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论文编号：	8293
作者编号：	1120120798
上传时间：	2016/6/7 10:18:19
中文题目：	上市公司独立董事制度有效性研究——基于独立董事功能分类的视角
英文题目：	Research on Effectiveness of Independent Director System of Listed Companies——A Perspective of Differentiating Independent Directors’ Different Roles
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	独立董事；监督；合法性；环境不确定性
英文关键字：	independent directors; monitor; legitimacy; environment uncertainty
中文摘要：	关于独立董事的法律法规主要期待独立董事能够发挥监督功能。那么，独立董事到底有没有发挥相应的功能呢？除了监督功能之外，中国上市公司的独立董事是否衍生出了新的功能？本研究尝试对这些问题进行回答。不同于已有研究，本研究将上市公司看作一个开放系统，重点分析上市公司是如何通过设立独立董事与外部环境进行互动的。具体的，本研究首先从超额设立独立董事这一独特现象入手，通过引入资源依赖理论和新制度理论对这一行为的动因进行分析，识别了独立董事可能发挥的功能，包括监督、获取合法性及应对环境不确定性。随后，本研究利用一份独特的问卷调查数据分析了被调查者所感知到的独立董事功能以及这些功能的影响因素，从另一方面佐证了对独立董事功能进行划分的合理性。进一步地，本研究对独立董事的不同功能进行实证检验。具体的，以掏空问题作为研究背景对专业背景独立董事获取合法性的功能及监督功能进行了实证检验。此外，采用事件研究法及大样本实证分析检验了官员背景独立董事所具有的应对环境不确定性的功能。本研究的主要结论如下：1.通过对影响上市公司超额设立独立董事行为的因素进行理论分析与实证检验，发现上市公司之所以引入独立董事，是为了充分利用他们的监督、获取合法性以及应对环境不确定性等功能。2.基于问卷调查数据的分析表明，被调查者所感知到的独立董事功能也可以分为上述三类。3.基于代理理论和新制度理论对专业背景独立董事的功能进行分析发现，来自非实务界的会计背景独立董事有利于为上市公司获取合法性，而法律背景独立董事以及实务界会计背景独立董事的功能主要是进行监督。4.基于资源依赖理论的分析表明，官员背景独立董事具有缓解外部环境不确定性的功能。本研究的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：首先，本研究引入资源依赖理论与新制度理论分析中国公司治理实践，拓展了这两种理论的研究领域。其次，通过分析中国上市公司独立董事的三种不同功能，补充了已有关于独立董事功能的研究。再次，本研究具体区分了专业背景独立董事发挥监督功能的时点，为分析独立董事的监督作用贡献了新的视角。最后，本研究通过检验官员背景独立董事这种形式的政治关联在上市公司获取政府补贴中的作用，丰富了已有关于政治关联的研究。总体上，本研究通过对独立董事的功能进行分类检验，发现在经历了十余年的发展后，上市公司独立董事制度体现出了一定的有效性。
英文摘要：	Laws and regulations about independent directors mainly expect them to play a role in monitoring. Have independent directors really played this kind of role? In addition to monitoring, is there any other role that independent director in China’s listed companies can play? This study tries to answer these questions. Differing from existing studies, this study regards a listed company as an open system, and emphatically analyzes how a listed company interacts with its external environment through introducing independent directors. Specifically, this study begins with a unique phenomenon about introducing independent directors proactively, and identifies independent directors’ three possible roles, namely monitoring, acquiring legitimacy and dealing with environment uncertainty by analyzing listed companies’ motivations of this kind of behavior using resource dependence theory and institutional theory. Next, this study uses a set of questionnaire data to analyze independent directors’ roles perceived by respondents and influencing factors of these roles, which proves differentiating three kinds of independent directors’ roles is reasonable on the other side. This study further empirically tests different roles of independent directors. In specific, it empirically tests the roles of acquiring legitimacy and monitoring of professional independent directors in the research context of tunneling. Also, it examines the role of dealing with environment uncertainty of independent directors who have official background by using event study and empirical analysis based on a large sample. The main conclusions of this study are as follows: 1. By theoretically analyzing and empirically testing influencing factors of listed companies’ behavior of introducing independent directors proactively, it finds that listed companies tend to introduce independent directors to take advantage of their roles of monitoring, acquiring legitimacy and dealing with environment uncertainty. 2. Analysis of questionnaire data shows that, independent directors’ roles perceived by respondents can also be divided into the above three kinds. 3. Analysis of roles of professional independent directors based on agency theory and neo-institutional theory shows that, independent directors with accounting background and not coming from practice circles are helpful for acquiring legitimacy for listed companies, and independent directors with law background and those with accounting background and also coming from practice circles mainly play the role of monitoring. 4. Analysis based on resource dependence theory shows that, independent directors who have official background play the role of buffering external environment uncertainty. This study has several innovative points: Firstly, by using resource dependence theory and neo-institutional theory to analyzing China’s corporate governance practice, it develops the research areas of these two theories. Next, it supplements literature on roles of independent directors through analyzing three different kinds of roles of China’s listed companies. In addition, this study distinguishes different time points when professional independent directors playing monitoring role, thus contributing a new perspective to analyze independent directors’ monitoring role. Finally, by examining how another kind of political connection, namely introducing independent directors who have official background affects listed companies acquiring government subsidies, this study enriches existing studies on political connection. Overall, through examining different roles of independent directors, this study finds that, after ten years of development, China’s independent director system of listed companies begins to show some efficacy.
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