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论文编号：	772
作者编号：	2120062003
上传时间：	2008/6/24 10:43:30
中文题目：	中国民营上市公司负债融资偏好及
英文题目：	Research on Debt Financing and
指导老师：	王全喜
中文关键字：	民营上市公司 控制权和现金流权
英文关键字：	Private-listed Companies Div
中文摘要：	自20世纪80年代开始，越来越多的学者研究发现在世界上许多公司存在明显的股权集中现象。La Porta等人沿着控制链条层层追溯发现在很多公司中都存在一个终极控股股东，而且由于金字塔等持股模式的存在，终极控股股东的控制权与现金流权之间存在着一定程度的偏离。 La Porta等的研究开创了对终极控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离问题研究的先河。在终极控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离的情况下，终极控股股东就会利用手中的控制权侵害其他中小股东和公司的利益而获得控制权私人收益，于是就出现了终极控股股东挖空上市公司的“隧道效应”。 融资一直是上市公司所关心的一个重要问题，与公司价值紧密相关，在终极控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离的情况下，终极控股股东往往为了自己利益的最大化而选择有利于自己的融资方式，进而影响公司价值。 本文试图通过规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法研究在我国民营上市公司中终极控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离对负债融资偏好进而对公司价值的影响。本文首先对相关概念进行了界定，并对国内外学者关于终极控制权与现金流权偏离问题的研究成果做了回顾，为本文奠定了理论基础。 在实证研究方面，本文以我国民营上市公司为研究对象，最终选取了2002—2006年共1028家上市公司为样本。在回归方法上对不同的模型根据Hausman检验的结果选用了不同的回归方法。研究结果发现两权偏离程度越大上市公司越不倾向负债融资，在负债融资期限结构方面，两权偏离程度越大，越倾向长期负债和长期借款。实证研究还发现，两权偏离系数与公司价值呈显著的负相关关系，因此两权偏离最终会对公司价值产生负的侵占效应，研究还发现，在民营上市公司中，负债并没有起到其应有的公司治理效应。
英文摘要：	From 1980s,more and more scholars found that most companies in many countries and areas used a concentrated ownership structure. La Porta found many listed companies have only one ultimate controlling shareholder. Many companies use pyramid ownership structure, so there is divergence between control right and cash flow right. The research by La Porta broke new ground of research on control right and cash flow right. If there is divergence between control right and cash flow right in a company, the ultimate controlling shareholder will pursue more private benefits of control by occupying benefits of other shareholders and company. By this way, the ultimate controlling shareholder will hollow out the listed companies, this is called tunneling effect. Corporate financing is very important for listed companies, and it is closely related to the value of the company. If there is divergence between the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control right and cash flow right, the ultimate controlling shareholder will choose a mode of financing which is favor for him in order to maximize his own benefit. This thesis tries to do research on impact of the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholder’s control right and cash flow right on debt financing and corporate value in private-listed companies by normative research and empirical research. First, the thesis defines some related concepts, then review the related research on the divergence between control right and cash flow right, This part lay a theoretical foundation for the whole research. In the part of empirical research, this thesis takes the Chinese private-listed companies as object, and selects 1028 listed companies as sample from year of 2002 to 2006,. In the process of regression analysis, it uses different regression method according to Hausman test. Finally, the research finds if the divergence between control right and cash flow right is great, the company will be inclined to choose equity financing. In the part of debt financing, if the divergence between control right and cash flow right is great, the company will be inclined to choose long-term liabilities and long-term borrowings. It also finds that the divergence of the two rights is negatively related to the corporate value, so the divergence will have a occupation effect on corporate value. The research also finds that in private-listed companies, the debt don’t play the corporate governance role it should have.
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