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论文编号：	8317
作者编号：	2120142462
上传时间：	2016/6/7 17:33:54
中文题目：	官员背景独立董事作用的实证研究——基于主板上市公司数据
英文题目：	An Empirical Study on Independent Directors with Official Work Experience—Based on the Data from Listed Companies on Main Board
指导老师：	郝臣
中文关键字：	官员背景独立董事;政治关联;税率优惠;政府补助;银行贷款
英文关键字：	Official Background Independent Director；Political Connections；Preferential Tax Rate；Government Subsidize；Loan
中文摘要：	中国政府对政企关系一直保持着高度的关注，2016年两会期间提到“政商交往”“新型政商关系”等关键词，强调政商交往中应遵循君子之交，既要“亲”又要“清”。对官员背景独立董事的严格限制，正是政府为保持政商关系“清”的重要举措。2013年年底，中组部颁布了关于严格限制官员背景人士出任独立董事的相关规定，随后出现大批官员背景独立董事的辞职潮。官员背景独立董事成为中国公司治理史上一个短暂盛放的昙花，迅速走向衰败，成为历史。独立董事设置的初衷是监督和咨询，本论文在一定程度上就是对该“禁官令”的解读，探讨官员背景独立董事这一有特殊背景资源的独立董事，是否在超出咨询和监督职能解释范围的几个微观维度起到作用，为企业带来了不正当获益。 本文以官员背景独立董事为解释变量，使用2010年至2013年沪深127家上市公司的数据，利用随机效应面板回归，分别探讨了与实际税率、政府补助和银行贷款三个维度的回归关系，其中银行贷款又从贷款额度、贷款期限和贷款成本三个方面进行衡量。回归结果表明，官员背景独立董事能够显著降低企业的实际税率，提高政府补助获得并降低银行贷款的贷款成本。这一结论与本文对相关理论与文献回顾的结果一致，表明官员背景独立董事作为一种具有特殊资源的独立董事，确实可以在本文探讨的上述几个领域起到影响。 本文上述研究结论的获得，虽然肯定了官员背景独立董事在企业经营中的积极作用，为企业带来不正当利得，但是从社会层面看却造成了资源的低效率分配，并且与当前倡导的反腐倡廉，构建和谐政商关系严重背道而驰。因此，本文的结论一方面是对“禁官令”的解读，肯定了对这类独立董事限制的必要性；另外本文结论暗示，应该对官员背景人士出任独立董事以及具有官员背景的其他企业利益相关者如董事长、CEO等严格监督，坚决杜绝权钱交易的行为，建立新型政商关系。本文的研究结论具有极强的政策引导性，并且在研究领域，针对性地分析了官员背景独立董事这一特殊群体的企业作用，系统性地从不同微观层面给出了分析结果，弥补了目前该领域的空白，为后续研究提供了借鉴。
英文摘要：	China's Government has maintained a high degree of concern to the relationship between politics and commerce. During the period of NPC & CPPCC in 2016, the key words such as "business and political contactions" "new government business relations" got lots of focus. These key words emphasis on contactions between business and political should be “Qin” and “Qing” like the relationship between gentlemen. Strict restrictions on the official background of independent director is an important methord for the government to maintain the political and business relations clear. The goverment issued files to strictly limite independent directors with official background, followed by the resignations of a large number of independent directors with official background in 2014. Independent directors with official background became a brief blooming Epiphyllum in Chinese company governance history, which declined rapidly and finally become history. The mind set of independent directors is monitoring and consulting, this paper in a certain extent is an interpretation to the "no official order". We want to find out whether independent directors with official background play a role to several certain micro dimension of a company, which beyond the explanation of the original role of independent directors. This paper use ndependent directors with officials background as explanatory variables, the data comes from 127 listed companies during 2010 to 2013. By using a random effects panel regression, we discussed the regression relationship between official background independent directors and actual tax rate, government subsidies, bank loans. Bank loans contain three aspects, the loan amount, loan term and loan cost. The regression results show that the official background independent directors can significantly reduce the actual tax rate, improve the obtained government grants and reduce the cost of bank loans. The conclusion in this paper is consistent with the related theory and literature review results, indicating the official background of independent directors’ work as a special resource, and can indeed influence the several fields above in this paper. Based on the above research conclusion, although we affirmed the positive role of official background independent directors in business, which bring unfair gains for the enterprise, however, it cause the low efficiency of resources allocation from the view of social level. This is in the opposite direction with the advocate of the anti-corruption and the construction of the harmonious relationship between government and business. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper is interpretation of the "no official order", affirmed the necessary to limit this kind of independent directors. In addition, the conclusion of the article indicates that it should be strictly supervised on official background who served as independent or other enterprise interests referred such as chairman and CEO. The government should resolutely put an end to bartering behavior and establish a new relationship between government and business. The conclusion of this paper has large policy implications, besides that, it also play a role in the field of research. This paper not only pays attention to the analysis of the official background independent directors, a special certain group in board of directors, but also shows the analysis results from several micro dimensions of an enterprise. This paper filled the gaps in the field and provides a reference for the follow-up study.
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