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论文编号：	82
作者编号：	2120051871
上传时间：	2007/6/21 18:04:39
中文题目：	客户化反向拍卖在工程招投标中的
英文题目：	Study on the Application of Cu
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	客户化反向拍卖;工程招投标;模糊
英文关键字：	customized reverse auction;pro
中文摘要：	客户化反向拍卖在电子商务市场中的兴起引发了我们将其运用到工程招投标上的思考。客户化反向拍卖是建立在反向拍卖的基础上，并保证整个拍卖过程体现以客户需求为中心。客户化反向拍卖的特点在于: 在拍卖实施之前必须由拍卖中介完成大量关于客户需求信息的收集工作，在拍卖实施过程中，拍卖中介增加对资源分配的控制。因此，依照客户化反向拍卖这两大特点，本文试图抽象出客户化反向拍卖在工程招投标中的应用，通过建立相应的模型找到最优的招投标机制。在介绍了研究背景和相关文献回顾之后，本文引入了模糊综合评价法，将客户对工程属性的模糊需求转化成定量需求。其次，本文建立了三种客户化拍卖模型并对它们进行了比较分析：第一个模型是以客户收益最大为目标的模型，在该模型里拍卖中介通过控制所显示的客户效用函数以实现客户收益最大化；第二个模型是以系统效率最优化为目标，在该模型里拍卖中介可以严格控制对工程每个属性的需求量；第三个模型仍是以系统效率最优化为目标，与第二个模型不同，在该模型里拍卖中介只能控制所显示的客户效用函数。 研究结果表明：首先，对于这三个模型，参与竞标的投标商数量越大和投标商的成本信息的不确定性程度越小，拍卖中介显示的最优效用函数越接近于客户实际的效用函数。其次，当投标商成本信息的不确定性大小发生变化时，在这三个模型中，客户的支付都会因此产生波动。从数值算例中，我们发现当以系统效率最优作为目标，同时拍卖中介能控制所显示的客户效用函数时，客户支付在成本信息不确定性程度发生变化时是最稳定的。但是，对于这三种模型的应用，应视管理者所要实现的具体目标而定。我们相信把客户化反向拍卖应用到工程招投标中的前景将非常乐观。
英文摘要：	Because of the popularity of customized reverse auction in the e-business world,we show great interest toward its application into project bidding.As an extension of the general reverse auction,the customized reverse auction is customer-oriented.Two main characteristics are involved in the whole process:before holding an auction event,the auctioneer should fully specify all dimensions of a customer's entire order;during the auction,the auctioneer should reinforce his control on the resource allocation.Accordingly,our research tries to establish the auction models,which represent these two characteristics,and to find the optimal mechanism.The balance of this paper is organized as followed:after the introduction and literature review,we convert the customer's fuzzy specifications into quantitive expression by the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation.Then,we compare three different auction models:the first model centers on the optimal mechanism design and the auctioneer can control the customer's payment by announcing the customer's utility function;the second model centers on the efficient mechanism design and the auctioneer can strictly specify the quantity of project's every attribute;the third model still centers on the efficient mechanism design whereas the auctioneer can only control the customer's payment by announcing the customer's utility function. Our conclusion is that, for all these three models, the greater the number of bidders and the less the uncertainty of bidders’ cost, the less the auctioneer deviates from announcing customer’s real utility function. Meanwhile, the uncertainty of the bidders' cost may cause the fluctuation of customer’s payment in all the models and the third model proves most stable from our numerical examples. However, which is the best mechanism depends on the detailed objectives of management. We think that the application of customized reverse auction into project bidding is promising.
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