联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	8492
作者编号：	2120142417
上传时间：	2016/6/13 21:05:05
中文题目：	机构投资者持股、信息披露质量与融资约束
英文题目：	Institutional Investors’ Shareholdings, Information Disclosure Quality and Financing Constraints
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	机构投资者持股；信息披露质量；融资约束
英文关键字：	Institutional Investors’ Shareholdings; Informational Disclosure Quality; Financing Constraints
中文摘要：	融资约束是现代企业普遍面临的问题，能否获得充足的资金决定了企业的经营业绩、生存与发展。企业融资分为内部融资和外部融资。内部融资是有限的，外部融资主要是指外部股权融资和外部债权融资。信息不对称以及委托代理问题的存在会使外部融资成本较高，这就是企业面临的融资约束问题。企业发展需要足够的资金，外部融资约束的存在会使企业因为资金缺乏而放弃良好的投资项目，制约企业发展。所以，缓解企业融资约束有重要意义，而缓解融资约束需要解决信息不对称和代理成本的问题。诸多研究表明机构投资者是减少信息不对称和代理成本的重要途径。机构投资者会通过资金规模、专业能力、信息搜集的优势积极影响上市公司治理，提高信息披露质量，降低代理成本、监督管理层。现阶段，我国资本市场仍在发展。本论文主要研究机构投资者持股比例和融资约束之间的关系。我们将机构投资者划分为两种不同类型：压力敏感型机构投资者和压力抵制型机构投资者。论文分别研究了这两类不同的机构投资者。本文回顾了上市公司机构投资者持股、信息披露质量和融资约束三者间关系的文献，对这方面的研究进行了深入推进。本文选取深市2012-2014年三年间样本上市公司，采用国内学者况学文构建的融资约束指数来衡量融资约束，对压力敏感型机构投资者和压力抵制型机构投资者进行了实证研究，论文发现压力敏感型机构投资者和融资约束并没有显著关系。然而压力抵制型机构投资者持股比例越高，其面临的融资约束越低，信息披露质量在两者之间起到了中介作用。
英文摘要：	Most modern enterprises face financing constraints. Whether an enterprise can have sufficient funding determines the results of operations and even the survival and development of enterprises. Corporate finance include internal financing and external financing. Internal financing is often limited, external financing includes equity financing and debt financing, information asymmetries and principal-agent problem will higher external financing cost, which is called financing constraints. The development of enterprises needs adequate funding. The enterprise has to abandon the investment as a result of the existence of external financing constraints. Then, the development of enterprise is constrained. So it’s significantly important to reduce the financing constraints, and to it, must be to reduce the degree of information asymmetry and agency cost. The research shows that the development of institutional investors is one of the main ways of information asymmetry and agency cost reduction. The institutional investors will actively improve corporate governance and improve information disclosure quality. At present in China, the capital market is still developing. This thesis mainly focuses on the relationship between the ratio of institutional investors’ shareholdings and financing constraints. We classify institutional investors into two different types: pressure-sensitive institutional investors and pressure-resistant institutional investors. Then, we separately study the different institutional investors. This thesis retrospects the previous literature related to institutional investors, information disclosure quality and financing constraints. In this paper, we take the sample from the listed company in Shenzhen stock exchange, covering period from 2012 to 2014. We use model to measure financing constraints. We find that there is no obvious relationship between pressure-sensitive investors and financing constraints whiles the higher of pressure-resistant investors’ shareholdings, the lower of financing constraints. In addition, the higher the pressure-resistant investor shareholdings are, the lower the financing constraints are. And information disclosure quality plays an intermediating role between the ratio of pressure-resistant investor holdings and financing constraints.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)