联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	8376
作者编号：	1120110784
上传时间：	2016/6/8 14:54:56
中文题目：	弱链结构中个体与群体决策的实验研究——兼析董事会决策的行为本质
英文题目：	The Experimental Study between Individual Decision and Group Decision in ‘Weak-Link’ Games: Analysis the Behavior Nature of the Board of Derectors Decision
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	弱链博弈；群体决策；董事会决策行为；实验研究
英文关键字：	‘Weak-Link’ Games; Group Decision; the Board of Derectors Decision；Experimental Study
中文摘要：	董事会是连接股东和经理层之间的桥梁，也是外部股东获取信息的唯一窗口，因此董事会研究是公司治理理论与实践的核心问题。目前董事会治理研究绝大多数是在委托代理理论框架下将重点放在董事会特征与企业绩效的关系上以寻找更优化的董事会结构，但是实践中屡见不鲜的董事会失职、股权激励计划失效等现象证明针对董事会结构进行优化并不能绝对为企业带来绩效改善，单纯表面的制度设计视角研究董事会难以指导公司治理实践和提升公司治理理论。董事会是公司的日常权力机构，其决策过程是由拥有不同偏好、信念和行为的多个体协调的结果，因此董事会的研究需要深入到这个层面。本文为了打开董事会决策的“黑箱”，选择弱链博弈结构这一符合董事会决策规律的框架考察个体和群体决策的基本规律。文章建立群体决策协调行为分析的基础模型，设计并实施个体与群体决策的行为实验，考察弱链博弈中不同决策单元支付占优策略的组容临界值，确定群体决策协调行为历史参照点的基本态势，为董事会决策理论提供行为支持，研究发现群体决策协调过程中存在明显的群体规模效应和组容效应，群体规模越大或组容越大协调成功率越高且更倾向于风险占优策略；另外当组容为3时不管是个体决策还是群体决策均倾向于支付占优策略，而当组容为5时无论何种类型的决策者均倾向于风险占优策略。文章进一步检验弱链博弈结构中个体与群体决策行为中风险占优先验信念的分布，考察学习过程中的后验信念更新的参照基础，为董事会的群决策理论提供信念参数的经验支持。对EWA学习行为模型参数分析的结果发现个体决策的先验信念更偏好支付占优选项，群体决策则相反更偏好风险占优选项；在学习过程中群体在进行后验信念更新时对机会成本赋予更多的关注，即群体决策更新后验信念的参照基础主要是前期的次序统计量结果。文章还率先考察弱链结构中竞争机制对个体和群（集）体决策效率的挤出和互补参数的临界值，为董事会断裂带理论提供机制性解释。嵌套竞争的复杂弱链结构研究发现竞争机制并不能改变群体决策协调过程中的先验信念，群体决策协调成功比例显著增加但其协调效率并没有改进，同时竞争中失败一方在下一期协调中更容易实现协调一致而胜利一方则相反。最后，文章从偏好和信念视角考察董事会决策的协调本质，为董事会决策理论的发展提供行为分析支持。董事会决策的本质就是群体决策，董事会内各群体间既存在利益冲突也存在共同利益，协调问题是董事会内群体决策的关键问题，在对董事会决策行为及协调行为分析的基础上文章提出董事会建立时需要考虑通过对董事会成员结构特征的控制以控制董事会群体内隐性群体的群体规模以及隐性群体的个数，同时提出解决董事会决策中协调问题的政策建议。另外，对董事会内成员学习行为的分析显示具有群体决策特征的董事会决策对机会成本考虑更多，尤其是对以前的经验及绩效反馈更为重视，因此董事会决策倾向于重复采用以前成功的决策行为。本文的创新有三点，一是率先从偏好和信念视角考察董事会决策的协调本质，为董事会决策理论的发展提供行为分析支持；二是率先考察嵌套竞争的复杂弱链结构中竞争机制对个体和群（集）体决策效率的挤出和互补参数的临界值，为董事会决策理论及董事会断裂带理论提供机制性解释；三是率先考察弱链博弈中群体决策的组容效应和群体规模效应，为董事会决策理论提供行为支持。同时文章也存在不足，在未来的研究中可以考虑在不对称群体决策环境、动态决策环境或者利用更丰富的博弈结构对群体决策做进一步的扩展。
英文摘要：	Board of directors, the bridge which links shareholders and management, is the only channel for the external shareholders to access information. Therefore, the research of board is the core question of corporate governance from both theoretical and practical perspective. Most of current studies about board governance under the framework of agency theory focus on the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance to seek for optimized structure. However, in reality, dereliction of duty and disabled stock incentive plan are common, which prove that optimizing the board structure cannot bring improvement of firm performance and superficial system design is incapable in directing corporate governance practice and promoting theory. The decision process of board, the routine authority, is the result of coordination between individuals with different preferences, believes and behaviors. Thus, the research of directors needs to penetrate into this nature level. To open the “black-box”, this dissertation chooses the weak link game to investigate the basic discipline of individual and group decision making. The basic model of group decision making coordination behavior analysis is established. In order to provide support to the board size theory，the behavioral experiment of individual and group decision making is designed and conducted to investigate cohort size threshold of payoff dominant strategy of different decision-making unit in the weak link game，and to determine the basic situation of group decision making’s reference point. It is found that there are significant group size effect and cohort size effect, and the larger size always combined with higher success rate and risk dominant strategy. In addition, when the cohort size is 3, both of the individual decision and the group decision making are risk dominant. While the cohort size is 5, both of those two types are risk dominant equilibrium. The dissertation further tests the risk dominant prior belief in decision making behavior of individual and group to explore reference bases of posterior belief renewing in study process and provide empirical evidence of belief parameter for group decision making theory in board of directors. The result of analyzing model simulation parameter shows that individual prefers to choose payoff dominant strategy in the beginning of the experiment, group is just the opposite. In the process of learning, group pay more attention on the opportunity cost during they update the posterior belief. It means that group decision maker update the posterior belief according to the historical information of the order statistics results. This article also examines the parameters threshold of the crowding-out effect and the complementary effect which the competitive mechanism affects the efficiency of individual or group decision making in weak link structure. The innovation provides a mechanism-based explanation for the board faultlines theory. The research of the complex weak link structure of nested competition mechanism suggests the competitive mechanism cannot change the prior belief in group decision making process. Competition increases the rate of successful coordination, but cannot influence the efficiency of coordination. In competition procedure, the losing side easier to achieve coordinate success in the next period, but the winning side just the other way. At last, this dissertation explores the coordination nature of board decision making from the perspective of preference and belief to provide the analytical support of human nature. The essence of the board decision making is group decision making. The common interest and the conflict of interests coexist in different groups in the board of directors. Thus, the key issue of group decision is coordination. Based on the analysis of decision making and coordination behavior, recommendations and suggestions for the coordination problem in board decision are proposed. In addition, the analysis of the board members’ learning behavior shows that boards with group decision feature consider more about the opportunity cost, especially about the previous experiences and the performance feedback. Consequencely, the board tends to repeat the prior successful behavior. There are three possible contributions of this dissertation: firstly, it takes the lead to study the coordinate natural of the board decision from the perspective of the preferences and beliefs to provide the analytical support of human nature; secondly, it provides a mechanism-based explanation for the board faultlines theory by examining the parameters threshold of the crowding-out effect and the complementary effect which the competitive mechanism affects the efficiency of individual or group decision making in weak link structure; thirdly, it studies the cohort size effect or group size effect of group decision making in weak link game, to provides behavioral support for board size theory. Meanwhile, there are some shortcomings in this study. The context of group decision making, the dynamic environment of decision, or more complex structure of game could be considered in further study.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)