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| 论文编号： | 8338 | |
| 作者编号： | 2120142520 | |
| 上传时间： | 2016/6/7 20:47:34 | |
| 中文题目： | 超额薪酬、治理机制与公司高管变更 ——基于2003-2014年沪深上市公司的实证检验 | |
| 英文题目： | CEO Overpayment, Corporate Governance and CEO Turnover | |
| 指导老师： | 张国萍 | |
| 中文关键字： | 管变更；超额薪酬；公司治理；相对绩效 | |
| 英文关键字： | CEO turnover; CEO overpayment; corporate governance; relative performance evaluation | |
| 中文摘要： | 公司业绩受经理人才能和努力程度驱动的同时，也受到行业和市场等高管不可控因素的影响。已有文献研究公司业绩与高管更换概率相关性时，一般未考虑公司治理层绩效评价过程中的绩效归因问题。根据归因理论，事物发展的因果关系可分为由个人因素决定的内因和由环境因素决定的外因，在解释他人行为时，人们倾向于归因于人格、态度、能力等内因。出于有限理性，公司治理层在高管更换决策过程中，很难准确识别公司业绩由经理人驱动部分。为检验其是否将不可控因素归因于高管个人，本文利用2003-2014年我国上市公司样本数据，采用强式相对绩效评价模型研究行业和市场等高管不可控绩效因素对公司高管更换的影响，发现由不可控因素决定的公司绩效显著影响公司高管变更可能性：该部分公司绩效越差，高管被更换的概率越高。 在公司治理决策过程中，高管超额薪酬则可能反映出公司对高管的较高期望，从而产生锚定效应，影响治理层对高管的绩效评价及对公司业绩的归因，进而影响高管变更概率。本文进一步利用高管超额薪酬与高管不可控部分绩效的交叉项检验超额薪酬对绩效归因的影响，发现高管超额薪酬加强了绩效与变更的敏感性，即上期领取超额薪酬的高管面临低劣业绩时，其变更可能性受到行业和市场等不可控因素影响更大。最后，本文检验各维度公司治理机制对高管变更决策中绩效归因的调节作用，发现董事长持股比例和和公司资产负债率都对绩效归因过程产生显著影响。 | |
| 英文摘要： | Firm performance is driven by the skill of CEOs and the efforts they make to the company, as well as the influences of industry and market, which are beyond their control. When studying the negative relationship between firm performance and the probability of CEO Turnover, standard economic theory assume that exogenous shocks cause by peer firm performance are filtered out by corporate boards when they evaluate the performance of a CEO and making CEO retention decisions. According to attribution theory, evaluators can attribute a behavioral outcome to either personal factors such as his/her personality attitude, and competence, or external factors caused by the context. In explaining the behavior of others, people tend to put more weight on personality, attitude, ability and other internal factors. Specifically, due to information asymmetry and bounded rationality, corporate boards can hardly accurately recognize CEO quality and the contribution to firm performance and identify bad firm performance driven by CEOs from the part caused by an economic downturn. Using the sample data of 2483 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China between 2003 and 2014, we explore a strong-form relative performance evaluation model and study the relationship between peer firm performance, which are beyond CEO’s control, and the likelihood of CEO turnover. It turns out that firm performance affected by peer performance negatively influences CEO Turnover probability. According to attribution theory, higher compensation leads to higher performance expectation. CEO overpayment or underpayment can serve as a judgmental anchor that reflects boards’ initial expectation of CEO performance, and thus affecting their subsequent interpretation of the cause of bad firm performance and the responsibility the CEO should take. We then investigate the moderating role of CEO overpayment on the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. The result is that the negative relationship is stronger for overpaid CEOs than for underpaid CEOs. Finally, we examine the role of corporate governance during attribution process when determining turnover of a CEO, and find that the shareholding ration of the board director and the asset-liability ration have a significant moderating impact on performance attribution process, and thus affect the possibility of CEO turnover. | |
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