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论文编号：	8405
作者编号：	2120142452
上传时间：	2016/6/10 10:49:17
中文题目：	多元化经营、CEO权力与公司投资行为：来自中国上市公司的证据
英文题目：	Diversification, CEO Power and Corporate Investment Behavior: Evidence from China’s Listed Companies
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	CEO权力；多元化经营；投资水平；资本配置效率
英文关键字：	CEO power; diversification; investment level; capital allocation efficiency
中文摘要：	现代公司制度促使所有权与经营权相分离，职业经理人应运产生。一直以来学者们对管理层的行为进行了广泛研究，其中最有代表性的是委托代理理论。委托代理理论认为管理层与股东之间存在利益冲突，经理人权力的强化会导致公司利益受损。在实际情况之中，随着企业之间竞争的不断加剧和市场形势的瞬息万变，很多公司中出现了拥有更高决策和执行权力的CEO。同时，投资行为一直在公司活动中占有重要地位，因此本文初步进行尝试，研究CEO权力与公司投资行为之间的关系。本文认为公司投资的真正含义不仅仅在于会计层面的资本性支出，也在于公司各方面的资源配置与增值。出于这个考虑，本文从投资水平与资本配置效率两个方面考察公司的投资行为，具体来说以公司新增投资度量投资水平，以全要素生产率度量公司的资本配置效率。 另一方面，多元化经营自出现以来便备受关注，同时也是很多公司采用的经营方式。多元化经营采用的组织模式一般有事业部和集团公司制，两种形式的共同意义是在公司内部划分了经营界限进而形成内部资本市场。多元化是公司开拓新产品与新市场的需要，同时也有助于分散公司的经营风险，但多元化经营对公司价值的影响尚无一致结论，多数学者认为多元化存在折价效应。本文以主营业务归类划分的方式确定公司是否多元化经营，进而考察该经营方式对CEO权力与公司投资行为关系的调节作用。 本文选取2011-2014年中国A股市场的1179家上市公司作为研究对象，从投资水平与资本配置效率两个方面研究公司的投资行为，实证检验了我国上市公司CEO权力对投资水平与资本配置效率的影响，并考察多元化经营方式对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现，在非国有公司中，CEO权力的加强显著提升了公司的投资水平，而在国有公司中这样的表现并不明显，同时在影响明显的非国有企业中，多元化经营没能对二者关系产生进一步影响；CEO权力的增强对于公司资本配置效率的提高具有正向作用，促进了公司资本配置效率的提高，但同时发现多元化的经营方式抑制了CEO权力增强对公司资本配置效率带来的促进作用。最后，本文结合研究结论从企业、政府及个人三个角度给出了建议。
英文摘要：	The modern corporation system prompted the separation of ownership and management, in such circumstances, occupation managers emerge as the times require. Scholars have conducted extensive research on the behavior of management, among which the most representative is the theory of principal agent. According to the principal-agent theory, there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, and the strengthening of executive power will lead to the damage of the company. In the actual situation, with the increasing competition between enterprises and the market situation rapidly changing, many companies have a higher decision-making and executive power CEO. Besides, the investment behavior has been an important position in the company's activities, so this paper tentatively tries to study the relationship between CEO power and the company's investment behavior. This paper argues that the real meaning of corporate investment lies not only in the capital expenditure of the accounting level, but also in the allocation of resources and the value added of the company. Out of this consideration, this paper investigates company's investment behavior from two aspects of the investment level and the capital allocation efficiency. Specifically speaking, using the company's new investment to measure the investment level, and the total factor productivity to measure the company's capital allocation efficiency. On the other hand, since the emergence of diversified business has attracted much attention, a lot of companies are operating in the way. The organization mode of diversified operation usually includes division and group company system, and the common meaning of the two forms is to divide the internal division and the internal capital market. Diversification is the need of company to develop new products and markets, while also helping to spread the risk of the company. However, the effect of diversification on firm value is no consistent conclusion, but many researchers believe that there is a discount effect of diversification. In this paper, the main business classification is the way to determine whether the company diversified business, and then examine the moderating effect of this operation mode on the relationship between CEO power and corporate investment behavior. This paper selects 1179 listed companies of China's A shares in 2011-2014 as the research objects, studies the investment behavior from two aspects of the investment level and the capital allocation efficiency, empirical tests the effects of China's listed companies’ CEO power on the level of investment and the efficiency of capital allocation, and investigates the regulation effect of diversification on the relationship between the two above. Study found that in non-state owned companies, CEO power to strengthen significantly enhance the level of investment companies, and in state-owned companies such performance is not obvious. Also in non-state owned enterprises, diversification did not further affect the relationship between the two. On the other hand, CEO power enhancement had a positive effect for the improvement of the efficiency of capital allocation in the company and improved the capital allocation efficiency. But at the same time that diversified business inhibited the CEO power’s enhancement on the efficiency of capital allocation in the company. At last, this paper gives suggestions from three angles of enterprise, government and individual.
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