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论文编号：	8436
作者编号：	2120142512
上传时间：	2016/6/12 16:54:26
中文题目：	高管激励、股权结构与上市公司财务风险
英文题目：	Executive Incentive、Ownership Structure and Financial Risk of Listed Companies
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	高管激励；股权结构；财务风险
英文关键字：	Executive Incentive; Ownership Structure; Financial Risk
中文摘要：	当前，全球股票市场、汇率市场和大宗商品市场大幅度波动。全球经济一体化的今天，中国与其他国家之间的互动更加频繁。而中国目前正处于经济转型期，GDP增速正从10%左右的高速增长转向7%左右中高速增长的新常态时期，经济下行压力较大。在目前经济形式下，公司尤其是上市公司的风险识别能力和风险管控能力就显得尤为重要。公司的风险可以分为经营风险和财务风险，公司的经营风险最终会体现到财务风险上来，因此本文主要对公司的财务风险进行研究。 本文以公司治理结构中较为重要的高管激励和股权结构作为切入点。研究高管激励与财务风险的相关关系，同时研究股权结构变量对高管激励与财务风险关系的调节作用，试图寻找能够改善公司治理结构，减少公司财务风险的最优路径。本文采用我国上市公司2010-2014年的数据为研究样本，提出相关假设，构建数理模型，并应用实证分析的方法对本文假设进行验证，最后对实证结果进行分析和论证，并做出相关的建议。 本文的实证结果表明：高管货币薪酬激励与财务风险之间存在负相关关系；高管股权激励与财务风险之间具有负相关关系。在股权结构的调节作用上，股权集中度对高管货币薪酬激励与财务风险之间的关系存在调节作用，股权集中度能够强化高管货币薪酬激励与财务风险之间的负相关关系；股权集中度对高管股权激励具有调节作用，股权集中度能够强化高管货币薪酬激励与财务风险之间的负相关关系；在侧重于公司破产风险衡量的模型中，股权制衡度对公司高管激励与财务风险之间的负相关关系具有相同的强化趋势，在侧重于公司违约风险的衡量的模型中，股权制衡度能够弱化高管薪酬激励与财务风险之间的负相关关系，强化股权激励与财务风险之间的负相关关系。
英文摘要：	At present, the global stock market, currency market, commodity market are swing. With the economic globalization, the economic relationship between China and other countries in the world become closer. Chinese economic structure is transition now, economic growth is moving from the high-speed growth of 10% to 7% increase in the new normal, economic growth has been seeing a downward.In the present economic situation, companies, especially the listed conpanies risk identification and risk management capability is particularly important. The company's risk can be divided into operational risks and financial risks, the company’s operational risk will eventually be reflected in the financial risk, so this paper mainly study on the company's financial risk. In this paper, we use the more important executive incentive and equity structure as the starting point. Study on the relationship between executive incentive and financial risk,as well as we also study on the regulating effect of the ownership structure on the relationship between executive incentive and financial risk, trying to find the best way to improve the corporate governance structure and reduce the financial risk of the company. In this paper, we use the 2010-2014’s data of listing corporation as the research sample, putting forward some relevant hypothesis, constructing mathematical model, and using the empirical analysis method to verify the hypothesis proposed in this paper, finally the empirical results are analyzed and demonstrated, and we make some relevant recommendations. The result shows that, there is a negative correlation between executive compensation incentive and financial risk; there is a negative correlation between executive equity incentive and financial risk. On the regulation of ownership structure, ownership concentration exists the regulation of the relationship between executive compensation incentive and financial risk, ownership concentration can enhance the negative correlation between executive compensation incentives and financial risk; ownership concentration exists the regulation of the relationship between executive equity incentive and financial risk, ownership concentration can enhance the negative correlation between executive equity incentive and financial risk. In the model which focuses on the company's bankruptcy risk measurement, equity balance degree has the same tendency to enhance the negative correlation between executive incentives and financial risk. In the model of the measurement of the risk of breach of contract, the equity balance degree can weaken the negative relationship between executive compensation incentive and financial risk, the equity balance degree can enhance the negative relationship between executive compensation incentive and financial risk.
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