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论文编号：	80
作者编号：	2120051890
上传时间：	2007/6/21 16:32:42
中文题目：	上市公司负债结构对资本支出的影
英文题目：	The research on the relationsh
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	负债结构;资本支出;相机治理;预<
英文关键字：	leverage structure;capital inv
中文摘要：	本文选取投融资关系的一个侧面——负债结构对企业资本支出的影响进行研究，并且以不同所有制结构下的上市公司样本进行了对比分析，力求考察国有上市公司和非国有上市公司的负债结构对资本支出的影响以及两者之间的差异。 本文以中国深沪市169家上市公司2003年至2005年的相关数据为样本，分别构建了以企业规模、滞后一期的资产负债率、独董比例为控制变量，负债类型(包括银行借款、商业信用和企业债券)与资本支出相关关系、负债期限结构(包括短期负债与长期负债)与资本支出相关关系的多元线形回归模型，并进行了回归分析。实证研究发现：银行借款对上市公司的过度投资行为并未起到相机治理作用，对于国有上市公司更是如此，商业信用也在很大程度上支持了上市公司过度投资；长期负债、短期负债并未发挥出相机治理作用，这种作用的弱化在国有上市公司身上体现得更加突出。 实证结果表明：一方面，我国债权约束机制并没有真正建立。银行的预算软约束与供应商的无约束使得债权人基本上不能对股东/经理的投资歪曲行为进行较好的抑制；另一方面，在我国上市公司特殊的股权结构下，由于众多上市公司股权集中于国家手中，使得经理成为了上市公司的实际控制人，内部人控制现象严重。经理出于自身利益考虑，会将多余的现金投资于非盈利性项目，企业存在过度投资行为；另外，我国上市公司股东/经理与长短期负债债权人之间都存在利益冲突，短期负债的代理成本不仅不是微不足道的，甚至可能高于长期负债的代理成本。 因此在现实中，我们应强化银行贷款的硬约束作用，增强负债的治理效用；同时改善信用环境，提高企业信用；并且大力发展企业债券市场，充分发挥债券的硬约束作用。
英文摘要：	The thesis selects one aspect of relationship between finance and investment to do research. Through comparing listed companies of different ownership, we try to analyze the relationship between their leverage structure and their capital investment, in order to find out the differences of this relationship under different ownership: state-owned and non-state-owned. The thesis is based on 169 listed companies' data from 2003 to 2005, researching on the relationship between leverage structure and investment after controlling for the variables such as the firm’s scale, debt ratio of last year and ratio of independent directors. We find a remarkable positive relationship between state-owned bank loans, commercial credit, long-term loans, short-term loans and capital investment. This indicates that, on one hand, bank loans don’t constrain on firm’s capital investment. This situation is more obvious for state-owned listed companies. Besides, commercial credit supports the excessive investment. On another hand, both long-term loans and short-term loans don’t constrain on the investment behavior, which supposed to be, especially for state-owned listed companies. The result shows that, first of all, the leverage constraint mechanism is not really existed. The creditors can barely control the investment behavior because of the bank loan’s soft-budget and non-constraint of commercial credit; Secondly, under the particular share structure of listed companies, the managers become the real controller of the company, which result in the excessive investment behavior. Finally, there are interest conflicts between shareholder/manager and both long-term, short-term loans creditors, the agency cost of short-term loans can even higher than that of long-term loans. Therefore, in practice, we need to strengthen the hard-budget effect of bank loan; Meanwhile, the credit environment should be improved; Finally, the government need make great efforts on the development of firm’s bond market.
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