联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	8333
作者编号：	2120142443
上传时间：	2016/6/7 20:07:10
中文题目：	董秘持股与信息披露质量的相关性研究
英文题目：	The research on the relationship between company secretary’s shareholdings and information disclosure quality
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	董事会秘书；董秘持股；信息披露质量；产权性质
英文关键字：	Company Secretary; Shareholdings of Company Secretary; Information Disclosure Quality; Ownership Type
中文摘要：	上市公司董事会秘书是公司的“发言人”，是联系公司内外部利益相关者的纽带，在上市公司与外部市场沟通中起着桥梁作用。2006年实施的《公司法》第一次从法律意义上明确了董秘（董事会秘书简称董秘，下同）的高管地位，董秘终于摆脱了此前的地位不明确、作用难以发挥的困境。2006年《公司法》还对董秘职责进行了具体规定，董秘最主要的职责是负责上市公司的信息披露事宜，督促上市公司按照证监会及相关法律法规的要求进行信息披露。2006年《公司法》增设董秘的相关规定反映了监管部门对提高信息披露质量的重视，监管部门希望通过完善董秘制度来提高信息披露质量。 管理层持股是上市公司股权激励的重要方式，通过对管理层的股权激励，可以增强管理层与股东之间的利益一致性，降低代理成本，激励管理层向股东披露更多的信息。董秘作为上市公司高管之一，主要负责信息披露事务，对董秘的股权激励能否产生利益趋同效应，提高上市公司信息披露质量是我们关注的问题。 本文以2010-2014年沪深A股主板上市公司为研究样本，对董秘持股与信息披露质量之间的相关关系进行了实证研究。研究发现，我国上市公司董秘持股比例与信息披露质量显著正相关。进一步的研究表明，上市公司产权性质会影响董秘持股对信息披露质量改善作用的发挥。民营企业中，董秘持股能显著提高信息披露质量，但在国有企业中，这一作用则没能得到充分发挥。董秘是否兼任公司其他高管职位以及是否具有财务背景也会对董秘持股与信息披露质量的相关关系产生影响。当董秘兼任公司其他高管职位或具有财务背景时，董秘持股对信息披露质量的改善作用更强。
英文摘要：	The company secretary is the company's "spokesperson". It is the window for the management of the listed companies to contact with the external stakeholders and plays the role of a bridge in the communication between them. The Company Law implemented in 2006 legally recognized the executive status of the company secretary for the first time. The company secretary has finally got rid of the dilemma of an unclear status and function. The 2006 Company Law also set the company secretary's specific responsibilities, among which the most important is to be in charge of the listed companies' information disclosure matters. The company secretary has the obligation to guarantee that the listed companies' information disclosure is in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and CRSR requirements. The additional provisions of company secretary in the 2006 Company Law reflected the regulators' emphasis on the information disclosure quality. They hope to improve the information disclosure quality by perfecting the company secretary system. Management shareholdings is an important way of the listed companies' incentive mechanism. Shareholdings of management can make the interest between managements and stockholders tend to become identical, thus reducing the agency cost and encouraging the managements to disclose more information. The company secretary, as one of the executives, is in charge of the company's disclosure matters. We are concerned that whether the shareholdings of the company secretary can produce the effect of interests convergence and thus improve the information disclosure quality. According to the analysis of the companies with company secretary's shareholdings listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share board from 2010 to 2014, the dissertation studies the relationship between the company secretary's shareholdings and the information disclosure quality. The dissertation found that the company secretary's shareholdings can notably improve the information disclosure quality. The further study showed that the company's ownership type has an effect on the relationship between the company secretary's shareholdings and the information disclosure quality. In the listed non-state owned companies, the company secretary's shareholdings can notably improve the information disclosure quality, while the relationship no longer exists in the listed state owned companies. Besides, whether the company secretary takes the position of other executives or whether the company secretary has related financial background will also influence the relationship between the company secretary's shareholdings and the information disclosure quality. When the company secretary also takes the position of other executives or when he has related financial background, the company secretary's shareholdings will improve the information disclosure quality more notably.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)