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论文编号：	8340
作者编号：	2120142515
上传时间：	2016/6/7 20:47:46
中文题目：	国有企业董事长变更、管理自主权与投资失误
英文题目：	The Board Chair Turnover, Managerial Discretion and Inefficient Investment: Evidence from China State-Owned Firms
指导老师：	吴德胜
中文关键字：	管理自主权；董事长变更；投资失误；资产减值
英文关键字：	Managerial discretion; Board chair change type; Inefficient investment; Assets impairment
中文摘要：	高阶理论指出组织的领导是主要战略的重要部分，总裁是连接组织和外部环境的关键桥梁。企业高层管理者掌握企业运营策略、资源分配，对公司投资和绩效具有绝对的影响力。高管变更经常被视为企业的重大事件，变更后对企业的影响现有研究结论不一，因为当企业进行高管变更时，继任者会对企业决策改革产生多大影响，还取决于其管理自主权大小。高层领导的管理自主权受到行业、组织和个人特征多层次因素影响，而在高管变更事件中，继任者来源类型和离任者离职类型对管理自主权的影响少有研究。本研究根据研究现状以及中国国有企业制度背景，探讨国有企业董事长变更过程中新任董事长管理自主权的相对大小与企业资产减值即投资失误揭露行为的关系。高管继任类型可能对新任高管的自主权产生影响。继任者的来源不外乎由内部人继任或外部人继任，但划分内部与外部继任者的方法有多种，本研究将继任者来源类型细分为内部继任者、外部继任者、轮换三种，这些可能影响新任高管的认知差异和自主权。前任高管的相对权力也会对新任高管改变战略的能力产生影响。因为现实情况是部分前任高管仍然对企业产生影响，这取决于前任高管的离职类型，现有关于前任高管的类型研究主要集中于前任高管离职原因，对于离职后的具体去向少有研究。本研究将前任高管离职类型划分为晋升到集团或政府、平调、降职或案件以及退休、健康等其他原因四大类，检验离任高管的相对权力对新任高管自主权的影响从而对资产减值产生不同的影响效果。本文以2005-2013年度期间发生董事长变更的国有企业为研究样本，剔除金融保险行业以及继任不足两年的公司后，最终取得620个研究样本，并手工搜集离任董事长和继任董事长的类型。研究基于管理自主权视角，以董事长变更前后的总资产减值、长期资产减值和流动资产减值为被解释变量，客观衡量高管变更中新任高管揭露企业投资失误的表现。本研究运用OLS回归分析，实证结果发现新任董事长的管理自主权与长期资产减值显著正相关，即离任董事长晋升到集团或政府时与长期资产减值情况显著负相关，离任董事长平调或降职时与长期资产减值显著正相关，退休、健康原因以及案件与资产减值正相关但不显著；内部继任董事长与长期资产减值显著负相关，外部继任者与长期资产减值显著正相关，轮换则与资产减值关系不显著。本研究还考虑了管理自主权的两种极端情况对资产减值的影响，结果依然显著。说明新任董事长的相对自主权的确会影响企业投资失误揭露行为。最后本文采用多种投资效率衡量方法作为被解释变量，对模型进行检验后，本研究结论仍然成立。上述实证研究结论说明了国有企业董事长变更事件中管理自主权与资产减值的关系。研究国有企业董事长变更事件中的管理自主权对企业投资效率的影响有以下三点意义：第一，丰富了管理自主权的前因研究，一大部分关于管理者自主权的研究集中关注任务环境或者行业特征产生管理者自主权，本研究寻求关于管理自主权更广泛的研究从而推进自主权前因的理解；第二，在一定程度上解释了现有关于高管变更事件对企业影响效果不一致结论的深层原因——即高管变更中离任高管去向以及继任高管来源背景中的管理自主权。第三，为国有企业市场化改革过程中的问题提供参考。
英文摘要：	The upper echelons perspective asserts that an organization’s leadership play a important role in organization strategic , with the chief executive acting as a critical bridge between the organization and its environment. The top management controls the resource allocation and strategic, so that, he plays important role for the firms and also has absolute influence power for the performance. Top management change often regarded as a major event, related research on the impact of executives turnover on organization is still inconsistent. The reason maybe that when and how much the successors take a important role in the corporation also depend on their managerial discretion. Managerial discretion will be effected by the industry, organizational and personal characteristics and so on. While in the process of executives changes, there are little researchers pay attention to where the pre-executives to go and successor origin effect managerial discretion. According to the Chinese state-owned enterprise institutional system and the research status, this paper is going to discuss the relationship between the successor’s managerial discretion and assets impairment, which on behalf of inefficient investment, when board change occurs in the Chinese state-owned enterprise. Board chair’s succession type may have an impact on the new board chair’s discretion. The successor origin come from among insider successor or outsider successor, while the partition method has been not yet unified by existing research, this paper subdivided board successor into insider successor, outsider successor and turn. Simultaneously, the former board chair’s relative power also have impacts on the new board chair’s ability to change strategy, because the reality is that most of the former chair of board still have influence on the corporation, which depend on where the former chair of board to go. Existing research on the departure type of former executive focus on the normal and abnormal, without considering the specific causes. This paper will divide former board type into promoted to group or government, parallel transfer or demotion, retirement, health and cases, so as to test how the new board chair discretion influenced by former board chair’s relative power effects asset impairment. This article is using a sample of 620 turnovers state-owned companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange Corporation from 2005 to 2013 after get rid of the finance and insurance business and the successor was in the office less than two years. At the same time, the writer collected the type of departure board chair and success board chair of state-owned companies manually. Based on the perspective of managerial discretion, this study adopts the total assets impairment, long-term assets impairment and current assets impairment to measure inefficient investment. this article is using OLS regression to analyze. The conclusion of this research is as follows: It is apparent that the discretion of success board and long-term assets impairment. i.e., the former board chair promoted to group or government have significantly negative correlation with long-term assets impairment; The former board chair parallel transfer or demoted have significantly positive correlation with long-term assets impairment, while retirement, health and case have positive correlation with assets impairment but not significant; insider successor have significantly negative correlation with long-term assets impairment and outsider successor have significantly positive correlation with long-term assets impairment, while turn is not obvious. The study also considered the effects of two extreme case of managerial discretion on assets impairment, the results remained significant. It illustrate that new board chair’s relative discretion does affect investment mistake expose behavior. The result of this research indicates the relation of managerial discretion and assets impairment in the process of board chair change in the state-owned companies. There are three contributions in this study: First, the findings contribute to the study of managerial discretion. A majority of studies focus on the task environment or industry characteristics; Second, the findings in a context explains the inconsistent study results of how the top management change event impact on companies, that is managerial discretion; Third, the findings provide some references for the process of state-owned companies’ market reform issue.
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