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论文编号：	7614
作者编号：	1120110770
上传时间：	2015/6/17 18:01:53
中文题目：	IPO中承销商声誉对承销服务价格和质量的影响
英文题目：	Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of IPO Underwriting Services
指导老师：	陈超
中文关键字：	IPO；承销商声誉；承销费；分析师关注；IPO估值
英文关键字：	IPO; undwriter reputation; undwrwriting fee; ananlyst coverage; IPO valuation
中文摘要：	基于承销商声誉的重要性，本文以声誉理论为基础，结合我国的制度背景，在控制发行公司与承销商选择内生性的基础上，研究了实施保荐制以来承销商声誉对IPO承销服务的价格和质量的影响。本文中承销服务的价格和质量均从发行公司的角度定义。承销服务的价格指IPO中发行公司向承销商支付的承销保荐费。承销服务的质量则分别从IPO后分析师关注和IPO估值两个方面考察。使用2004年到2012年A股IPO的公司为样本，本文主要得到以下研究结论。 第一，保荐制以来，承销商声誉资本能为其带来声誉溢价，高声誉承销商收取了较高的承销费。作为IPO项目的具体负责人，保荐代表人声誉同样能增加承销费。但是，保荐代表人声誉与承销费的关系受承销商声誉的影响，高声誉承销商所属保荐代表人声誉能增加承销费，而低声誉承销商所属保荐代表人声誉对承销费没有显著影响。 第二，承销商和保荐代表人声誉与承销费之间关系受发行公司控制权性质和政治关联的影响。在国有企业IPO中，承销商和保荐代表人的声誉对承销费均没有显著影响，在非国有企业IPO中，承销商声誉和保荐代表人声誉均与承销费显著正相关。进一步研究表明，在具有政治关联的非国有企业IPO中，承销商和保荐代表人的声誉效应不显著，在没有政治关联的非国有企业IPO中，承销商和保荐代表人声誉均与承销费显著正相关。 第三，承销商声誉影响发行公司的IPO后分析师关注。相对于低声誉承销商，高声誉承销商更有可能在IPO后为发行公司提供明星分析师关注。由于认证作用，高声誉承销商还能为发行公司吸引到非承销商明星分析师的关注。本文的研究还表明，高声誉承销商承销的发行公司在IPO后有更多的分析师关注。 第四，发行公司控制权性质会影响承销商声誉与IPO后分析师关注的关系。在国有发行公司中，高声誉承销商的认证作用不明显，既没有为发行公司吸引到非承销商明星分析师关注，也没有增加跟踪发行公司的分析师人数。 第五，高声誉承销商能增加估值相对较低的国有企业和非高科技行业企业的IPO估值。 论文共分为六个部分。第一章是引言，介绍了本文的研究问题、研究意义、研究思路、研究的主要内容、研究框架以及研究方法和技术路线等。第二章是文献综述，分别对声誉理论、承销商声誉的研究和承销费的文献进行了梳理。第三章结合我国IPO市场的特殊制度背景，研究了承销商声誉和保荐代表人声誉对IPO承销费的影响。第四章进一步研究了承销商声誉对IPO后分析师关注的影响。第五章研究了承销商声誉对IPO估值的影响。第六章是研究结论与研究展望。 本文的创新之处主要体现在以下几点：第一，立足于我国的制度背景，在控制发行公司与承销商选择内生性的基础上，提供了承销商在IPO承销服务中获取声誉回报的实证证据，补充了现有研究；第二，将IPO承销服务质量拓展至非价格维度，从IPO后分析师关注的角度，研究了承销商声誉对承销服务质量的影响，拓展了承销商声誉问题的研究视角；第三，采用新的代理变量——发行公司IPO时的托宾Q衡量发行公司IPO估值水平，检验了承销商声誉对IPO估值的影响。
英文摘要：	In view of the importance of underwriter reputation, this dissertation analyzes the effect of underwriter reputation on the price and quality of IPO underwriting services since the implementation of the sponsor system. The dissertation is based on the reputation theory, controlling for endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching combining with China’s institutional background. Using A-stock market IPO companies from 2004 to 2012 as samples, the following conclusions are reached: Firstly, underwriter reputation can bring reputation premium, high-reputation underwriters charge high underwriting fees since the sponsor system. As the specific leader of IPO project, sponsoring representative’s reputation can also increase the underwriting fees. However, underwriter reputation will impact on the relationship between sponsoring representative’s reputation and underwriting fees. If sponsor representative belongs to high reputation underwriters, his reputation will increase underwriting fees. On the contrary, sponsor representative reputation of low reputation underwriters does not significantly affect underwriting fees. Secondly, the relationship between the reputation of underwriters and sponsoring representative and underwriting fees is influenced by the issuing firms controlling rights and political connection. In the IPO of state-owned enterprises, the reputation of underwriters and sponsor representative does not significantly affect the underwriting fees. For the IPO of non-state-owned enterprises, there is significantly positive correlation between the reputation of underwriter and sponsor representative and underwriting fees. Further research results show that, on the one hand, the effect of the reputation of underwriters and sponsor representative on underwriting fees is not significant in the IPO of non-state-owned enterprises with political connection. On the other hand, underwriting fees has significant positive correlation with underwriter and sponsor representative reputation in the IPO of non-state-owned enterprises without political connection. Thirdly, underwriter reputation affects the analyst coverage after the issuing firm's IPO. Relative to the low reputation underwriters, high reputation underwriters are more likely to provide star analyst coverage to the issuing firms after IPO. Due to the effect of certification, high reputation underwriters can attract star analyst coverage of non-underwriters for issuers. Research indicates that more analysts will give coverage to the issuing firms underwrote by high reputation underwriters after IPO. Fourthly, the properties of the issuing firms’ controlling rights will affect the relationship between underwriter reputation and analyst coverage after IPO. In state-owned issuing firms, the certification role of high reputation underwriters is limited. It does neither draw attention from the star analyst coverage of non-underwriters, nor does it increase the number of analyst covering the issuing companies. Finally, high reputation underwriters can increase the valuations of IPO for the state-owned enterprises and the enterprises in non-high-tech industry with relatively low valuation. The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, the background and meaning, main contents and structures, research methods, and technique routes etc. are introduced. Chapter 2 is literature review, which presents the reputation theory, and summarizes the relative knowledge of underwriter reputation and underwriting fees, respectively. Combining with the special system background of China’s IPO market, the influence of underwriter reputation and sponsor representative reputation on IPO underwriting fees is analyzed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 makes further study on how underwriter reputation to affect the analyst coverage after IPO. In Chapter 5, the effect of underwriter reputation on IPO valuations is studied. Finally the conclusions and research prospects are given in Chapter 6. The contributions in this dissertation are mainly manifested as follows: Firstly, in view of the system background in China and controlling for endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching, the dissertation provides empirical evidence for the underwriter which gets reputation in the IPO underwriting service. This will be supplement and advancement to the existing research. Secondly, the service quality of IPO underwriting is expanded to the non-price dimension. From the perspective of analyst coverage after IPO, this dissertation analyzes the influences of underwriter’s reputation on the underwriting service quality. It extends the research on the underwriter’s reputation problem. Thirdly, a new proxy variable, i.e. Tobin Q of the issuing company's IPO, is used to measure IPO valuation levels, and to verify the effects of underwriter’s reputation on IPO valuation.
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