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论文编号：	8433
作者编号：	1120120789
上传时间：	2016/6/12 13:47:21
中文题目：	国企高管行政型治理对战略选择的影响研究
英文题目：	The Effect of Administrative Governance of State-Owned Firm’ Executives on Strategic Choices
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	国企高管治理；行政型治理；管理自主权；风险承担；战略变革
英文关键字：	Governance of Executives of State-Owned Firms; Administrative Governance; Managerial Discretion; Risk-taking; Strategic Change
中文摘要：	行政型治理背景下我国国企高管实际上处于政府和政府股东的治理之中，国企高管处于行政型治理状态。国企高管的行政型治理会对高管的自主权产生怎样的影响？国企高管行政型治理是否会影响企业战略选择，又会对企业战略选择产生怎样的影响？国企高管行政型治理和管理自主权是一个硬币的正反两面，然而，已有研究在考察行政型治理时关注制度因素，却忽视管理自主权；在考察国企高管自主权时又常常聚焦组织内部因素，忽视行政型治理的作用。基于此，本文探讨国企高管行政型治理对战略选择的影响。在梳理相关文献和国企行政型治理演进背景的基础上，本文构建国企高管行政型治理影响战略选择的理论框架。继而从行政级别、控制层级以及董事长相对权力等方面，理论分析并实证检验高管行政型治理对风险承担、战略变革的影响。国企高管与政府官员之间、上市公司高管与股东单位高管之间以及同一国资委系统的公司高管之间存在广泛的交流，形成潜在的内部经理人市场，因而本文理论分析并实证检验国企董事长离任原因、继任类型对战略变革的影响，提供高管变更方面的国企高管行政型治理证据。通过以上理论分析和实证检验，研究发现：国企高管行政型治理通过管理自主权对战略选择产生影响；行政级别较低、控制层级较多的国企在风险承担水平、战略变革程度等方面较弱；董事长相对权力越大，国企风险承担水平、战略变革程度越低，总经理的监督能够弱化董事长“一言堂”对战略选择造成的负面影响；在对风险承担的影响方面，行政级别、控制层级与高管持股比例具有替代效应，表明对国企高管授权也是一种激励；前任董事长降职对继任董事长的战略变革有促进作用、前任董事长被调查或辞职对继任董事长的战略变革具有抵制作用、继任董事长来自岗位轮换有利于继任后的战略变革。相关结论对于国企治理实践具有一定的启示。首先，国企治理改革坚持从行政型向经济型转型；其次，国企治理改革的一个重要方向是减少控制层级；再次，国企要强化董事会建设，规范董事长行为；最后，国企完善职业经理人市场要给予外聘经理人充分授权。
英文摘要：	In the content of administrative governance of state-owned firms, executives of China’ state-owned firms are actually controlled by government and state shareholders. How will administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives affect managerial discretion? Whether will administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives affect strategic choices of state-owned firms, and if it does, what effect it will have. Administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives and managerial discretion are opposite sides of the same coin. However, research literatures on administrative governance are focus on institutional factors, but neglecte managerial discretion; research literatures on managerial discretion are focus on organization factors, but neglecte the effect of administrative governance. Based on this, this dissertation discusses the effect of administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives on strategic choices. After reviewing literatures and analysising process of administrative governance of state-owned firm, this dissertation constructs fundamental theory frame of effect of administrative governance of executives on strategic choices. Then, this dissertation analyses the effect of administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives on risk-taking and strategic change, and check the hypothesis by demonstration analyses. It exists that executives be exchanged between state-owned firms and governments, and between listed companies and their shareholders, and between different listed companies from the same State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. This dissertation also tests the effect of reasons of chairman leving office and categories of chairman succession on stragetic change, and provides empirical evidences of administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives. Results suggest that: by managerial discretion, administrative governance of state-owned firms’ executives has effect on strategic change; administrative levels have a positive significant effect on risk-taking and strategic change, but pyramidal layers have a negative significant effect on risk-taking and strategic change; relative power of chairman both decrease the level of risk-taking and the magnitude of strategic change, and under the supervision of general managers, chairmen lessen the negative significant effect on risk-taking and strategic change; administrative levels and pyramidal layers can substitute for managers' share-holding of effect on risk-taking; demotion of predecessor chairman is positively related to post-succession strategic change; inquiry and resign of predecessor chairman is negatively related to post-succession strategic change; chairman rotation is positively related to post-succession strategic change. Consequently, conclusions of this dissertation have strong effect on policy recommendations. Firstly, reform of China’s corporate governance of state-owned firms should stick to the process from administrative governance to market-oriented governance; secondly, reform of China’s corporate governance of state-owned firms should reduce pyramidal layers; thirdly, state-owned firms should improve the board of directors and restrict behaviors of chairman; fourthly, establishment and improvement of professional manager market in state-owned firms should give more managerial discretion to outsiders.
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