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论文编号：	8409
作者编号：	2120142505
上传时间：	2016/6/10 13:44:54
中文题目：	相对声誉激励视角下繁忙独董
英文题目：	The Value Contribution Strategy of Busy Independent Director From the Perspective of Relative Reputation Incentive
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	繁忙独董；相对声誉激励；价值贡献策略
英文关键字：	busy independent director; relative reputation incentive; value contribution strategy
中文摘要：	发展和完善独立董事制度是我国公司治理改革的一项重要内容。近年来，上市公司一系列治理事件的频频爆出，使得独立董事的实际治理作用备受质疑。针对这一现实情境，许多学者指出独立董事缺乏足够的动力去监督管理层。那么，建立科学的激励制度，尤其是声誉激励制度，是提高独立董事有效性的重要且可行的途径。不过，对于繁忙独董而言，他们具有较高的声誉资本，有激励去有效履职，但同时他们的时间精力又是稀缺宝贵的，那么，作为理性人，他们真的会疲于奔命吗？他们会采取怎样的价值贡献策略？本文选取国内上市公司的独立董事为样本，首先，从董事个体层面，通过研究会议出席、审计委员会任职和非正常辞职三个方面的行为决策来检验其个人资源贡献策略，研究发现，基于繁忙独董所兼任的不同董事会席位对其个人的声誉贡献不同，繁忙独董在不同的席位上并没有一视同仁地投入了均等的时间、精力等资源，而是在相对声誉激励更高的董事席位上，会更愿意投入时间来出席董事会会议，更愿意担任需要投入更多时间和精力的审计委员会职务，也更不愿意主动辞职，而是愿意保留该席位，继续投入其个人的价值。进一步地，我们再拓展到董事群体层面，研究相对声誉激励较强的董事会对对非效率投资的治理效率，研究发现当企业董事会中有更多视该席位为相对声誉激励较高的繁忙独董时，企业的投资不足程度更低，这表明繁忙独董在相对声誉激励较高的席位上确实会贡献个人更多的价值，进而通过董事会治理改善了企业的投资效率。最后，我们将样本企业按照所有者性质分成了国有控股和民营控股两组，发现在企业的产权性质会对繁忙独董的价值贡献策略会有差异性的影响。
英文摘要：	Developing and perfecting the independent director system is an important part of the corporate governance reform in our country. In recent years, a series of governance scandals broke out frequently in listing Corporation，making the actual governance effect of independent directors has been questioned. Many scholars point out that this is due to the lack of sufficient power of independent directors to supervise the management. Therefore, establishing a scientific incentive system, especially the reputation incentive system, is an important and feasible way to improve the effectiveness of independent directors. However, for the busy independent directors, with high reputation capital, they have incentive to perform their duties effectively, but at the same time, their time and energy is limited and scarce, then, as a rational being, will they be exhausted with those board seats? What kind of value contribution strategy they will take? This paper selects the independent directors of domestic listing Corporation as samples. First of all, from the individual level, we study the three aspects of the meeting attendance, serving on the audit committee and abnormal resignation decision of the independent directors to unfold their personal resource contribution strategy. Results show that, busy independent directors, based on the different reputation gains contributed by different board seats they served, did not equally treat all the seats, and contribute equal time, energy and other resources. Actually, they are more willing to devote more time to attend the meeting, serve on the audit committee which consumes more time and energy in their relatively high reputation incentive board seats, and they are less willing to relinquish the relatively high reputation incentive directorships, conversely, they are willing to retain them, and continue to contribute their value. Further, we extend to the level of the board, we study the effect of inefficient investment governance of the board, and found that boards with a greater proportion of busy independent directors who rank this directorship highly are associated with lower degree of under-investment of the firm, suggesting that busy independent director in higher ranked directorships indeed contributed more value, and then which through the board improved the efficiency of investment, so it turned out to be a lower degree of under-investment. Finally, according to the nature of the owners, we divide the sample into state-owned enterprise group and private holding group, and we find that the character of property right of the enterprise will have an effect on the value contribution strategy of the busy independent director.
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