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论文编号：	8254
作者编号：	1120130783
上传时间：	2016/6/5 16:35:30
中文题目：	众包创新的决策机制研究
英文题目：	Research on the Decision Mechanism of Crowdsourcing Innovation
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	众包创新; 发布者; 解答者; 众包平台; 决策机制
英文关键字：	crowdsourcing innovation; sponsors; solvers; crowdsourcing platform; decision mechanism
中文摘要：	随着科技与信息技术的发展，我国双创政策的逐步实施，以及开放式创新商业模式的不断涌现，众包创新已经成为企业进行新产品创新与开发，汲取大众创新资源的重要手段。众包创新不仅使企业以低成本、低风险获得大众无限的创新智慧，还能及时、准确的了解大众需求，使得众包成为企业创新领域最成功的商业模式之一。因此，越来越多的企业开始通过众包模式进行产品创新，获得用户需求，以获得促进企业成长的长期动力。同时，众包模式可以有效的将大众闲余的劳动力和智力资源转化为生产力，是大众通过众包创新任务获得收益的重要渠道之一。在这样的发展背景下，众包创新模式应如何实施、应用和管理已经成为学术界关注的热点问题。 现有研究多使用定性方法研究众包模式中各参与主体的行为策略，并且多局限于对各参与主体行为策略“是什么”的研究，很少回答各参与主体“为什么”参与众包创新，以及在参与众包创新过程中应该“怎么做”的问题。缺乏指导企业实施众包创新、解答者参与众包创新和平台开展众包创新的系统性理论指导。针对这一研究现状，本文以众包创新的参与主体为研究对象，以众包过程为研究逻辑，运用数理模型分析、实证研究、案例研究相结合的形式，基于最优化理论、博弈论、双边市场理论和系统动力学理论，分别研究了企业为何实施众包，企业如何实施众包，解答者如何参与众包，众包平台如何开展众包创新，以及从系统角度如何促进众包创新的持续发展等五个核心问题。具体而言，本文主要研究内容和创新点如下： （1）通过对企业采纳众包因素的识别，发现低成本、低风险和高创新质量是企业采纳众包创新的重要原因。基于此，在考虑创新成本和创新质量的基础上，以最大化企业收益为目标，分别构建了企业进行内部创新和企业使用众包产品创新的决策模型。通过对企业采纳众包创新成败案例的分析，得到产品研发强度也是影响企业进行内、外创新的因素之一。研究表明，当企业内部创新成本较低或外部解答者数量较少时，应进行内部创新，反之则采用众包创新；当产品创新强度较大时，企业应进行众包创新。 （2）明确了发布者企业可能采用的最大化总质量和最大化最高质量两个众包创新的目标，在构建完全支付拍卖的众包模型基础上，得到两个众包目标下发布者企业的Stackelberg博弈均衡解，探讨了企业应如何实施众包创新的问题。加之实证数据和案例分析对数理模型结论的验证与拓展，研究发现解答者风险偏好对提高总质量和最高质量均有正向作用；当解答者为风险规避和风险偏好时，企业应实施最大化总质量，而当解答者为风险中性时，企业应实施最大化最高质量。此外，案例部分说明了众包项目与企业目标的一致性，众包流程制定的规范性，以及众包质量的控制是企业成功实施众包的关键要素。 （3）基于解答者参与众包创新的动机，构建了解答者的个人努力模型和总努力模型，比较分析了解答者参与众包创新的最优决策；然后，使用Tripadvisor的数据以及访谈研究，探讨了除个人努力外，其他因素对解答者中标的影响，以对数学模型的结论进行补充。研究发现，在个人努力模型中，当个人中标率增加时，解答者努力与任务奖金呈正比，与参与人数呈反比；而在总努力模型中，解答者努力与任务奖金和参与人数呈正比，并且会出现过度竞争的情况。为了进一步探讨解答者个人努力决策机制，将解答者分为低能力解答者和高能力解答者。结果发现，解答成本较小时，高能力解答者付出的努力大于低能力解答者，随着解答成本的增加，两者努力和收益趋于相同；随着解答者人数的增加，竞争加剧降低了解答者努力和收益。此外，通过实证研究和案例分析还发现，对参与众包创新的外部动机而言，除已有研究结论外，身边家人/朋友的推荐也是重要影响因素；对中标因素而言，除解答者参与经验、解答者参与战略和任务属性外，与客户之间的良好关系也影响解答者中标。 （4）根据双边市场理论，构建了众包模式下众包平台双边市场的定价决策模型，探索了间接网络效应、交叉网络效应和平台之间的竞争对众包平台定价机制的影响。研究表明，发布者或解答者在短期和长期竞争情况下，彼此之间均存在间接网络外部性和交叉网络外部性，促进了众包平台规模的增长。在短期内众包平台可以减少对解答者收费，增加对发布者的收费，以培养大量的潜在创新资源，但是当解答者数量足够多时，为了吸引发布者众包平台可以减少对其收费；对长期竞争而言，众包平台可以适当增加对发布者和解答者的收费。此外，文章还研究了两个众包平台竞争情况下的定价机制问题，发现当众包平台的初始规模较大或收费较低时，众包平台规模显著增加。猪八戒网的案例分析不仅验证了前面的基本模型还对模型结论有所补充：众包平台应对不同的发布者或解答者实行不同的定价机制；对于低端任务要采取全额托管，避免发布者的投机行为；对于资历较高的解答者，实行合同约定制度或免去部分费用，以挽留高能力的解答者；而对于资质较低的解答者则采取收费制度，以减少过度竞争和人力资源的浪费。 （5）基于上述众包创新中发布者、解答者和众包平台的研究内容，运用系统动力学方法探讨了参与者补贴、交叉网络效应对众包竞赛平台规模的影响，以及质量审查、参与者互惠意愿对众包社区平台规模的影响。研究发现，众包平台应适当给予发布者和解答者更多补贴，以吸引更多的发布者在平台发布任务或共享信息，吸引更多的解答者前来解答问题或咨询信息；众包平台还应对双方进行匹配，以提高间接网络效应和交叉网络效应，增加双方的满意程度。此外，为了提高众包平台对双方的吸引力，众包平台还应对众包流程和信息质量加以控制，确保各方公平参与。 本研究通过对上述五个核心问题的系统研究，创新点体现为如下三点：①本文从全新的研究视角，以众包流程为逻辑从分散到集中的研究思路，综合采用最优化和博弈论等数理模型，实证研究和案例研究等研究范式，分析众包创新中任务发布企业、解答者和众包平台的决策行为，探讨各方参与众包创新的影响因素及最优决策机制。②研究内容方面，根据研究逻辑本文为企业选择采纳众包创新，实施众包创新提供了决策建议；指导解答者提高参与众包创新的中标率；帮助众包平台通过定价机制扩大规模；并从系统角度提出促进众包创新持续发展的策略。③研究结论方面，包括实践启示和理论贡献。本文得到的一系列结论对于众包创新中各参与主体的决策，众包创新的实施、利用与管理都具有非常重要的实践意义和决策参考价值。在理论贡献上，补充了以成本为基础的有限理性框架，在企业决定是否采纳众包创新时应考虑产品研发强度；补充了现有外在动机理论的内容，在解答者参与众包决策的研究中，家人、朋友推荐和扩大自有业务也是众包参与者参与众包的外在动机。总之，本文的研究结论对众包创新的实施、利用和管理，以及各参与主体的决策都具有非常重要实践价值与理论价值。
英文摘要：	With the development of science and information technology, and the progressively implementation of mass entrepreneurship and innovation policy, as well as the constantly emergence of open innovation business mode, crowdsourcing innovation has become a new way of R&D and an important means of scooping innovation from the masses. Crowdsourcing innovation is a way for collecting the mass wisdom at lower cost and risk for companys, and also be able to obtain the needs of the masses timely and precisely, which make crowdsourcing to be the most successful business model. As a result, more and more companies began to carry out the crowdsourcing model to innovation and obtain the mass needs, so as to gain the driving force to promote the development of company. Similarly, the crowdsourcing model can effectively translate the masses labors and intellectual resources into productive forces. The crowdsourcing model also is one of the main channel for the public gaining profits. Based on this, how to implement, apply and manage the crowdsourcing has become a hot topic in the academic world. Existing literatures use the qualitative method to study the participations’ behavior strategy of crowdsourcing, which limited to answer the problem of "what is". Rarely authors answer "why" and “how” to participate the crowdsourcing innovation. So there are no systemic guidance for the adoption and implementation of enterprises, the participation of solvers and the perform of platform. Against the current situation, based on crowdsourcing process and participants, this paper discussesed five questions, using the combination method of mathematical analysis, empirical research and case studies, and theories of optimization theory, auction theory, game theory, two-side market theory and system dynamics theory. The five questions are why and how to implement crowdsourcing for sponsors (enterprises), how to participate for solvers, how to develop the crowdsourcing for platforms and how to promote the sustainable development of crowdsourcing innovation, respectively. Specifically, the detail results and innovation points as follow: (1) Low cost, low risk and high innovation quality are the important reasons that enterprises adopt the crowdsourcing innovation. Based on this, to maximize the profit of company with cost-quality tradeoff, this paper build up the decision-making model of internal innovation and external crowdsourcing. The case analysis find that the R&D intensity also determind the adoption of corwdsourcing. Results shows that enterprises should carry on the internal innovation when the internal innovation cost is lower or the number of solvers are smaller, otherwise adopt crowdsourcing innovation in the conversely situation. When the R&D intensity is higher, enterprises should make innovations to the package. (2) With tow goals of total quality maximization and highest quality maximization, this part obtains the Stackelberg game equilibrium for firms in two crowdsourcing goals, in which how to implement the crowdsourcing is discussed. Combined the empirical study and case analysis, we find that the risk preference of solvers have a positive impact on the total quality and highest quality. Enterprises should implement total quality goal when the solvers are risk avoidance and risk appetite. While enterprises should implement highest quality goal when the solvers are risk neutral. In addition, the case analysis illustrate that the consistency of goals, the normalization of process and the control of crowdsourcing are also the key elements for the success of crowdsourcing innovation. (3) Based on the solvers’ participation motivation, we build up the individual effort model and total effort model, and analyze the optimal decisions of solvers. Then, we explore other factors excepting effort by the data and interview research, which replenishing the mathematical conclusions. Results found that solvers’ effort increase with the rewards and decrease with the number of competitors in the individual effort model. While in the total effort model, the solvers’ effort both increase with the rewards and number of competitors, while the excessive competition would be happened. For extention research, we divide the capability of solvers into low-capability and high-capability. It finds that, the high-ability solvers pay more effort than the low-ability ones; both low and high solvers’ efforts tend to be the same the win probility increased. In addition, with the empirical research and case analysis, we also find that, for solvers’ motivation, besides the internal and external motivation, their family’s or friend's recommendation is also an important influence factor. For the winning factors, apart from their experience, participation strategy and task properties, the good relationship between customers can also affect the solver’s winning probability. (4) According to the two-sided market theory, this paper builds up the platform’s price-decision model, to explore the affection of indirect network effects, cross network effects and the competition on crowdsourcing platform pricing. Results show that, the network effects can promote the growth of platform. The platform, in the short term, should decrease the fee of solvers and increase the fee of sponsors. While the platform could increase the fees of solvers and sponsors in the long run. Furthermore, we also discuss the case of competition between two crowdsourcing platforms, which find that the scale of crowdsourcing platform will increase significantly when initial size bigger or lower fees. The case of witmart.com not only test the basic model but also complete the conclusion. Crowdsourcing platforms should set up different price for different sponsors and solvers.. (5) According to the above content, this section discusses the affection of subsidies and cross network on crowdsourcing contest platform scale, and the affection of quality review and willingness on crowdsourcing community platform scale. We find that the platform should give more subsidies to sponsors and solvers, so as to attract more sponsors and solvers participation. Crowdsourcing platform also should match on both sides, in order to improve the affection of indirect network and cross network. What’s more, in order to improve the attraction of crowdsourcing platform, the platform should control the process and information quality during the crowdsourcing. According to the above five research problems, the innovation points of our thesis are as follow. First is the research perspective. We study the problems from the logic of crowdsourcing process. And we do the research by combining the method of mathematical model, empirical study and case study, which could provide a new perspective and breakthrough for the decision-making mechanism of crowdsourcing. Second is the research contents, which providing adoption and implementation suggestions for enterprises, increasing the successful rate of solvers, helping to expand the scales of crowdsourcing platforms. Third is the research conclusion, which including practical enlightenment and theoretical contributions. For practical enlightenment, the results and sugesstions are good for the implementation, utilization, participation and management of crowdsourcing. For theoretical contributions, we enrich the framework of bounded rationality, which find that firms should consider the strength of R&D when they adopt crowdsourcing. We also complementing the extrinsic motivation theory, which find that the recommendation of friends and expanding their own business are also the external motivation. Above all, the conclusions could provide meaningful practical value and theoretical value for participation, implementation, utilization and management of crowdsourcing.
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