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论文编号：	8350
作者编号：	2120142501
上传时间：	2016/6/7 23:13:50
中文题目：	风险投资对高管激励及企业创新影响的研究——基于创业板高新技术企业
英文题目：	The Influence of Venture Capital on Executive Incentive and Enterprise Innovation—a Study of High-tech Enterprises Listed on GEM Incentive and Enterprise Innovation—a Study of High-tech Enterprises Listed on GEM
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	风险投资;高管激励;企业创新
英文关键字：	Venture Capital;Executive Incentive;Enterprise Innovation
中文摘要：	2015年以来，中国资本市场酝酿着新一轮改革，依托于 “大众创业、万众创新”的政策导向，越来越多的创业企业进入资本市场。伴随创业企业的融资需求和规范治理需求，中国的风险投资在近几年获得了飞速的发展，已经成为创业企业获得融资、实现管理层激励并且进行创新投入的有力支撑。为了解决风险投资与被投资企业之间因二者利益不一致而存在代理问题，风险投资通常会在薪酬和股权方面给予创业企业高管相关的激励；鉴于技术创新与研发是创业企业生存和发展的原动力，理论上风险投资会通过对创业企业的监督和高管激励来提升创业企业的创新投入，获得技术优势。现阶段国内外对风险投资的研究多集中在对上市公司IPO抑价、先动优势以及经营绩效的影响，更偏重具体的市场表现，忽略了对影响途径的研究。本文从影响途径入手，探究风险投资对创业企业高管激励与创新投入的影响，并分析高管激励在风险投资与企业创新投入之间是否存在中介作用。本文首先对风险投资、高管激励和创新投入的概念和相关理论进行总结，梳理关于风险投资与高管激励和创新投入的相关文献和研究成果，进行回顾和述评。随后本文借鉴成熟的研究方法构建研究模型，选取样本和变量进行实证研究。本文选择近五年创业板上市的高新技术企业为研究样本，共计320个。通过研究，本文主要得出以下结论：现阶段中国的风险投资对高管薪酬激励存在显著的正向影响，但是对高管股权激励的正向影响不显著；风险投资的介入会削弱高管薪酬与绩效之间的敏感度；现阶段高新技术创新企业高管薪酬存在黏性，而风险投资对于改善薪酬黏性作用不明显；风险投资不利于增强企业创新研发投入也不利于促进企业专利的申请的增加；高管薪酬激励在风险投资对企业创新的影响中存在负向的部分中介效应，但是高管股权激励不存在中介效应。本研究共有图1幅，表8个，参考文献78篇。
英文摘要：	China’s capital market is on the way of a new reformation since 2015, and more new enterprises and high-tech enterprises are being guided to the capital market under the policy of encouraging people to start their own businesses and to make innovations. With the financing and management demand of new enterprises, China’s venture capital obtained rapid development in recent years, and became a strong support to new enterprises in the sight of financing and executive incentives. Because the benefit inconsistency between venture capital and new enterprises, agency problems and moral risk are obvious, venture capital would give some incentives to executives. In addition, technological innovation and researching are lifeblood of the new enterprises. Theoretically speaking, in order to make new enterprises get more technology advantages, venture capital tend to promote the innovation by giving executives more supervision and incentive. The current studies about venture capital are focused on IPO underpricing, first-mover advantage and influence on operating performance. All of these researches considered more about marketing performance but ignored the way to the results. So this dissertation holds the view that venture capital has some influence on executive incentive and enterprise innovation, and this dissertation will also analyses whether an intermediary role of executive incentive exists in the impact on enterprise innovation by venture capital. At the beginning of this dissertation, a theoretical generalization about venture capital, executive incentive and enterprise innovation is listed. Then the dissertation discusses about the development of venture capital in China as well as do a literature review about these three sides to find suitable quantitative evaluation index combined with the environment of Chinese capital market. After that samples and variables are chosen to be used in empirical study. The samples are chosen from the high-tech enterprises listed on GEM in recent 5 years and the total number is 320. Through the research, the conclusions of this dissertation are as conclusions: As for the executive incentive, venture capital has a positive influence on the executive compensation with a high significance level but an indistinctively positive effect on executive equity incentive. Also, the involvement of venture capital will weaken the sensitivity between executive compensation and enterprise performance. Finally, the executive compensation of high-tech enterprise has a sticky effect, and venture capital doesn’t have an obvious effect on improving the sticky effect. As for the enterprise incentive, this dissertation finds that venture capital has negative effect on the enhancement of R&D devotion and patent application. Also, this dissertation finds that executive compensation incentive has a negative partial mediation effect on the relationship between venture capital and enterprise innovation, but executive equity incentive has no intermediary effect on it. There are 1 figure, 8 tables and 78 references in this dissertation.
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