangement and bring agent feature like ability, risk attitude, overconfidence into our analytical framework, by which means to solve the matching problem between allocation of residual claims and agent feature. There are two treatments in our experiment. In endogenous treatment, participant has right to choose contract type for himself, but in exogenous treatment, participant has to work under three contracts respectively. The main conclusions are as follows: In endogenous treatment: firstly, more productive participants are more likely to choose contracts which owns residual claims; secondly, the reporting efforts are significantly different between participants who choose residual claims contract and who do not; thirdly, overconfidence factor affect the contract sorting, the more overconfident the participants are, the more likely they choose the contract with large proportion of residual claims; fourthly, when the productivity is close to critical point, risk attitude is also an important factor on sorting, but in general, risk effect will be crowded out by ability factor; fifthly, different from previous conclusion, we don't find gender has any impact on contract sorting. In exogenous treatment: firstly, productivity and reporting efforts are much higher in residual claims contract compared to non-residual claims contract; secondly, the general productivity under residual claims contract in endogenous treatment differs from that in exogenous treatment. When participants have sorting rights, they will generate better performance. In all, our research emphasizes the significance of arrangement of residual claims and multiple sorting, that is to say, different incentive scheme attracts different type of agents. We want to provide some suggestions and guides on employees' contract sorting and filtering, design of payment system and reduction of hiring costs.
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