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论文编号：	8329
作者编号：	1120120794
上传时间：	2016/6/7 19:18:50
中文题目：	混合所有制企业投资决策有效性研究
英文题目：	Research on the effectiveness of investment decision making in mixed ownership enterprises
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	国有企业改革；混合所有；风险承担；投资效率
英文关键字：	state owned enterprise reform; mixed ownership; risk taking; investment efficiency
中文摘要：	投资决策是企业财务决策中的核心问题之一，投资决策是否科学、及时关系着企业能否长期生存并健康发展。当前国际经济环境复杂多变，市场竞争日益激烈，企业生存和发展面临着越来越多的不确定性因素，投资决策的难度越来越大。尤其是中央和地方各级政府控制的国有企业往往涉及国民经济的命脉，投资规模较大，如何通过深化国有企业的改革，优化国有企业的治理机制和决策机制，使有限的资本资源得到合理有效地分配，提高国有企业投资决策的有效性，优化国有企业的运营情况，是政府和国有企业管理层必须面对的一大难题。在政策推动及生存需求的双重驱动下，混合所有制成为了国有企业改革的重要手段和方向。 从宏观层面上来说，混合所有制是一个国家或地区的所有制成分的多样性，即在所有制结构中，既有国有、集体等公有制经济，也有个体、私营、外资等非公有制经济，还包括同时拥有公有和非公有成分的合资、合作经济。而微观层次的混合所有制经济，就是不同性质的投资主体共同出资组建而成的混合所有制企业，是一种富有活力和效率的企业资本组织形式，以市场为基础，通过国有资本与非国有资本交叉持股、相互融合，实现产权多元化，形成高效的资源配置。在全面深化改革的趋势下，商业类国有企业纷纷引入民营资本、外资资本逐步向混合所有制企业转型，这是国有企业完善治理机制、提升运营效率、增强国有资本影响力和竞争力的发展趋势和必然选择。本文以上海证券交易所部分商业类上市公司为研究对象，以国有股东的特殊性、政府干预、政治关联以及政府层级为切入点，探讨了混合所有的程度对企业投资决策有效性的影响。 本文共分为七章。第一章为引言，概括了本文的研究背景、研究目的、主要研究问题、研究意义、结构安排、技术路线图及可能的创新点。第二章为相关文献回顾和述评，从混合所有制企业中国有产权管理和混合所有制改革有效性两个方面对相关文献进行了梳理和述评。第三章为国有企业混合所有制改革的制度背景，分析了国有企业改革目标、背景和改革进程。第四章为混合所有制企业投资决策有效性的理论分析，并提出了本文的研究假设。第五章和第六章是实证分析部分，分析了不同政府干预、政治关联、政府层级下，混合所有的股权结构对风险承担和投资效率的影响。第七章总结了本文的主要研究结论，并提出了相关政策建议。通过对相关理论进行分析，并对选取的样本进行实证检验，本文主要的研究结论如下： 第一，国有企业的混合所有制改革能够促进企业投资决策有效性的提升，但混合主体深入性并非越高越好，通过检验本文发现当非国有股权比例处于30%-40%这个区间内，企业风险承担水平相对较高，混合所有制企业的投资不足情况也会得到显著改善。可能的原因是，当非国有资本持股比例达到这个水平时，不仅能够为企业提供不同的资源要素，降低企业的资源获取成本，他们还有可能在内部形成利益团体，增加弱化国有股东强势地位的可能性，进而提高企业的合规性和市场化程度。 第二，以政府干预和政治关联作为切入点，本文研究了政府干预行为和企业的政治关联对于混合所有的股权结构与风险承担及投资效率之间关系的影响作用。本文的研究结果表明无论是直接的政府干预行为，还是政治关联这种内化于企业的干预，都削弱了混合所有的股权结构与风险承担水平之间的关系；但在政府干预在改善投资效率中体现出了“帮助之手”的作用，而进一步的研究又发现伴随着政府干预而来的政策性负担弱化了非国有股东优化投资效率的作用。事实上，现阶段中政府对企业的有效干预确实存在积极的意义和作用，特别是在经济体制转轨过程中，市场机制还不健全，资源配置的基础性作用还不能够完全有效地发挥，政府干预能够在一定程度上弥补市场失灵，但应该积极剥离由政府干预伴生的政策性负担，纯化企业的运营目标，才能真正实现企业投资效率和运营效率的改善。 第三，混合所有制改革中存在优序选择问题。本文的研究中发现，在政府干预弱和政治关联较少的情况下，中央企业应着力增加民营股权的比例，以提升企业的活力，而地方国有企业则应积极吸引外资股东，以提升企业的合规性，优化企业的治理机制。
英文摘要：	Investment decision is one of the core issues of enterprise financial decision. If the decision is scientific and timely, the enterprise will developsustainably. Now, with the international economic environment becoming more and more complex and changeable, the enterprisesare in a fiercely competitive marketand are facing more and more challenges. Also, it is more difficult to make investment decision. Especially in SOEs, which lay hold the lifelines of national economy, the troublesome issue that the government and SOEs have to face is how to allocate resources efficiently. Spurred on by the policy and survival needs, mixed ownership has become the target and direction of reform of state-owned enterprises. On the macro level, mixed ownership refers todifferent ownership structures within a country or region, not only public owned economy, which includes state-owned economy and collective economy, non-public sectors which includes self-employed and private enterprises, but also cooperative economy. The micro level of mixed ownership economy means different shareholders co-finance in one enterprise. Actually, it is an effective and efficient organization, and it bases on market mechanism, and state-owned capital and non state-owned capitalinterlock shareholding. Then the enterprisediversifis the propertyrights, and it can allocate resources efficiently. On the background of deepening the reform, commercial state-ownedenterprises absorb non state-owned capital to develop mixed ownership enterprise one after another. And it is inevitable choice of SOEs to improve corporate governance structures and operational efficiency. Then it can expand the influence and competitiveness of sstate capital. Using a sample of state-owned enterprises of 2001-2013, and based on the characteristic of state-owned shareholder, government intervention political connection and government level, this paper will discuss the effect of mixed ownership on risk taking and firm investment efficiency. This paper consistsofsevenchapters. Thefirstchapterisintroduction of the study, which brieflyintroduces the motivation,implication,idea, frameworkandtechnicalmap. The second chapter isliteraturereview, including management of state owned property rights in mixed ownership enterprisesand the effectiveness of mixed ownership reform. The third chapter is the background of mixed ownership reform in SOEs, including reforming goals, context and process. The fourth chapter istheoretical analysis of the investment decision effectiveness in mixed ownership, and put forward the research hypothesis. The fifth chapter and the sixth chapter are the empirical analysis of this paper, in these two chapters, the paper analyzes the impact of the effect of mixed ownership structure on risk taking and investment efficiency under different government intervention, political connection and government level. The seventh chapter summarizes the main research conclusions of this paper, and puts forward suggestions on policy making, and points out the limitations of this study. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, the following conclusions are researched: Firstly, mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises can promote the effectiveness of the investment decision, but it is not the higher the better. Through empirical analysis, the paper finds when non state-owned equity ratio is in the range of 30% - 40%,the risk taking level is relatively high, and the lack of investment will also be improved. Possible reason is thatwhenshareholding ratio reaches this level, non state-owned shareholders can provide different resourcesfor the enterprise and reduce resource acquisition costs. Then they also may form an interest group with other non state-owned shareholders, after that they may have the ability to weaken the strong position of state-owned shareholders, and improve the degree of marketization of the enterprise. Secondly, in consideration ofgovernment intervention and political connections, this paper studies the effect ofmixed ownership structure on risk taking and investment efficiency of enterprise. The research results show thatboth the direct government intervention and political association internalized in the enterprise weaken the effect of mixed ownership structure on risktaking, but government intervention provides “helping hand” in improving investment efficiency. Further study finds policy burden which following government interventionweaken the non state-owned shareholders’ role in optimizing the investment efficiency. In fact,governmentinterventiondoes exist positive significance, especially in economic system transition process, market mechanism is not perfect, the role of resource allocationis not able to effectively play, and in a certain extent government interventioncan make up for the market failure. But government should deprive the policy burden on enterprise and purify enterprise operation goal, then the efficiency of investment and operationa can be improved. Thirdly, there is an order selection in mixed ownership reform. The conclusions of this study show that central governmentowned companies may increase the proportion of private equity to enhance the enterprise vitality, and local state-owned enterprises should actively attract foreign shareholders to enhance corporate compliance and optimize the governance mechanism, when government intervention and political association is weak.
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