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论文编号：	844
作者编号：	20022429
上传时间：	2008/6/26 20:15:09
中文题目：	产业投资基金治理研究
英文题目：	Governance of Industrial Inves
指导老师：	范秀成
中文关键字：	产业投资基金 基金治理 委托代理
英文关键字：	Industrial Investment Fund（II
中文摘要：	产业投资基金在中国是一个新生事物，要保障其快速、健康、稳定的发展，良好的治理是十分重要的。中国产业投资基金发展的历史还不够长，相关的法律法规和制度还处于缺失状态，相关产业投资基金的设立还需要国家有关部门的特批，发展的进程比较缓慢。在借鉴国外产业投资基金治理经验的基础上，对中国产业投资基金治理问题进行系统的理论和实践研究，可以为中国产业投资基金的发展提供理论上的支持，避免产业投资基金在以后的发展中出现不必要的问题，促进产业投资基金的快速、健康、稳定发展。 本研究以中国产业投资基金为研究对象，以委托代理理论为主线，系统地研究分析产业投资基金中委托代理链条中的信息不对称问题，以及由此引起的道德风险、逆向选择和内部人控制等若干问题。在分析这些问题在中国产业投资基金治理结构中的具体表现后，提出解决这些问题的方法。针对道德风险、逆向选择和内部人控制问题，本研究从建立基金管理人激励约束机制的角度，提出基金内部治理和外部治理的机制与结构，继而形成完善中国产业投资基金治理结构的建议。 本研究共包括九章，内容安排如下： 第一章为绪论。首先介绍产业投资基金和产业投资基金治理的研究历史与现状等背景，提出该研究的理论和实践意义；其次总结全文的研究思路、内容、方法，并指出本研究的创新点。 第二章为相关理论与文献综述。主要是对国内外关于公司治理、产业投资基金治理及本文所涉及的信托理论、信息经济学理论、企业产权理论和股票期权理论等理论和文献进行综述。 第三章介绍产业投资基金管理人的激励机制。产业投资基金要设置激励制度，以使基金管理人的行为符合基金持有人的利益。在契约型产业投资基金中，管理费收入制度是关键性制度，该制度分为固定管理费、业绩分成管理费以及混合管理费模式；公司型产业投资基金可以股票期权作为激励机制，本文认为不宜单独采用股票期权的激励模式，可将股票期权与其它类型的激励模式结合运用。 第四章介绍产业投资基金管理人的约束机制。通过比较国外一元信托模式、二元信托模式、共同受托模式、监督人受托模式，分析中国契约型产业投资基金存在的问题并提出完善的建议；通过比较美国的独立董事制度、日本的监查人制度、英国的附加董事制度，对中国建立公司型基金内部约束机制提出完善建议。 第五章介绍产业投资基金管理人的业绩评价机制。业绩评价可以科学考核基金经理人的业绩，减少道德风险和内部人控制风险，提高基金的整体业绩和形象，保证产业投资基金的良性发展。 第六章介绍产业投资基金的信息披露机制。产业投资基金投资者主要面临发行阶段的逆向选择风险和日常运营中的道德风险。产业基金在的信息披露上应把握适度性原则，在内部披露上强调基金托管人的作用，而在外部强调政府的强制信息披露和专业中介机构的市场化介入。在信息披露的主题和内容上也应区分不同阶段，做出有针对性的不同制度安排。 第七章介绍产业投资基金的监督机制。产业投资基金的监督包括内部监督和外部监管。内部监督包括基金持有人监督和基金托管人监督；外部监管分为行政主管监管和行业自律监管。国外有两种不同的产业投资基金监管模式：英国模式和美国模式。中国应综合借鉴这两种模式，实行职能监管。 第八章结合渤海产业投资基金的实践，在全面介绍渤海产业投资基金的背景资料的基础上，重点对渤海产业投资基金的激励约束机制进行实证分析。 第九章对产业投资基金治理的研究进行总结，并提出需要进一步解决和研究的问题，为后续研究指明方向。 本文的创新点主要体现在： 第一、设计和提出了产业投资基金治理机制框架。本文以保护基金投资者利益最大化出发点设计并提出了针对基金发起人、基金投资者、基金管理人、基金托管人、基金中介服务机构等各方的治理机制，包括基金的内部治理和外部治理两部分。其中，基金的内部治理机制的核心是对基金管理人实施激励机制，从而在基金各利益主体之间进行剩余控制权与剩余索取权有效配置的一套制度性安排。外部治理包括通过市场机制来约束管理人行为。基于上述两方面的治理问题，本文提出了我国现阶段产业投资基金的治理机制，具体包括：对基金管理人的激励机制、对基金管理人的约束机制、对基金管理人的业绩评价机制、产业投资基金的信息披露机制和产业投资基金的监督机制等内容。 第二、尝试性地提出了跨越法学、经济学、管理学等学科对产业投资基金进行综合分析的独特研究视角。产业投资基金治理研究涉及法学领域的信托理论，经济学领域的信息经济学理论（含博弈论和机制设计理论）、企业产权理论和股票期权理论，管理学领域的公司治理理论等多领域多个研究专题，通过多视角对产业投资基金治理相关问题的借鉴、借用和整合，提炼出产业投资基金治理问题所适用的原理和规则。 第三、研究并构建了一个相对完整的契约型产业投资基金的管理费模型。虽然委托代理关系中代理人与委托人目标函数并不总是一致，但激励安排可以使二者部分重合，手段就是赋予基金管理人以剩余索取权，让管理人参与基金收益分配。基金管理人的报酬与基金的业绩相挂钩，使委托人与代理人之间的目标相一致，实现基金管理人与持有者的目标函数兼容。在本文第三章创新性地尝试采用建立模型的方法，对契约型产业投资基金的管理费提取机制进行研究，分析影响管理费收取的因素、解释不同的管理费提取机制的内在规律，从理论推导角度，初步得出了对我国产业投资基金业发展具有一定启发意义结论。本文所提出的契约型产业投资基金的管理费模型设计方面的结论对于推动国内基金业激励机制模型设计方面的研究具有一定的前瞻性作用。 第四、研究并提出了将产业投资基金管理人义务的相关内容纳入产业投资基金管理人约束机制研究框架，为约束机制的研究拓展了全新的视角。本文第四章研究认为，无论是契约型产业投资基金还是公司型产业投资基金，基金管理人都是产业投资基金法律关系的核心，在产业投资基金法律关系中处于“共同受托人”的地位，是决定产业投资基金成功投资运作的关键。为保障和实现基金投资者的利益，基金管理人必须遵循严格的行为规范，承担相应的义务约束。为此，本文从法学角度研究了基金管理人的信赖义务，对其内涵、判断标准、内容和违反信赖义务的责任的完整把握为约束机制的研究拓展了全新的视角。 第五、研究并提炼了渤海产业投资基金的激励约束机制的特点。作为中国第一支经批准的大型人民币产业投资基金，渤海产业投资基金在约束与激励机制上进行了大量的有益探索。首先，在基金的成本控制和利润分配上进行了详细规定。以管理人的管理费用和业绩报酬的计提为例，综合了多种计提方式，在较大程度上防止激励不足或激励过度，相关的内部规定非常细化并具有很强的可操作性，可以说为日后的契约型产业投资基金的设立和运营提供了一个范本；其次，在发起人的出资上采取了承诺出资制，借用了有限合伙制基金“无过错离婚制度”等概念进行契约安排，对基金管理人形成有效约束，从资本的入口对道德风险进行防范；再次，渤海产业投资基金在内部治理上体现着很多灵活性，例如风险准备金制度，便于避免基金管理人与基金持有人之间的利益冲突；最后，不同与以往国内产业基金的制度安排，渤海产业投资基金的设计者赋予了基金托管人较多的监管职能，例如在渤海产业基金中实践中设计的“产业基金托管项目经理制”，充分体现出设计者落实和强化托管银行职能的意愿，建立起有效的多角权力制约架构。
英文摘要：	The Industrial Investment Fund (IIF) is a new-born thing in China, whose fast, healthy and stable development is guaranteed by the effective management who is very important for the IIF. The history of Chinese IIF is so short that the relevant laws and regulations are absent and the special approval of the relevant administrative departments is needed by the establishment of the relevant IIF. As a result, the speed of the development of IIF is very low. The function of the theoretic and practical research of Chinese IIF is as follows: providing the theoretic support for the development of IIF, avoiding the unnecessary problems happening to the following development of IIF, promoting the IIF to develop fast, healthily and stably. This thesis analyzes series of problems in China’s IIF governance structure from the angle of Principal-Agent theory, systematically analyzing information asymmetry within the Principal-Agent Chain, moral hazard, adverse selection and inside control as a result of information asymmetry. Based on these detailed analysis, the thesis proposes solutions to current problems in China’s IIF governance structure. Aiming at moral hazard, adverse selection and inside control, this thesis holds the view that Incentive & Constraint Mechanism for fund management should be established, inside governance and outside governance of IIF should be strengthened, and Chinese IIF governance structure can be improved. In this paper the structure comprises nine chapters, which are as follows: Chapter One focuses on Introduction. First for industrial investment funds and industrial investment funds control of the history and status quo, and other background information, the study put forward the theory and practical significance of the study followed by concluding remarks ideas, contents, methods, and noted that the innovation of this study. Chapter Two focuses on for the relevant theory and literature review. Mainly on the domestic and international corporate governance, investment fund management industry and covered by the trust this theory, information economics theory, theory of enterprise property rights and stock options theory and the theory of literature. Chapter Three focuses on the Incentive Mechanism of industrial investment fund managers. IIF should establish the Incentive Mechanism to make the activities of the Fund Manager accord with the interest of the Fund Holder. As for the Contract Fund, the crucial system is the management fee income system which includes fixed management fee, achievement share management fee and the mixed management fee. As for the Corporate Fund, stock option should be taken as the Incentive Mechanism. This thesis holds that it is better to take the stock option together with other Incentive Mechanisms. Chapter Four focuses on the Constraint Mechanism of industrial investment fund managers. Through the comparison of the modes include Single Variable Trust, Duality Trust, Joint Trustee and Supervisor Trustee, this thesis analyzes the problems existing in Chinese IIF of Contract Fund and then puts forward the relevant suggestion. Through the comparison of the system of American Independence Director, Japanese Supervisor and Britain Attached Director, this thesis puts forward the suggestion concerning the establishment of the inside constraint mechanism of Corporate Fund. Chapter Five focuses on the Mechanism of Achievement Evaluation of IIF’s manager. Achievement Evaluation can assess the achievement of the managers, reduce the moral hazard and inside control, increase the achievement and reputation of the whole fund and guarantee the IIF to develop in a health way. Chapter Six focuses on the Information Disclosure Mechanism of IIF. The main risk IIF will be faced with is moral hazard and inside control. The main parties of Information Disclosure at the phase of issuance of IIF include Fund Initiator and Fund Manager and the main party of Information Disclosure at the stage of operation of IIF is Fund Manager. The content of Information Disclosure includes profit forecast information, background information, management data, forecast information, unconfirmed immateriality assets and inside control report. Chapter Seven focuses on the Supervision Mechanism of IIF. The Supervision Mechanism of IIF includes inside supervision and outside supervision. The inside supervision includes the supervision of Fund Holder and Fund Trustee, outside supervision includes the supervision of administrative department in charge and the Organization of Industry Self-discipline. There are two different fund supervision modes concerning IIF: Britain mode and American mode. China should learn from these modes and adopt the mode of Function Supervision. Chapter Eight focuses on the Bohai Industrial Investment Fund practice, in a comprehensive account of the Bohai Industry Investment Fund background information, on the basis of the industrial investment fund incentive and restraint mechanisms for empirical analysis. Chapter Nine focuses on the industrial investment fund governance research summation, and the need to further study and solve the problem, specify the direction for the follow-up study. The main innovation primarily embodied in: First, the design and the presentation of the industrial investment fund governance framework of the mechanism. In this paper, in order to protect the interests of fund investors maximize the starting point to design and fund sponsors were addressed, and fund investors, fund managers, fund trustees, the fund intermediary service institutions such as parties mechanisms of governance, including the Fund's internal governance and external governance two parts. Among them, the Fund's internal governance mechanisms in the core of the implementation of the incentive mechanism of fund managers, the main interest in the fund among the remaining Residual Claim effective control and configuration of a system arrangements. External governance, including through market mechanisms to restrain the administrator acts. Based on the above two issues of governance, the paper puts forward China's industrial investment funds at this stage of governance mechanisms, including the mechanism of incentives for fund managers, fund managers and the restraint mechanism, the fund manager's performance evaluation mechanism for industrial investment fund information disclosure mechanism and industrial investment fund supervision mechanism, and so forth. Second, to study and propose across law, economics, management, science and other subjects on the industrial investment fund comprehensive study of a unique perspective. Industry Investment Fund Governance study involves the area of trust law theory, economics, information in the field of economic theory (including game theory and mechanism design theory), the enterprise property rights theory and stock options theory, the field of management theory a number of corporate governance research topics perspective on the industry through a variety of investment funds from issues related to governance, borrowing and integration, industrial investment funds derived from the application of governance principles and rules. Third, the study and construction of a relatively complete industrial investment fund lease-management fees model. Although the principal-agent relationship between agents and clients in the objective function is not always the same, incentive arrangements will enable the two parts of coincidence, the means is given to Residual Claim fund managers, fund managers involved in the distribution of income. Fund managers and remuneration linked to the performance of the Fund so that the principal and agent between the objectives of the agreement in order to achieve fund managers and holders of the objective function compatible. In this third chapter of innovative attempt to build a model of the lease of industrial investment fund management fees extraction mechanism for research, analysis of the impact of management fees charged factors to explain the different mechanisms of management fees from the inherent laws derived from the theory perspective, the preliminary draw on China's industrial investment fund industry to develop a certain instructive conclusions. In this paper, the proposed lease of industrial investment fund management fees model for the design of the conclusions of the fund industry incentives to promote domestic mechanism model of the design has certain forward-looking role. Fourth, to study and propose the industrial investment fund managers will be the obligations of relevant content into the industrial investment fund managers restraint mechanism on the framework for the mechanism of restraint expand a new perspective. Chapter IV of this study, whether the lease of industrial investment funds or corporate industry investment funds, fund managers and investment funds are the core of legal relations in the industrial investment fund legal relations in a "common trustee" status, Industry Investment Fund is to determine the operation of the key to investment success. For the protection and realization of the interests of fund investors, fund managers must follow strict code of conduct, undertake corresponding obligations binding. Therefore, this article from the law point of view of the obligations of the trust fund managers, their content, criteria, content and breach of trust in the integrity of the obligations of responsibility and restraint mechanisms to grasp the expansion of the new perspective. Fifth, research and refining the Bohai Industry Investment Fund of incentive and restraint mechanisms. As China's first large-scale RMB approved industrial investment fund, the Bohai Industry Investment Fund in the restraint and incentive mechanism on a large number of useful exploration. First, in the Fund's cost control and distribution of profits on the detailed provisions. Managers to the management and performance fees paid Provision for example, a variety of integrated Provision, to a greater extent on the incentives to prevent excessive or inadequate incentives related to the internal regulations are very detailed and highly operable It can be said that the contract for the future of industrial investment funds for the establishment and operation provides a template; Secondly, the sponsors of investors to take on the commitment of financing, borrowing a limited partnership fund "no-fault divorce system" concept lease arrangements, the fund managers to form an effective constraint from the entrance of the capital to guard against the risk of moral hazard; again, the Bohai Industry Investment Fund in the internal governance of a lot of flexibility, such as risk reserve system, easy to avoid fund managers and fund holders It was the conflict of interests between the end, different from the previous system of domestic industries fund arrangements, the Bohai Industry Investment Fund, the designers of the fund trustees have given more of a regulatory function, for example, in the Bohai Sea in the fund industry practice designed "Industry Fund Trust project manager "system, to give full expression to the designer to implement and strengthen the role of custodian bank will establish an effective framework polyhedrosis power constraints.
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