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论文编号：	8292
作者编号：	1120120796
上传时间：	2016/6/7 10:15:50
中文题目：	政府治理、董事会资本与企业投资效率研究
英文题目：	A Research on Government Governance, Board Capital and Enterprises’ Investment Efficiency
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	政府治理；董事会资本；董事会人力资本；董事会社会资本；
英文关键字：	Government Governance; Board Capital; Board Human Capital; Board Social Capital; Investment Efficiency
中文摘要：	当前中国宏观经济发展的下行压力，使得微观企业投资效率问题的重要性再次凸显。而在中国“权力+市场”的转型体制中，企业投资效率的改善需要在两个方面有所突破：一是要提升作为决策主体的董事会在投资决策中的治理有效性（内治）；二是要积极应对外部的政府干预行为（外攘）。那么，摆在研究者面前的问题是：中国企业的董事会建设如何应对政府治理情境的变化，企业在“内治”和“外攘”之间的投资决策行为及其经济后果如何？在此背景下，探析政府治理、企业董事会资本配置与投资效率关系问题，不仅能够折射出宏观制度变迁和政府演进所隐含的治理变化，对微观经济主体的治理行为与投资决策行为的影响。也可以在更一般的意义上，反映地区公共治理与公司治理的差异状况和效率问题。文章围绕所提炼的科学问题“在中国经济转型背景下，地方政府治理差异是如何影响企业董事会资本配置，并进而影响企业投资效率的？”以2010-2014年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本，进行实证研究。解读中国企业在不同的政府治理情境下，实现董事会治理有效性和投资决策有效性的内在逻辑。研究发现：（1）政府治理状况越差，企业对董事会社会资本的诉求越强烈，而这一影响在固定资产比例较高的企业中更显著；政府治理状况越好，企业对董事会人力资本的诉求越强烈,但这一影响并不依赖于企业的固定资产比例而发生变化；相对于国有企业，民营企业更重视董事会社会资本配置；但政府治理状况对董事会社会资本，以及董事会人力资本配置的影响关系，在国有企业和民营企业之间不存在显著差异。（2）董事会资本水平的提升有助于改善企业投资效率，其影响机制在于董事会资本的监督效应和资源效应。其中，董事会资本的资源效应占据主导地位，董事会资本影响企业投资效率的关键在于资源效应。（3）政府治理对企业投资效率的影响，部分的可以视作通过企业董事会资本的中介效应发挥作用。更进一步来说，董事会人力资本在政府治理水平和企业投资效率之间发挥中介作用；董事会社会资本则对政府治理水平与企业投资效率之间的关系产生了遮掩效应。同时，研究还发现，就企业董事会资本配置与政府治理水平的匹配性问题而言,在政府治理水平较好的情况下，企业强化董事会人力资本建设有助于改善投资效率；在政府治理水平较差的情况下，企业则需要通过强化董事会社会资本建设来促进企业投资效率的提升。文章的创新性主要体现在：（1）在研究视角方面，一是不同于以往政企关系研究所采用的“扶持之手-掠夺之手”的分析视角。本文以企业为主体构建分析框架，把关注重点从以往基于政府视角的分析，转向企业在不同政府治理情境下的内生反应，也即企业治理行为及其经济后果对政府治理行为的反应。二是不同于以往研究，试图通过检验董事会结构的经济绩效反应这一角度，来寻求最优的董事会治理模式。本文从公司治理行为对制度环境的内生反应入手，探究董事会构建与政府治理情境依赖的相机抉择性，从而为董事会建构研究提供了新的认知视角。（2）在研究范式方面，以往关于董事会治理与企业投资决策研究，大多采用了形式主义研究范式。把董事会视为一个完全独立而理性的决策行为主体，将文化、制度、组织惯性等基本因素游离于董事会治理之外。而本研究回应学术界提出的“企业如何根据其所根植的治理环境选择有效的治理机制”的问题，探究董事会资本配置与企业投资效率关系，是否会随着外部政府治理情境的变化而有所差异，即是否具有“状态依存性”，并为之提供了经验证据。这与以往研究有所差异。（3）新的研究策略以及应用前沿计量分析方法，获得新发现。本文设计了新的研究策略，对董事会资本的不同治理效应进行分离处理，识别出了不同治理机制的差异性和重要性，为学术界关于“董事会究竟发挥何种治理作用”的争议，提供了新的差异化的经验证据。同时，采用前沿性计量方法，发现了董事会社会资本在政府治理与企业投资效率间的遮掩效应，而这种影响效应尚未在现有文献中得到充分认识。
英文摘要：	The downward pressure of China's macro economic development enables the problem of Chinese enterprises investment efficiency once again highlighted. In Chinese "power and market" transformation system, companies have to achieve breakthrough in two respects to improve investment efficiency: one is to improve the effectiveness of board governance in investment decisions (Internal Governance); the second is to actively respond to the external behavior of government intervention (Resisting External Intervention). Hence, the researchers are facing the problem that: How Chinese enterprises’ board construction adapts to changes in the situation of government governance, and what are the investment decision-making behavior and economic consequences between the “Internal Governance” and the “Resisting External Intervention "? In this context, the paper analyzes the relationship between government governance, board capital and enterprises’ investment efficiency, which not only can reflect the influence of the governance changes in the macro institutional change and organizational (here refers to the government) evolution on the micro economic organization governance and decision-making behavior, but also can reflect the differences and efficiency of public governance and corporate governance in different regions. This paper focuses on the scientific question：“Under the background of economic transition, how the differences of local government governance influence the allocation of corporate board capital and thus affect its investment efficiency?” Using listed companies of CSSE and SSE of 2012-2014 as samples, Give an explanation regarding of the inherent logic of the effectiveness of board governance and investment decisions of Chinese enterprises in different situations. The study found: firstly, the results show that in certain conditions, the level of government governance and the social capital of corporate boards were significantly negatively correlated. The impact is more significant in the enterprises which have a higher proportion of fixed assets. The level of government governance and the human capital of corporate boards were significantly positive correlated. Data test results also show that compared with the state-owned enterprises, private enterprises pay more attention to the board social capital. The relationship between government governance and board capital allocation has no significant differences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. Secondly, we find that the improvement of board capital level helps to enhance the corporate investment efficiency, and the empirical evidence suggests that its mechanism lies in the supervision effect and the resources effect. Among them, the resources effect of the board capital dominates, and the key that board capital affects firm’s investment efficiency is the resource effects. Thirdly, test results show that the board capital plays an intermediary role between the government governance and investment efficiency, and the board human capital also plays an intermediary role between the government governance and investment efficiency, but board social capital plays a shadowing role between the government governance and investment efficiency. Meanwhile, the study also found that when the government governance is better, enterprises strengthen the construction of human capital of board of directors can help improve the efficiency of investment, and when the government governance is poor, companies can improve the efficiency of investment by strengthening the construction of social capital of board of directors. The main value and innovation of this paper are as follows: first of all, innovation in the perspective of research, the first is different from the "hand of the hand - the hand of plunder" perspective in the previous study of the relationship between government and enterprises. This paper takes the enterprise as the main body of the analysis framework, and the focus changes from the previous analysis based on the perspective of government to enterprises’ reaction in the context of different government governance. The second is different from the previous researches which seek the best board governance model through examining the influence of the structure of the board of directors on economic performance. This article explores how the companies’ board construction changes according to governance situation, thus the paper provides a new cognitive perspective for understanding context of board construction. Secondly, innovation in the research paradigm, the past research on the board governance and business investment decision, mostly adopt the form of paradigm which regards board of directors as a completely independent and rational decision-making body, and the basic elements of cultural, institutional, organizational inertia drifted away from the board governance. The paper responses to the issue of "how to select effective governance mechanism according to the governance environment which it is rooted in” rose by the academic community, which examines how the relations of board capital and investment efficiency embedding public administration situation? Or namely whether the "state dependence" exits? And which provides empirical evidence. This is somewhat different from previous studies. Thirdly, the new discovery is made by using the new research strategy and the cutting-edge quantitative analysis method. In order to examine the differentiation of different governance effect of board capital from experiences, we designed a new research strategy to separate the different governance effect of board capital so as to identify the differences and the importance of different board governance mechanisms, Thus this research provides new empirical evidence for the academic debate on "what the exactly governance role board plays”. Meanwhile, we abandoned the traditional gradual testing methods of mediating effect and adopted a cutting-edge quantitative analysis method. Using the new method, we found the cover effect of board social capital between the government governance and corporate investment efficiency, and this effect has not yet been fully recognized in current literature.
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